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Abstract 
 
This thesis challenges the notion that landscape can be seen or thought 
as a picture i.e. in terms of its modern definition and etymology.  In 
questioning the modern definition of landscape the thesis asks a number 
of specific questions: does the etymology of landscape yield any latent 
meanings which may be profitably explored? Can these be used as the 
basis for a new formulation of landscape i.e. ‘landtext’ or landscape as 
text?  The thesis goes on to consider what the implications of this are. 
 
Importantly, this thesis is practice based which has entailed that the work 
is interdisciplinary in nature, the working method amounts to a dialogue 
between disciplines.  The practice with which the thesis concerns itself is 
photography and it has been a pivotal component of this research to 
consider photography in terms of Jacques Derrida’s expanded field of 
writing.  The photograph as a motif of the metaphysics of presence, a 
Barthesean emanation, is presented in relation to Derrida’s 
grammatology, or generalised system of difference.  Critically this thesis 
asks is photography a form of writing?  If so, what are the consequences 
of this for the relation between photographic writing, or as it is termed 
here, photogrammatology and landtext?  The thesis explores whether 
 7 
intertextuality adequately describe the nexus of relations between each 
of the systems of difference. 
 
Due to the practice led nature of the project, a significant consideration 
has been the implication of a relational, text based understanding of 
practice for the viewer or reader in the gallery.  To this end the thesis 
investigates relational aesthetics vis à vis text with a view to theorising 
photographic practice in a gallery setting in terms of a text which the 
reader enters.  In addition, the role of light in the intertextual relation is 
considered, especially with respect to the articulation of difference. 
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Introduction 
 
The point of departure for this research project is an existing photographic 
practice through which I am largely concerned with borderland spaces, 
an abiding fascination with boundary places such as roundabouts, 
roadside verges and leisure spaces: golf course, park and such like.  The 
motivation for undertaking this research project is to build a framework 
which may facilitate better photographic outputs and to develop a 
practice which is research driven.  In short, I undertake this project in order 
to be a better, more rigorous visual practitioner.  At the outset I have a 
number of frustrations in mind, namely the narrow conceptions involved in 
our everyday commerce with landscapes, that is to say, our general 
understanding of landscape concurs with its modern definition: it is a view, 
a view of natural scenery.  This conception of landscape is too limited, 
and indeed limiting, when considered in relation to my current 
photographic practice, which meditates upon the humanly inscribed 
land around us and wants to call them landscape(s)1.   
 
                                                
1 Lucy Lippard writes: “Concerned photographers have to compete with Arizona 
Highways and the popular scenic calendars beloved of environmental fundraisers, which 
have been dubbed ‘eco-porn’.  And they must deal with the higher toned versions 
made popular by Ansel Adams’ glorious and misleading images of the West, which 
succeed the tough, functional and also grand nineteenth-century expeditionary 
photographs.” ‘Outside (But Not Necessarily Beyond) the Landscape’ Aperture 150 
Winter 1998 p.60 
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However, this naming of landscape cannot come at all costs: it is critical 
that this exploration aims to avoid metaphoric extensions of landscape, 
my interest in the land’s-scape, the shape of the land, is very real.  I 
wonder: how might we articulate these in-between places?  Indeed, a 
rehabilitation of the word landscape is a significant place to start.  
Therefore, I will begin this thesis by asking: to what extent can the modern 
definition of landscape be challenged?  Are there latent meanings which 
can be usefully employed to enrich our understanding of landscape?  
And ultimately for this thesis, can these latencies provide new openings for 
practice?  The method that I will employ will be an etymological overview 
of the word itself through which I will uncover the etymological oversights 
of the modern definition. 
 
One of my enduring interests as a practitioner has been the jostle of 
different activities on the land’s surface, each leaving its trace on the 
land.  This notion of the humanly inscribed landscape contributes to a 
palimpsestic overlay which disciplines such as archaeology unpeel in their 
scientific explorations.  Taking my cue from cultural geographers such as 
James Duncan and Nancy Duncan, I intend to investigate whether we 
can think about this overlaid landscape as a kind of text.  Although, for 
Duncan and Duncan, this way of articulating landscape is metaphorical,2 
I will go further and look at landscape as text.  However, not in terms of an 
ontology of landscape, but as a critical means of understanding our 
relationship with it.  Landscape as text is the way we make landscape, 
both physically through inscription and as a characterisation of our 
experience of it: we read it both sensibly and intelligibly. 
 
                                                
2 James Duncan and Nancy Duncan ‘Ideology and Bliss: the secret landscapes of 
Roland Barthes’ in Writing Worlds: Discourse, text and metaphor in the representation of 
landscape Trevor J. Barnes and James Duncan (eds) 
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The work of Roland Barthes will play a key role in this thesis: he is a theorist 
with whom I experience an affinity, especially in terms of his writing on text 
and early writing on photography.  Whereas his last work, Camera Lucida, 
is a text which I consider to be a misrepresentation of photographic 
practice, a declaration which will be explored and proven in chapters 
two and three.  The duality found in Barthes’ writing will therefore work as 
a backdrop to this study.  I do not intend to bring this right to the fore, 
rather it will act as a ground which informs the course of the work.  Our 
earliest encounter with Barthes will be relative to the discussions on text 
during this first chapter, subsequent to which I will ask: what are the 
consequences of thinking landscape as text?  In particular, in terms of our 
experience of landscape, but also the consequent impact upon 
photographic practice that this suggests.  Indeed, if landscape can be 
configured intellectually and experientially as text, how should we 
articulate the relationship(s) between ‘landtext’ and photography? 
 
In order to begin to formulate an answer to this question, it will be 
necessary to situate myself in the general discourse on photography.  
Therefore, during the second chapter I will investigate the ‘natural’ with 
respect to photographic images, in particular, the realist notion that they 
can be considered to be natural images.  In research which preceded 
this project I investigated the transparency thesis in the analytical tradition 
of philosophy; to an extent, this subject is continued here, albeit from an 
entirely different viewpoint.  This change in perspective is prompted, in 
part, by my decision to pursue a practice-led approach to the research 
process.  To work against what Jan Baetens describes as 
 
the professionalization of the discourse on photography…the 
appropriation of the discourse…by strictly scholarly academics.  The 
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discourse is then no longer held by photographers themselves, who 
are excluded from the very discussions of their own work.3 
 
It is important to note that this work is undertaken within an academic 
context which enables my work as a photographer to be part of the 
process.  Additionally, I intend to focus my attention largely on works of 
philosophy which are considered to fall within the continental tradition.  
However, I am mindful that this distinction, like many rigid definitions, is not 
always clearly defensible.  Notwithstanding this, the second chapter asks: 
is the subject incarnated in the photograph, as Roland Barthes would 
have it, or can we think of photographs as imbroglios, complex objects in 
which the photographer and the apparatus are imbricated?  It is 
therefore my intention to investigate the writing of Vilèm Flusser and Bruno 
Latour as counterpoints to Barthes’ quasi-theological reading of 
photography. 
 
We might argue that the most direct consequence of Barthes’ Camera 
Lucida is the configuration of photography in terms of an economy of 
presence: the subject is brought to presence in or through the 
photograph.  The third chapter of this thesis will set about an exploration 
of photographic presence and its parallels with Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
conviction regarding the proximity of thought and speech, that is, the 
natural unity of the sign.  The photograph’s being-as-presence will be 
considered with particular reference to the philosophical work of Jacques 
Derrida and the art criticism of Rosalind Krauss.  The key question of this 
chapter will be: can we think about photography in general as a practice 
of writing?  If so, what are the attendant consequences of this in terms of 
photographic being-as-presence?  In addition, if photographic images 
                                                
3 Jan Baetens Photography Theory James Elkins (ed) New York; London: Routledge, 2007 
p. 71 
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are considered to be part of a general system of difference, rather than 
tokens in an economy of presence, can we articulate photographic 
practice as writing?  And, what impact might this have on the relation 
between landtext and photography? 
 
In order to tease out the relationship between landtext and photography, 
it will be necessary to return to the implied binarism of photography, the 
inside/outside of camera and world, to address a doubt about the nature 
of this relationship.  Therefore, one of the questions at hand in the fourth 
chapter will be: to what extent does the lens act as a barrier, an 
intervening surface, and indeed, what import does the answer to this 
have on the thesis?  Does the intrinsic/extrinsic prevail as an informative 
binarism in photographic practice, can we take this inside/outside 
opposition to be a product of photography as physis in différance, a 
product of what might called parergonality?  As an inevitable 
consequence of our interest in the parergon, a further question arises: 
does the notion that photographs are textual challenge the photograph 
as aesthetic object? 
 
In articulating landscape as textual surfaces and photographs as the 
product of a textual practice, the inferential answer to the question 
regarding the relationship between landtext and photogrammatology is 
that it is intertextual.  Therefore, in order to test this question, different 
theorisations of the intertext will be considered, from Julia Kristeva to 
Roland Barthes in addition to Jacques Derrida’s notion of textuality.  
Following on from this, I intend to ask: if the lens is one of the producers of 
parergonality, or put more simply, if the lens opens difference, how are we 
to theorise light with regard to all of this?  Looking chiefly at Cathryn 
Vasseleu, I will go on to explore the role that light plays in the putatively 
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intertextual relationship between the two systems of writing looked at in 
this thesis: landscapes and photography.   
 
The final chapter of the thesis will investigate more fully the consequences 
of thinking landscape and photography as generalised systems of 
difference.  Returning to the work of Roland Barthes, I will once again 
question text, but this time from the point of view of text as productivity.  
The parallel between Barthesean notions of text and Nicolas Bourriaud’s 
writing in Relational Aesthetics will be considered, bringing text and 
relational systems of difference into the gallery context.  I will ask: to what 
extent can we think about the gallery space as relational, that is a space 
which is open, which encourages textual relationships that are woven in 
their nature?  Considering the gallery in these terms also enables us to ask: 
is the gallery an intertextual space and what is the significance of this for 
the reader/viewer of the work?  To attempt to answer this in Barthesean 
terms I will look at his writing in ‘Theory of the Text’ which is concerned with 
the loss of the subject in text, a process which Barthes refers to as 
‘significance’4.  
 
The ideas of loss and ‘signifiance’ will then be explored in relation to 
landscape.  It is my intention, at the close of the thesis, to return to where I 
began, with landscape, in order to ask: what impact does the theme of 
difference have on our understanding of landscape?  Following readings 
on ideas relating to difference, text, writing and landscape, I will explore 
the conception of landscape in terms of the textual sublime.  Is landscape 
in difference, landscape as text under the ever-changing touch of light to 
                                                
4 Roland Barthes ‘Theory of the Text’ in Untying the text: a post-structuralist reader Robert 
Young (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 p.40 
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be theorised as an instance of the textual sublime: in other words, is 
landtext always, already the difference of itself? 
 19 
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I An Overview of the Terrain 
 
I begin this chapter with a question in mind: what do I understand 
landscape to be?  If we come to the question etymologically, we seem to 
find a straightforward answer: a landscape is a picture or it is a view; it is a 
picture of scenery or scenery seen as a picture.  However, this does not 
fully answer my question.  The idea that landscape is a view, a picture of a 
picture, raises still more questions, such as, where is the edge of the view 
and how do we define its parameters?  At what point does landscape 
return to land?  Additionally, in calling certain areas landscapes, we are 
confronted by the idea that certain parts of the world are aesthetically 
privileged; they are special tracts of land, to be seen from somewhere. 
 
This etymological conception of landscape is partial insofar as it takes the 
modern origins of the word to be definitive and indeed the landscape 
itself to be definable.  In addition, the notion that landscapes are pictures 
is partial in terms of its inadequacy in the face of the richness of 
experience in landscape, the sense that we can be both within as well as 
distanced from the landscape.  With these reservations about ‘landscape 
as view’ in mind, I intend to probe a little more deeply into the etymology 
of the word itself in order to flush out any latencies which may be 
profitably explored.  Part of this etymological investigation will be a look at 
the writing of John Brinkerhoff Jackson and his notion that landscape is a 
synthetic space.  For Jackson, the landscape is a collection of lands tied 
together, and this interweaving of social spaces resonates with an entirely 
different reading of landscape i.e. landscape is a text not a picture. 
 
To conceive of landscape as text is not entirely new, it is an idea which 
has been theorised by cultural geographers.  However, this has tended to 
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be a metaphorical description, a generative metaphor for landscape, 
which I consider merits much deeper enquiry.  Firstly, it should be 
investigated in terms of our general experience of being immersed in 
landscape and secondly, on a more personal level, the enquiry will help 
me to come to an understanding of my own photographic landscape 
practice. A significant approach that this research project has taken, is 
the photographic investigation of the physical landscape as a process or 
means of questioning the idea landscape, in both images and words.  My 
research is informed by a practice led enquiry into the landscape around 
us, and the extent to which it is culturally actualised.  So, what do we 
mean by landscape; is it tangible, or just an outmoded term of reference?  
To this end, I will briefly look at Ferdinand de Saussure and Roland Barthes 
with a view to progressing in some depth the final stages of the shift from 
landscape as picture, to landscape as text. 
 
In everyday speech it is hard to dissociate landscapes from views and 
pictures.  Is this simply a matter of convention, or is there something latent 
in the word which makes us susceptible to these interpretations?  That is to 
say, does the word landscape mean view or picture?  In ‘Writing Moods’ 
James Elkins argues that scholarship of gardens is less rigorously practised 
than that of art history, therefore thinking the garden has a mildly soporific 
effect: an incitement to reverie.  “[O]ur writing,” argues Elkins, “evinces a 
mental state close to both hypnosis and dreaming.”5  I wonder if we are 
walking in a state of reverie in the landscape, content to think of the 
landscape as a pleasing view whilst there are historical, etymological, 
aesthetic and political positions secreted in the term which we are too 
hypnotised to recognise? 
                                                
5 James Elkins ‘Writing Moods’ in Landscape Theory James Elkins and Rachel Ziady DeLue 
(eds,) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 p.81 
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To a photographer, the question of the landscape does seem to be 
particularly vexed.  I intend to touch this apologist stance towards 
landscape a little later, but here are some words from New Scottish 
Photography, discussing the work of Peter Cattrell which point to this sense 
of discomfort and anxiety: 
 
Like any contemporary landscape photographer working in a 
representational or ‘straight’ manner, Peter Cattrell is aware that it is, 
ideologically-speaking, a problematic undertaking.  For it is argued 
that every manner of edifying representation, from an early 
nineteenth-century oil painting of a misty glen, to the kind of thing that 
adorns postcards, simply reinforces a cosy, complicit view of nature 
that denies the present day realities of the new landscape mythology 
of corporate grouse shoots and NATO.6 
 
Depicting the natural landscape (if any such thing could even be said to 
exist) does not interest me in my role as a photographic practitioner.  My 
principal visual interest has been human intervention in, and relationship 
with, the land, especially through the creation of pseudo-natural leisure 
spaces and the intaglio marks left on the land by work activities such as 
farming, peat cutting, quarrying and so on: landscape, in this sense is a 
mediation between leisure and work.  Earlier preoccupations of my visual 
practice were borderland spaces: almost non-places, such as planted 
roundabouts, edges of towns, parks, gardens, golf courses.  Examples, I 
observe with hindsight, of Michel Foucault’s notion of the heterotopia.7  
                                                
6 David Brittain, New Scottish Photography: a critical review of the work of seventeen 
photographers, Edinburgh: Scottish National Portrait Gallery, 1990, p.102 
7 These borderland spaces are heterotopian insofar as they are places of difference, or 
Otherness.  They are Other places, places of leisure, or collections (the garden), or 
boundary spaces which are articulated by the convergence of various social spaces.  In 
the case of large pedestrian access roundabouts, they have no real function other than 
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However, my current overarching frame of reference is landscape and 
the man-made.  The question of whether these spaces belong to the 
landscape genre is not at issue here: I will take as a start point 
W.J.T.Mitchell’s notion that the “[l]andscape is not a genre of art but a 
medium.”8  The landscape is both medium and message.  Landscapes 
have different meanings for different people: landscapes are always 
already representations.  Through this chapter, I will move away from the 
notion of the landscape as a picture, seen from a particular place, 
towards a conception of the landscape as a kind of text, a palimpsest of 
marks and traces of social activity.  The landscape in this sense can be 
thought as a surface upon which culture writes itself, indeed, as is 
consonant with the notion of palimpsest, the landscape is always already 
written.  One cultural practice overwrites another, accreting the trace of 
these activities: the landscape is a collage of traces, overlaid on the 
surface of the land. 
 
I therefore intend to focus my attention away from the ‘edifying 
representation’ of the landscape, towards the everyday landscape.  The 
everyday landscape which, we might argue, is a cultural representation.  
In ‘Frameworks for Cultural Landscape Study’, Paul Groth writes 
 
For writers in cultural landscape studies, the term landscape means 
more than a pleasing view of scenery.  Landscape denotes the 
interaction of people and place…All human interaction with nature 
can be considered as cultural landscape: the high-style cathedral or 
                                                
to pass through but are often transformed into leisure spaces by the addition of seasonal 
planting and benches.   
8 W.J.T. Mitchell ‘Imperial Landscape’ in Landscape and Power (Second Edition) 
Chicago, Ill.; London: University of Chicago Press, 2002 p.5 
 26 
office tower, as well as the Depression-era Hooverville hut, a farmer’s 
barbed-wire fence, or a kitchen garden.9 
 
For cultural geographers landscape is culturally actualised.  The study of 
the cultural landscape is the study of human relationships with nature: the 
term landscape denotes human intervention in the land as nature.  It is as 
a result of the manipulations of humankind that nature is cultured as 
landscape.  Whilst a deep and systematic study of nature is far beyond 
what I have set out to achieve here (it would be both voluminous and all 
consuming), the problematic of nature does require some comment, if 
not by way of the philosophical clarification of the matter, but at the very 
least, an analysis of my emerging attitude to nature, if only in semantic 
terms.  However, as we proceed through the thesis, it should become 
clear that ideas about nature inform the argument, specifically in relation 
to text, which we shall come to in this chapter in due course. 
 
Considered in the terms above, the representation of the landscape 
through painting, and by extension, the ‘landscape as view’, is the 
figuration of man’s relationship with nature.  The material landscape, a 
surface which indicates human interactions with nature, implies that 
landscape is a mode of mediation10 between culture and nature, either in 
terms of landscape overwriting, or landscape as a play of Derridean 
differencing: landscape writing culture, writing nature.  I intend to explore 
this more fully later, but, for the time being at least, I shall observe that the 
                                                
9 Paul Groth ‘Frameworks for Cultural Landscape Study’ in Understanding Ordinary 
Landscapes Paul Groth and Todd W. Bressi (eds) New Haven Conn.; London: Yale 
University Press, c1997 p.1 
10 W.J.T. Mitchell: “Landscape is a natural scene mediated by culture.  It is both 
represented and presented space, both a signifier and a signified, both a frame and 
what a frame contains, both a real place and its simulacrum, both a package and the 
commodity inside the package.” ‘Imperial Landscape’ Landscape and Power Chicago, 
Ill.; London: University of Chicago Press, 2002 p.5 
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differentiation between culture and nature follows a structuralist binarism.  
That is, we come to understand our human selves, society etc, in 
opposition to nature.  Culture is incomprehensible without a tacit 
reference to nature.  It was the structuralist linguist Roman Jackobson who 
wrote 
 
In oppositive duality, if one of the terms is given, then the other, 
though not present, is evoked in thought.  To the idea of white there is 
opposed only that of black, to the idea of beauty that of ugliness, to 
the idea of large that of small, to the idea of closed that of open, and 
so on.  Opposites are so intimately interconnected that the 
appearance of one of them inevitably elicits the other.11 
 
But, as Jackobson and Jacques Derrida remind us, paradigmatic 
oppositions such as white and black, culture and nature, are rarely 
neutral, that is ideologically equally weighted.  Either of the terms is likely 
to be naturalised according to the dominant ideology of a given culture.  
This is to say, the unmarked term will be taken to represent the universal, 
natural position.  The dominant term implies priority over its opposite, it is 
hierarchically elevated, whilst the marked term is Other, outside of the 
universalising category. 
 
Therefore, for human society, culture is the dominant term (especially in 
terms of classic Cartesian binarism which takes the mind and body to be 
opposed dualities).  Nature fulfils the needs of culture from raw materials 
to the provision of a space for leisure.  Man as culture is systematically 
posited as the paradigmatic opposite of nature, and, argue feminist 
theorists, woman.   
                                                
11 Roman Jakobson cited by Daniel Chandler in Semiotics: the basics 2nd edition, New 
York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007 p.91 
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Man, in biblical theology, is 
prior to woman and the ideal 
cultural subject (male) posits 
woman as nature, subjugated 
under the power of the male 
gaze.  Although a feminist 
critique of scopic regimes, 
including the thesis on the 
male gaze, is well beyond 
what I hope to achieve here, 
the relationship between vision 
and power, and the 
disembodied ‘cool’ gaze of 
the ideal (male) viewer, does 
inform my thesis.  Whilst I do 
not intend to subject the 
seer/seen dyad to exhaustive 
scrutiny, by the very nature of this project: a photographic enquiry (with its 
attendant ocular metaphor) into the landscape (the body of the land as 
seen object), certain binary oppositions will inevitably require some 
thought along the way. 
 
In order to critically review the optical objectifications of photography 
(taken to be a Sontagian mode of seeing) the thesis will take the position 
that photography is a form of writing.  I will also present an argument 
which investigates the premise that the landscape can be thought about 
in terms of text.  Taken as such we might argue that the text of landscape 
is rewritten photographically, landscapes are reinscribed through the 
photographic register.  Consequently, I will explore the question whether 
We Won’t Play Nature to Your Culture, Barbara Kruger, 1983 
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photographic practice may be described as being intertextual in nature.  
However, such conclusions are still a long way off and therefore this first 
chapter will form an exploration of the idea that the landscape can be 
taken to be a text.  Firstly, I intend to look at the modern etymological 
conventions of the word landscape.  Next, I will explore an alternative to 
this, presented by the American landscape theorist John Brinkerhoff 
Jackson.  I then intend to investigate the word text and will consider the 
tensions between text, writing and landscape, reframing Jackson’s 
definition of ‘the word itself’ in the context of Roland Barthes’ ideas of the 
semiotics and Text to be found in ‘Myth Today’ and ‘From Work to Text.’  A 
short exegesis of some of Ferdinand de Saussure’s ideas from the Course in 
General Lingustics will provide some background to the Barthesean Text.   
 
II Re-picturing Landscape 
 
According to modern etymological sources, the word landscape was first 
seen in the English language during the late sixteenth century.  It was a 
term exported from the Dutch language, landskip literally landship, across 
the sea to England.  Landskip was a vessel which carried the associations 
of picturing, which have remained in the language ever since.  For 
landskip was a pictorial representation of natural inland scenery, it was a 
painter’s term meaning the picture of the view rather than the view itself.  
It was not until the seventeenth century that views of natural scenes 
began to be called landscapes.  However, by this point the precedent 
had been set: to talk of landscapes, is to talk of pictures; either pictures of 
the land, or the land itself seen as a picture. 
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The scholar, Thomas Blount writes of landscape in his Glossographica of 
1656: 
 
Lanskip, Parergon, Paisage, or By-work, which is an expressing of the 
Land, by Hills, Woods, Castles, Valleys, Rivers, Cities, etc as far as may 
be shewed in our Horizon.  All that which in a picture is not of the body 
or argument thereof is Landskip, Parergon or bywork.12  
 
                                                
12 Thomas Blount cited by John Fowles in Fay Godwin: Land, London: Heinemann, 1985 
p.xv 
Woman at a Window, Caspar David Friedrich ,1822 
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Blount elucidates the conception that the landscape is a staging device 
for the accomplishments of man: the landscape is a bywork, a 
background for human activity.  Landscape considered in this way 
amounts to sceneography: a stage set for the dramatisations of culture.  
The landscape as natural place is turned into a spectacle to be seen from 
somewhere.  Thus the word comes to the twenty-first century reader 
replete with the convention of a viewing subject surveying a viewed 
object: the landscape as picture is the objectification of the land by a 
viewer set at a distance from the scene.  The spectacle of nature is seen 
from a privileged vantage point, that is, outside of nature: a cultural 
vantage point. Indeed, the modern definition of the syllable -scape is that 
it enables a combinative noun formation which denotes “a view or 
representation of a view”13. 
 
The landscape, aesthetically privileged nature with the idea of the ideal 
viewer written in, is Other to our daily lives.  The implied viewer looking at 
the landscape makes the landscape into a spectacle: the act of looking 
is a gesture of re-viewing an ideal scene, which according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, is natural (it is not worked).  As Raymond Williams writes: 
 
A working country is hardly ever a landscape.  The very idea of 
landscape implies separation and observation.14 
 
One might conjecture that based on this assumption, the landscape is a 
place of leisure and escape.  The landscape, other to the working 
countryside, is a place to which one travels in a touristic or leisure mode, 
to observe and enjoy.  This notion of the landscape is separate from the 
                                                
13 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9th Edition Della Thomson (ed) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995 p.1231 
14 Raymond Williams The Country and the City London: Chatto & Windus, 1973 p.120 
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urban and also the rural.  It seems that, under this conception, the 
landscape entails non-working untamed wilderness: the landscape is a 
place of Otherness, separate from our commonplace lives.   
 
Indeed, this idea of the landscape as a picture, a privileged view with an 
implied viewer, precipitates an engagement with nature which is firmly 
located in an artistic tradition, that is, in terms of landscape, nature is 
cultural from the outset.  John Brinkerhoff Jackson writes that: 
 
It was [the artist’s] task to take the forms and colo[u]rs and spaces in 
front of him – mountains, rivers, forest, fields, and so on – and compose 
them so that they made a work of art…the word gradually changed 
in meaning.  First it meant a picture of a view; then the view itself.  We 
went into the country and discovered beautiful views, always 
remembering the criteria of landscape beauty as established by 
critics and artists.  Finally…we undertook to make over a piece of 
ground so that it resembled a pastoral landscape in the shape of a 
garden or park.15 
 
Thus if we are to follow the developments of the word landscape in the 
period after the sixteenth century, we could say that nature is judged and 
engaged with according to the aesthetic principles of art.  The 
landscape, thought of in terms of the picturing of nature is very much a 
cultural product: landscape is modelled on art rather than nature. 
 
However, the notion of the landscape as privileged place is by no means 
modern.  It has been a feature of European culture since the first century 
BC.  The Idylls of the Greek poet Theocritus (c. 308-240 BC) celebrated 
                                                
15 John Brinkerhoff Jackson Discovering the Vernacular Landscape New Haven, Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, c1984 p.3 
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spring landscapes featuring Sicilian herdsmen, far from the city: pastoral, 
blissful and peaceful.  These idyllic scenes are said to initiate the locus 
amoneus, or ‘lovely place’, which becomes a major theme for landscape 
artists.  The pastoral celebration of the place of agriculture, which extols 
the virtues of a simple life, reputedly begins with the Roman writer Virgil 
writing the Georgics late in the first century BC. Whilst it is not until the 
seventeenth century AD that the aesthetic categories of the landscape 
are more clearly defined, the idea that the landscape has a taxonomy 
either as ‘lovely place’ or, place of agriculture emerges in this early 
period.  It appears that the appreciation of the landscape, mediated by 
art and literature is not just a sixteenth century phenomenon.  The notion 
that the landscape is not part of the main body or argument but a 
background for narrative derives from literature as generative of the 
major themes concerning landscapes.  The landscape was a stage 
instruction for the eye. 
 
The propensity to divide of the landscape into a hierarchy of types16 
demonstrates that our engagement with the land is fragmentary and can 
be easily characterised.  This general differentiation of the landscape from 
land argues in favour of a privileged view, based on cultural assumptions.  
For example, the differentiation between countryside and town, the 
aesthetic properties of particular landscapes and the extent to which 
certain landscapes embody particular cultural ideals and ideas.  Thus the 
landscape is classified according to historical and social contexts and our 
tastes begin to inform the view.  As Nicholas Green writes in his 
Introduction to The Spectacle of Nature: 
                                                
16 Ermeonville, an encyclopaedic garden comprised of landscape types i.e. Arcady, 
Elysium, wilderness (désert), farm, forest, castle, dolmen, château etc.  This was a 
picturesque garden, landscaped after the estate in a novel by Jean Jacques Rousseau 
where he eventually died.  Much of it is now privately owned but some is retained by the 
state as the Parc Jean Jacques Rousseau. 
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My reading of the view through the window suggests that the sense to 
be made of something called nature is already shaped by a complex 
network of expectation and interpretation grounded in social 
experience.17 
 
Indeed, as Green points out, the ideas that we have about nature and 
place, inform the “kinds of cultural map we carry around in our heads and 
act out in our daily lives.”18  I would argue that the classification of 
landscape in terms of its aesthetic properties, or the effect that 
landscapes have on viewers, and the idea that landscapes are scenes 
which imply the presence of an ‘ideal’ viewer, all contribute to a cultural 
map of the landscape which we carry with us, a mental map, which we 
could argue, disregards the full complexity of the actual landscape.  In a 
sense, this particular cultural map is of landscape as aesthetically 
privileged; other to our daily lives, a place of aesthetic contemplation.  
But the landscape is a profoundly social space, seen and described in 
contested terms by various viewers, and therefore it is my intention to 
challenge this idea and to investigate alternative typologies of the 
landscape which typify my concerns as a practising photographer. 
 
We might argue that it would be better to dispense with the word 
landscape altogether.  That ‘landscape’, the word itself, is problematic 
and has no real bearing as the term may be substituted by a range of 
alternatives: terrain; environment; or space.  Landscape expresses a kind 
of heterogeneity of space which these terms perhaps do not.  Indeed, as 
we shall see from the etymological analysis of the word which follows, 
                                                
17 Green, Nicholas, The Spectacle of Nature: Landscape and Bourgeois Culture in 
Nineteenth-Century France Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990 p.1 
18 Ibid p.4 
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landscape is not explicitly connected either to pictures or even to 
nature.19  There are latencies in the word landscape, which provide 
inferences that differ significantly from the words ‘space’, ‘terrain’, 
‘environment’.  As I hope to demonstrate in due course, these 
etymological effects are fertile grounds for thought which makes the case 
for an approach which rehabilitates the word landscape, rather than 
simply substituting it for another term entirely. 
 
The term landscape is often rejected because it is so laden with meanings 
relating to artistic practice and the picturesque.  However, the word 
landscape denoting firstly a picture, then a view of natural scenery, was, 
according to John Brinkerhoff Jackson, re-introduced into English in the 
sixteenth century.  He argues that the word was first brought to Britain 
sometime after the fifth century AD by the Angles, Saxons, Danes and 
Jutes and its early usage has another sense entirely.  According to 
Jackson’s account, landscape is a compound of land and -scape, which 
he subjects to a close etymological analysis in ‘The Word Itself’ from his 
book Discovering the Vernacular Landscape.  I do not intend to represent 
his entire argument here, suffice it to say, land has a wide variety of 
etymological beginnings from: soil; sovereign territory; strip division of a 
field; to a ridge in a ploughed field.  Land means a defined space, an 
area on the surface of the world which may be ploughed, grassed and 
grazed, or ruled over.  It is a  
 
                                                
19 Even in Dutch landscape paintings of the sixteenth century, the very era of the 
etymology of the word we are about to explore, the view was rarely if ever entirely 
‘natural’.  It would often include a cityscape, the landowner’s prospect or the sea with 
trading vessels.  Dutch landscapes were far more than pictures of natural scenery. 
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remarkably versatile word, but always implying a space defined by 
people, and one that could be described in legal terms.20 
 
Anne Whiston Spirn argues that land is a word for both the physical place 
and its population.  Thus landscape ties together people and place and 
the suffix –scape in Nordic and Germanic languages is strongly associated 
with shaping: landscape is both place shaped by people, and people 
shaped by place.  Although the second syllable of the compound (i.e. 
scape) resonates with the idea of space, etymologically it has no 
connection with this concept.  David Hay observes in Landscape Theory 
that  
 
those misunderstandings of the word landscape are actually a double 
false etymology.  When people define landscape, they actually take –
scape as –scope, as if it pertained to vision.  But it does not.21 
 
However, certain theorists argue that in spite of this philological 
misreading of the word, landscape does pertain to vision insofar as it is 
intimately bound to the notion of either the picture or the prospect.  
Kenneth R. Olwig points out that he agrees in principle with Hay’s 
statement, although he argues that it is important not to forget that the 
Netherlandish landscape artist was indeed associating the word 
landscape with vision.  The artist apprehends the land from a suitable 
vantage point, for the purposes of picturing, the picture in turn embodies 
a set of ideological assumptions. 
 
                                                
20 John Brinkerhoff Jackson Discovering the Vernacular Landscape New Haven, Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, c1984 pp.6-7 
21 David Hay in ‘The Art Seminar’ Landscape Theory James Elkins and Rachel Ziady DeLue 
(eds) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 p. 93 
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Yet, insofar as the early landscape painters of the low lands did paint 
regions (in the sense of country or land) as seen in prospect, they were 
nevertheless engaging visually with the idea represented by the suffix 
–scape at a time when –scape did not signifiy –scope, but something 
quite different.  The nether lands artists (sic)…gains a wide prospect 
over the country below, which gives an overall view of the character, 
or shape, of the land that would not be visible closer up.  –Scape 
became identified with –scope because the distant view provided 
one way of abstracting the abstract quality of a region, country, or 
land’s-scape.22 
 
Thus –scape collapses into –scope as it refers to the ideology of ownership 
and the view: the notion of the prospect.  The distanced view thus 
enables the artist to foreground the “abstract quality” of the “land’s-
scape”23: existing conceptions about the land, i.e. ownership, cultural 
difference, identity, nationhood.  Inserting distance between the viewer 
and the land shows the distinctive characteristics (natural and cultural) of 
a region: the distanciation enables the land’s-scape to be revealed.  This 
implies that the landscape is objectifiable: the viewing subject has the 
landscape in the centre of his vision.  The subject (in Descartes’ terms, 
implicitly male) holds the landscape in the cone of his visual field and this 
distance separates the viewer and the viewed into subject and object: 
the prospect is a matter of ownership. 
 
The prospect is thus connected to the revelation of the land’s shape, the 
visual perception of the shape of the land, rather than the idea of 
landscape as view.  The –scape of landscape needs to be disassociated 
from –scope.  Indeed in Old English the suffix (from the Germanic –scipe) 
                                                
22 Kenneth R. Olwig ‘The “Actual Landscape,” or Actual Landscapes’ Landscape Theory 
James Elkins and Rachel Ziady DeLue (eds) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 pp. 163-164 
23 Ibid. 
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also has an association with collectives and groupings of people.  –Ship is 
defined by the Concise Oxford English Dictionary as “the collective 
individuals of a group (membership)”24.  J. B. Jackson argues that the suffix 
once meant “a composition of similar objects as when we speak of a 
fellowship or membership.”25  In Old English –scape denotes a variety of 
elements collected in the environment.  He cites the related English word 
“sheaf” as an example: a sheaf is a bundle or collection of similar stalks.  
Jackson writes: 
 
It is as much as if the words had been coined when people began to 
see the complexities of the man-made world.  Thus homescape 
meant what we would now call a household, and a word of the same 
sort which we still use – township – once meant a collection of “tuns” 
or farmsteads. 
 
Taken apart in this manner, landscape appears to be an easily 
understood word: a collection of lands.26 
 
So from this derivation of the compound of two words, we can infer that 
the landscape is not a fragment of the world which can be taken in at a 
glance, but a place shaped by people, a collection of lands.  This much 
older use of the word suggests the division of land based around social 
uses, and as Jackson intimates, this could be demonstrative of a human 
response to the increasing complexity of the man-altered environment.  
According to his account the landscape is a vernacular space. 
 
                                                
24 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Della Thomson (ed) Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995 p.1278 
25 John Brinkerhoff Jackson Discovering the Vernacular Landscape New Haven, Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, c1984 p.7 
26 Ibid 
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Thus in these divergent definitions of landscape, i.e. particular place 
versus general sign, there are a number of issues at play.  The older sense 
of landscape: the interconnectedness of people and place; has been 
erased from modern dictionaries in an effort to counteract the conflicts in 
the meaning of the word.  Olwig cites Pierre Bourdieu who writes that the 
dictionary  
 
assembles, by scholarly recording, the totality of the linguistic 
resources accumulated in the course of time and, in particular, all the 
possible uses of the same word (or all the possible expressions of the 
same sense), juxtaposing uses that are socially at odds, and even 
mutually exclusive (to the point of marking those which exceed the 
bounds of acceptability with a sign of exclusion such as Obs., Coll. or 
Sl.)  It thereby gives a fairly exact image of language as Saussure 
understands it, “the sum of individual treasuries of language,” which is 
predisposed to fulfil the functions of a “universal” code.27 
 
The overlay of a certain sense of the word landscape in the modern 
dictionary exemplifies the manner in which particular cultural ideas are 
enabled to dominate: the absence of an old etymology of landscape 
traces the dominant ideology. The dictionary as a model of Saussurean 
universality underplays the discordances of meaning in order to obfuscate 
the significance of contradictory parole(s).  Thus, using the definition of 
landscape as an example, the modern dictionary is logocentric in its 
tendency to marginalise discordant meanings.  This has given rise to a 
fixed, yet entirely fallible and fractional definition of the word landscape.  
Landscape, in the modern sense, is laden with the ‘imperialism’ of the 
                                                
27 Pierre Bourdieu cited by Kenneth R. Olwig in Landscape Theory James Elkins and 
Rachel Ziady DeLue (eds) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 p.160 
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view and the ideology of prospect and ownership.  The sign landscape is 
naturalised as a view of scenery. 
 
However, the notion of manmade spaces which articulate boundaries 
and strata, overlaid on and in the land, opens the idea of the landscape 
as laminated, worked over: a changing collage of the traces of different 
uses.  Landscape is a patchwork of spaces, the borderlands between 
different zones of practice are in certain places clearly defined, but in 
others they are liminal.   
 
A landscape is not a natural feature of the environment but a 
synthetic space, a man-made system of spaces superimposed on the 
face of the land, functioning and evolving not according to natural 
laws but to serve a community – for the collective character of the 
landscape is one thing that all generations and all points of view have 
agreed upon.28 
 
The evolution of landscape is not natural but cultural: the engaging point 
about landscape is that it is both the product of a collective and a 
collection of spaces.  The function of the landscape is to serve the 
community who lives upon the land.  But if we rethink the ‘collective 
character’ in terms of the etymology of the –ship of landscape, it is the 
relativity of the collection which is important i.e. a membership is 
constituted by particular individuals.  Thus place is defined in terms of the 
relational character of landscape.  The documentation (recollecting) of 
these places is a kind of chorography of synthetic spaces, which in some 
sense at least are also collections in their own right. 
 
                                                
28 Ibid p.8 
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Indeed if we are to reflect upon the British landscape, there is very little 
about it which could be described as natural or original.  Since Neolithic 
times, the land has been manipulated and transformed, by the accretion 
of traces of human activities such as farming and homemaking.  The 
surface of the world is subject to relative re-arrangements through 
seasonal variation in agriculture or other local occurrences such as felling, 
quarrying and road building.  The landscape is the material vestige of 
processes of change, both natural and man induced; it is the tablet upon 
which we trace our culture in the very broadest sense.  It is through 
cultural activities such as farming, sport and travel that we inscribe 
ourselves in and on the land. 
 
We discussed the culturing of nature earlier in this chapter, and an 
interesting example of this cyclical reference from historic landscape to 
art to contemporary landscape, is the conservation of the Danish 
landscape around Copenhagen: 
 
Contemporary Danish landscapes…are being shaped today by 
nineteenth-century paintings of the Danish “Golden Age,” which 
once were shaped, in turn, by the character of the rural landscape 
near Copenhagen.  Take the area around Lejre, a cultural landscape 
that was idealized by Golden Age painters and celebrated by poets, 
that now is protected by law as scenery of historic national 
significance.  Lejre is now a bedroom community, but certain farms 
must remain in crops, even though owned by a doctor or 
businessman.29 
 
                                                
29 Anne Whiston Spirn Landscape Theory James Elkins and Rachel Ziady DeLue (eds) New 
York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 pp.110-111 
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This example of the conserved landscape of Lejre, re-pictures the land so 
that the actual landscape is a representation of a socially defined reality 
derived through reference to art history, which in turn references literature.  
The actual landscape of Lejre could be thought of as a picture of a 
picture.  However, under Jackson’s challenge, the landscape as picture 
has given way to an idea of landscape which is a collection of man-
made spaces.  The landscape of Ljere is a potent reminder of the very 
historicity of the land, the notion that the landscape is culturally inscribed.  
However, rather than describing this landscape as a picture of a picture, it 
should be thought as a re-representation: a palimpsestic overlay.   
 
The synthetic space, overlaid on the land’s surface is formed by activities 
which rewrite the appearance of the landscape.  Thus the landscape in 
Jackson’s account is dynamic.  The unique sense of place (genius loci) is 
informed by this collective tracery, yet it is also undermined or erased by 
it.  If landscape is dynamic, always moving, there is no genius loci, 
perhaps there is a moment of uniqueness, but no sense in which place 
endures.  Therefore, natural landscape is not marked out as culture’s 
Other: landscape is not natural but made.  Additionally, Jackson’s 
definition of the landscape proposes the idea that place is a set of 
collections, collections in space. 
 
III Other Places: Towards Landscapes of Difference 
 
It may be argued that this line of argumentation amounts to a denial of 
natural landscapes, although the influence of human intervention means 
that there are indeed very few unspoiled places on the globe.  However, 
the veneration of wild places has its own history, which is intimately 
connected with changing ideas about the city and travel.  In short, 
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nature, not in itself, but as defined in human terms, is cultural.  Nature’s 
very conception as nature reflects a set of human values.  The difficulty 
here is that nature resists definition: pure nature, that is, nature in itself, is 
noumenal, we will never know it other than through our experience of it.  
Physis itself eludes us.  We might argue that humankind is part of nature – 
this does not resolve the problematic, it merely shifts its locality from the 
duality nature/culture in the world, to the human as duality itself: both 
natural and cultural.  However, Jacques Derrida argues, as we shall see 
later, that the binary categories nature and culture are produced rather 
than inherent in being.  They are the products of the differential and 
deferred play of différance.  The natural and the cultural are eternal 
differences of the same: physis in différance.   
 
In order to develop the conception of landscape as place in difference, I 
would now like to briefly turn my attention to Michel Foucault’s notion of 
the heterotopia.  This will enable us to look at landscape in terms of the 
heterotopia, or place of otherness, especially with respect to the National 
Park.  In particular, I intend to look at the landscape photographs of 
Yosemite taken by Ansel Adams and Stephen Shore.  These images 
elucidate Foucault’s point that the heterotopia contests the very utopian 
ideal that it purports to represent. 
 
According to Foucault, the heterotopia is a space of otherness and 
difference.  For Foucault, the world is a set of structural/spatial relations, 
and those relations which are of significance to Foucault relate in a 
particular way to time.  These “emplacements”30 as he calls them, fall into 
two categories: the utopia and the heterotopia.  The utopia is an ideal 
                                                
30 Michel Foucault ‘Different Spaces’ Aesthetics Method and Epistemology James 
Faubion (ed), Robert Hurley (trans), London: Penguin, 2000 p. 178 
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space: literally a non-place, perfected, out with time.  It is either “society 
perfected or the reverse of society…these…spaces…are fundamentally 
and essentially unreal.”31  On the other hand, there are localities, places in 
society, built into its very institutions which seek to fulfil utopian ideals.  
Foucault calls these “actually realized utopias”32 heterotopias.  These are 
physical spaces which  
 
all the other real emplacements that can be found within a culture 
are, at the same time, represented, contested, and reversed, sorts of 
places that are outside all places, although they are actually 
localizable.  Because they are utterly different from all the 
emplacements that they reflect or refer to, I shall call these places 
“heterotopias,” as opposed to utopias33 
 
Heterotopias are therefore other places, they are places of otherness and 
difference.  The localisable place of the heterotopia overturns and 
undermines all other actual cultural emplacements.  The heterotopia 
reverses the very relations that (through a given culture) it attempts to 
represent.   
 
There are two types of Foucauldian heterotopia, the first is characterised 
by a significant relationship with time, i.e. those institutions which 
accumulate time (museums), and those institutions which have a 
transitory/fleeting relation to time, (the fair or the carnival and the festival 
opening onto heterochronias).  The heterotopia also juxtaposes disparate 
and incompatible elements.  He gives several examples, such as the 
cinema and the theatre but, according to Foucault, the oldest and 
                                                
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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arguably most prevalent form of the contradictory heterotopia is the 
garden. 
 
The garden is the smallest parcel of the world and the whole world at 
the same time.  Since early antiquity the garden has been a sort of 
blissful and universalizing heterotopia (hence our zoological 
gardens).34 
 
The garden is a representation of nature.  The garden is also an important 
point of departure in terms of American and European thought regarding 
the perfection of nature.  In European thought nature reaches its 
perfection in the garden, a kind of Edenic return.  For the American, on 
the other hand, nature perfected is the pre-Edenic wilderness.  Thus a 
particular way of thinking about the National Park as pristine wilderness 
holds sway over American landscape identity.  However, we might argue 
that something that all National Parks have in common is their status as 
contradictory heterotopias. 
 
The elusiveness of physis entails that ‘Pure Nature’ is the site of a range of 
cultural disagreements, but as the sociologist Bruno Latour argues, 
contentions about nature are also politically derived.  Nature is an 
extremely complex term which is culturally and politically motivated.  It is 
a multivalent term which is constituted by the user’s viewpoint, a point 
which we will return to during the following chapter.  Being close to 
nature, in a Latourean sense, is to be at the heart of conflict and 
contention regarding nature.  The multiple definitions of nature therefore 
carry ideological (often religious) latencies.  However, as I shall go on to 
demonstrate, the notion of the landscape as wilderness is a kind of 
                                                
34 Ibid. p.182 
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utopian vision of Nature which contests that which it purports to represent.  
This conception of nature (i.e. an ideal place outside of culture) is, in the 
Latourean (political) sense, a bad representation. It could also be argued 
that the wilderness landscape is culturally inscribed as a heterotopia: a 
contested utopia. That is to say, as Foucault presents it, the heterotopia 
brings together the disparate or the incompatible in one place.  In a 
sense, the ideal of the National Park epitomises the contradictory 
heterotopia as it is at once an emblem of Pure Nature, whilst fulfilling the 
cultural needs of its visitors.  We need only refer to the dramatically 
divergent images of Yosemite photographed by Ansel Adams and 
Stephen Shore to make this point.  Neither image gives us a definitive view 
of Yosemite, although it might be fair to say that the dominant 
Merced River, Yosemite National Park, California, August 13, 1979 Stephen Shore, 1979 
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iconography of Yosemite National Park is presented by the ubiquitous 
work of Ansel Adams. 
 
 
 
These contested representations of Yosemite, a place of difference, give 
rise to a reading of the landscape heterotopia as “heterotopology.”  
Foucault writes: 
 
As for heterotopias…how might they be described? …One could 
imagine…a sort of systematic description that would have the object, 
in a given society, of studying, analyzing, describing, “reading,” as 
people are fond of saying now, these different spaces, these other 
Clearing Winter Storm, Yosemite National Park, Ansel Adams, 1944 
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places, a kind of contestation, both mythical and real, of the space in 
which we live.  This description could be called “heterotopology”.35 
 
A National Park, such as Yosemite in the United States, is a place of 
otherness, a re-sacralized space36, considered by its visitors as 
quintessentially natural.  And yet, the Yosemite Valley has a history of 
environmental management which exemplifies a particular ethnocentric 
ideology of place.   
 
The ideology embodied in “imperial landscape” was used to help 
justify the clearing of the Yosemite Valley of the Yosemite “Indians” 
because it was claimed that they not only did not appreciate its 
scenery but also damaged it through their practice of burning the 
“natural” meadowlands… 
 
Images of this scene, emptied of its native inhabitants, have become 
“canonised”…as when seen through the lenses of an Ansel Adams or 
an Eadweard Muybridge.37 
 
Adams’ photographs of Yosemite, stripped of its human presence through 
habitation purport to be sublime vistas, pure presentations of wilderness 
America: the perfection of nature.  As Kenneth Olwig points out, they 
have become canonical, authoritative, accepted visions of the rhetoric 
                                                
35 Ibid p.179 
36 The notion of the National Park relies on the opposition between nature and culture, 
leisure and work, conserved and unconserved.  Foucault writes: “perhaps our life is still 
dominated by a certain number of oppositions that cannot be tampered with, that 
institutions and practices have not ventured to change – oppositions we take for 
granted, for example, between private space and public space, between the family 
space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space 
of leisure activities and the space of work.  All of these are still controlled by an unspoken 
sacralisation.” Ibid. p.177 
37 Kenneth R. Olwig Landscape Theory James Elkins and Rachel Ziady DeLue (eds) New 
York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 pp.174-175 
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of nature as wilderness.  Adams’ images of nature are also photography 
perfected, tonally superior to the light on the land itself.  Dodging and 
burning (the tonal manipulations used by the photographic printer in the 
darkroom), observed Adams, are a matter of rectifying the mistakes 
made by God in the tonal relationships in the world!  The manner in which 
the photographer visualises the landscape, which is after all a 
contrivance, should draw to our attention to the culturally determined 
mythic values associated with this allegedly pristine wilderness.  However 
our tendency is to treat photographs as natural and somehow 
transparent, but as we shall see in due course, according to Barthes’ early 
writing on photography, photographs are pseudo natural. 
 
The ethnocentric ideology of the landscape transforms the body of the 
land into a contested territory, in which certain myths operate, a 
dominant heterotopology:  
 
how “actual” is a landscape that must be secretively maintained by 
the U.S. Park Service to maintain seemingly natural meadows that are 
actually the cultural landscape created by the burning practices of 
the Yosemite people.38 
 
We might argue that the myth of nature is promulgated by the 
Foucauldian “unspoken sacralisation”39 of the National Park which in turn 
invites association of this ideology with a distinctive sense of nationhood.  
The cultural landscape as natural landscape is in a sense heterotopian: it 
contests the utopian ideology of nature, negating the sense of landscape 
as a cultural entity by the assertion of its naturalness. In these 
                                                
38 Ibid.p.175 
39 Michel Foucault ‘Different Spaces’ Aesthetics Method and Epistemology James 
Faubion (ed), Robert Hurley (trans), London: Penguin, 2000 p.177 
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circumstances, nature is a myth: “Nature has”, as Denis Cosgrove points 
out, “a history.”40  
 
The photographs of Ansel Adams function like a high definition myopia.  
They present a vision of the American wilderness which is heterotopian 
insofar as it contests what it represents: nature as an ideal place outside of 
culture.  In this sense, these images are examples of Latourean bad 
representations.  We might go far as to say that Adams’ work from 
Yosemite is an exemplar of Barthesean mythologie: the pristine wilderness 
is a cultural myth.   
 
For Roland Barthes, myth supervenes on an already existing semiological 
chain.  However, where the sign is unmotivated, or arbitrary, mythical 
signification is motivated.  Myth, argues Barthes, is motivated by ideology, 
bourgeois ideology to be precise.  Unlike first order meaning, there 
appears to be a natural connection between the signifier (first order sign) 
and its concept (signified).  The function of mythology (cultural myths) is 
the perpetuation of bourgeois ideology and the practice of pseudo-
natural signification is, according to Barthes, instrumental in this regard.  
Unlike Ferdinand de Saussure, for Barthes, semiotics has a profoundly 
social dimension.  Semiotics enables cultural myths to be constructed but 
also, crucially for Barthes, deconstructed.  Semiotics is a tool which can be 
used to undermine dominant ideologies which are perpetuated by 
cultural myths in a range of public media. 
 
Myth, argues Barthes, “is a type of speech.”41  This conception of myth sits 
comfortably with its etymology insofar as myth is a “fictitious narrative”, an 
                                                
40 Denis Cosgrove ‘The Art Seminar’ Landscape Theory James Elkins and Rachel Ziady 
DeLue (eds) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 p.90 
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oral tradition which accounts for cultural belief through recourse to the 
supernatural.  For Barthes, writing in Mythologies, both verbal and visual 
forms of communication are speech: 
 
We shall therefore take language, discourse, speech, etc., to mean 
any significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual: a photograph 
will be a kind of speech for us in the same way as a newspaper article; 
even objects become speech if they mean something.42 
 
The type of speech articulated by the visual (i.e. the photograph) is a 
pseudo-natural signification, this is to say, it is presented as if it were 
natural.  The natural speech of the photograph is a construction.  In order 
to deconstruct the dominant mythologies of culture, Barthes argues that a 
particular kind of reader is called for.  To read and decipher myths we 
should, argues Barthes, return to the “duplicity of [myth’s] signifier”43 The 
signifier, both full and devoid of meaning can be considered in three 
different ways which, states Barthes, ‘produces’ three kinds of reader: 
 
i) The signifier can be analysed in terms of its emptiness, the 
concept fills the signifier (form) and the signification is literal: it 
exemplifies or symbolises something.  This reader is a producer of 
myths, complicit in the system of myth production: cynical. 
 
ii) The signifier may be analysed as being full: both the meaning 
and the form are distinguishable from one another and thus the 
manipulation/distortion is demonstrated.  This reader is a 
demystifier: a mythologist. 
                                                
41 Roland Barthes ‘Myth Today’ in Mythologies Annette Lavers (trans and selected) 
London: Vintage, 2000 p.109 
42 Ibid. pp.110-111 
43 Ibid. p.128 
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iii) The signifier is analysed (focussed) as a whole, constituted by 
both meaning and form i.e. both aspects of its duplicitous 
identity.  This generates ‘ambiguous signification’ which 
produces the ‘reader of myths’ 
 
I respond to the constituting mechanism of myth, to its own dynamics, 
I become a reader of myths… the reader lives the myth as a story at 
once true and unreal.44 
 
This, according to Barthes, is a ‘dynamic’ reading in which the reader 
both participates in and disbelieves the myth.  For, in order to undermine 
the cultural myths of the dominant ideology, the reader must be able to 
participate in and comprehend the myth in order to deconstruct it.  The 
myths of dominant ideologies are powerful due to the fact that they 
appear to be natural.  Second order meaning has a logical, pseudo 
natural connection between signifier and signified (Barthes’ example is 
the now famous discussion of the cover of Paris Match showing the young 
black soldier saluting the French flag).  Myth signification (the coupling of 
the form and concept) is naturalised: 
 
Everything happens as if the picture naturally conjured up the 
concept, as if the signifier gave a foundation to the signified: the myth 
exists from the precise moment when French imperiality achieves the 
natural state: myth is speech justified in excess.45 
 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. pp.129-130 
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I would now like to explore precisely what bearing Barthes’ ideas about 
myth expressed in ‘Myth Today’ will have on our previous discussions 
regarding landscape.  
 
We already looked at the photographs of Ansel Adams in the context of 
the National Park.  Taking a very different image of Yosemite 
photographed by Stephen Shore into consideration, we begin to see the 
artifice of Adam’s image.  Now, the very notion that the photograph is 
artifice or artful is, to a certain extent, acceptable to Adams and his 
publishers: 
 
The creations of man or nature never have more grandeur than in an 
Ansel Adams photograph, and his image can seize the viewer with 
more force than the natural object from which it was made.46 
 
For Adams, the artifice of the photographic is not in itself problematic, 
indeed I concur with this up to a point.  However, I believe that what 
Barthes teaches us about myth and the myth-speech of photography in 
particular, is that we should be ready as readers of myth to decode and 
deconstruct the image before us:  to read Adams’ images of Yosemite, 
admittedly as photographic constructions, but nonetheless 
representations of Nature in its pure and awe inspiring form.  Adams’ 
photographs may be made, but the image of the landscape that he 
advocates is supposedly unaltered by man: the myth of nature is 
promulgated photographically in his images of Yosemite. 
 
Through his writing in ‘Myth Today’ Barthes wants us to challenge our 
assumptions about what is natural in writing and image but, as we will see 
                                                
46 From an advertisement for a book of Adam’s photographs cited by Susan Sontag in 
On Photography Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002 p.188  
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in the next chapter, by the time Barthes is writing in Camera Lucida, two 
decades later, his position on photography has dramatically changed.  
Barthes’ final work is a meditation on love, mourning, loss and 
photography, the implications of which will be examined during the next 
chapter.  In the meantime, let us look at Barthes’ writings on text and 
investigate where this takes us in terms of our investigations into 
landscape.  Firstly, as is consistent with the discussion of myth, the notion 
that landscapes can be read will be explored in conjunction with ideas 
put forward by the cultural geographers Trevor J. Barnes and James S. 
Duncan.  The definition of text in terms of lingustics will be investigated 
through a brief exegesis of the writings of Ferdinand de Saussure, then we 
will move on to look at Roland Barthes, whose writings on semiotics, text 
and photography are key points of contact throughout this thesis.  Both 
approaches will have a critical bearing upon how we begin to reconsider 
landscape as a non-essentialist concept, a non-place without boundaries. 
 
IV Landscape as Text 
 
We have seen that landscapes are cultural products and thinking the 
term expansively supports the idea that landscapes are inscriptions of 
culture.  Loosely, we might say that the inscribed body of the landscape is 
a kind of text.  Indeed cultural geographers, literary theorists and 
anthropologists have often used the word ‘text’ to describe cultural 
products including landscapes, but can the landscape really ‘mean’ as a 
text does, or does this conception rely on a rethink of the word text itself?  
Is the landscape a cultural product which can be read, that is, does it 
support signification?  This is not to ask can I read the landscape for a 
singular meaning, but does text account for landscapes which promote 
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open readings that are culturally informed?  Barnes and Duncan, in the 
Introduction to Writing Worlds argue that: 
 
Cultural productions such as paintings, maps and landscapes…should 
all be seen as signifying practices that are read, not passively, but, as 
it were, rewritten as they are read.  This expanded notion of texts 
originates from a broadly post-modern view, one that sees them as 
constructive of reality rather than mimicking it – in other words, as 
cultural practices of signification rather than as referential 
duplications.47 
 
So, on the face of it, Barnes and Duncan posit that landscapes are texts 
and therefore they should be treated as artefacts which are capable of 
supporting a fluid practice of signification, understood in the post-
structuralist and post-modern sense of being rewritten as they are 
engaged with.  Rather than texts being representations or ‘referential 
duplications’ of that which they stand for, the text ‘constructs’ reality: the 
text is a process which activates meaning through the cultural practice of 
signification, rather than embodying a fixed semantic content which is 
‘uncovered’ by reading, or by transparent reference to a world external 
to itself.  In a sense, writing, as both practice and product, is a space of 
engagement.  Texts are therefore not decoded to reveal their alleged 
deep meaning (structure), rather they are the spaces of meaning 
production: play.  The text is not simply a collection of words that contain 
meaning like vessels, text is a process through which meaning is activated.  
Text is opaque: it is part of the world and the world is part of text. 
 
                                                
47 Barnes, Trevor J. and James Duncan ‘Introduction’ Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and 
Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape New York; London: Routledge, 1992 p.5 
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Barnes and Duncan take their cue from the later, post-structuralist, literary 
writings of Roland Barthes in which he theorises the text and the death of 
the author, in an attempt to decentre literary works, authors and critics.  
As we will see later, in Barthes’ differentiation between ‘work’ and ‘Text’, 
the material body of the literary work (i.e. ink on paper bound together) is 
to be differentiated from the Text which transects many works, inscribing 
meaning relationally.  Therefore it is necessary to explore the notion of the 
text more deeply if we are to progress beyond a superficial understanding 
of landscape as text i.e. simply as a surface physically marked with the 
traces of human activity. 
 
In etymological terms a text, “wording of anything written,” from the Latin 
textus literally means a thing woven.  The word has metaphorical origins: 
like fabric, a text is constructed, tied together and Text has connections to 
art through techne, to make.  A text is made by the practice of writing, 
the texture of the text is to be read with the eye.  Text is: 
 
[a]n ancient metaphor: thought is a thread, and the raconteur is a 
spinner of yarns – but the true storyteller, the poet is a weaver.  The 
scribes made this old and audible abstraction into a new and visible 
fact.  After long practice, their work took on such an even, flexible 
texture that they called the written page textus, which means cloth.48 
 
In order to fully grasp what Barthes means by the word Text, it would be 
prudent to look briefly at some of the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure 
whose semiology informs Barthes’ thought, in particular his earlier 
structuralist writings.  For Saussure, language means through a process of 
                                                
48 Robert Bringhurst ‘Elements of Topographic Style’ cited in the Online Etymology 
Dictionary http://www.etymonline/index.php?search=text&searchmode=none accessed 
25.02.2008 
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signification based upon difference or differentiation.  Meaning is 
constructed using a system of signs which operate in relation to one 
another.  The meaning of any given sign only makes sense in relation to 
other signs within the system.  Thus signs come to be significant in relation 
to that which they are not.  
 
For Saussure the key binary opposition in semiology is between speaking 
(parole) and language (langue).  Speaking is an individual act whereas 
language is the system, defined and regulated by its collective use, which 
makes it resistant to continual change. 
 
Execution is always individual, and the individual is always its master: I 
shall call the executive side speaking [parole].49 
 
language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within 
a collectivity.50 
 
A critical component in the semiological system is the tri-partite sign: the 
(empty) signifier and the signified (concept) are united in the (meaningful) 
sign.  The signifier is not simply an expression of the signified: meaning is 
constituted by the conjoining of the signifier and the signified as sign.  As 
we will see later, Saussure’s choice of terminology has relevance (or 
indeed is revelatory) for Jacques Derrida, however, for the time being let 
us simply restate his words: 
 
I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign, but in 
current usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a 
                                                
49 Ferdinand de Saussure ‘The Linguistic Sign’ from Course in General Lingustics reprinted 
in Semiotics: an introductory reader Robert E. Innis (ed) London: Hutchison & Co., 1986 
p.32 
50 Ibid. p.33 
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word, for example (arbor, etc.).  One tends to forget that arbor is 
called a sign only because it carries the concept “tree,” with the result 
that the idea of the sensory part implies the idea of the whole. 
 
Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here were 
designated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the 
others.  I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the 
whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by 
signified [signifié] and signifier [significant]…as regards sign, if I am 
satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of any word to 
replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other.51 
 
The sign is central to Sausurre’s project of linguistic differentiation, its 
constitutive components are inseparable like the recto verso of a sheet of 
paper.  In his Course in General Lingustics, Saussure states that the first 
principle of semiology is that the relation between the signifier and the 
signified is arbitrary.  The arbitrary nature of the relation between the two 
parts of the sign denies any natural link between the thing and its name.  
Saussure argues that this accounts for the profound differences between 
languages when it comes to certain words: some words have no 
equivalent in other languages, thus the relation must be arbitrary, rather 
than naturally determined.  Controversially, Saussure ‘brackets’ the 
referent in his system of semiology.  That is to say, the sign is cut from the 
referent in virtue of its arbitrary and psychological nature.  Linguistic signs 
therefore function in a separate system to what might be described as 
reality, or the ‘extra-semiotic’.  The world, constructed by language is 
intra-semiotic’.  However, for Saussure the linguistic sign is immaterial: it is 
composed of a sound pattern (Saussure calls it a ‘sound-image’) and a 
                                                
51 Ibid. p.37 
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concept.  The sign, liberated from the ties of its phonic substance and 
materiality, is not simply the coupling of a name and a thing: 
 
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and 
a sound-image.  The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical 
thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it 
makes on our senses.  The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to 
call it “material,” it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to 
the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally 
more abstract.52 
 
Thus the linguistic sign is constituted by the psychological impression of the 
sound image, or pattern, in the hearer and the concept brought to mind: 
Saussure’s sign is fundamentally psychological: 
 
Both terms involved in the linguistic sign are psychological and are 
united in the brain by associative bond.53 
 
This phonic privilege in Saussure’s account has been criticised by Jacques 
Derrida as it marginalises writing and casts it as a perverse exteriority, a 
theme to which we will turn later in the thesis.  It is therefore significant to 
note that Saussure clearly situated the linguistic sign out with the 
materiality of written or spoken language – the word is dematerialised.   
 
Because we regard the words of our language as sound-images, we 
must avoid speaking of the “phonemes” that make up the words.  This 
term, which suggests vocal activity, is applicable to the spoken word 
only, to the realization of the inner image in discourse.  We can avoid 
this misunderstanding by speaking of the sounds and syllables of a 
                                                
52 Ibid. p.36 
53 Ibid. 
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word provided we remember that the names refer to the sound-
image.54 
 
The artifice of the sign is instituted by Saussure’s first principle of semiology, 
which states that the sign is “unmotivated”.55  Thus semiology does not 
translate our experience of the world.  In fact, semiology constructs our 
(meaningful) experience of the world by differencing homogenous 
sensory experience into a differentiated field of signs.  We make sense of 
the world using language (through speech) which is structured relationally 
and coded through convention: we see and speak the world through a 
screen, the relational tissue of language. 
 
Saussure put at the heart of his work the …thesis …that experience is 
an undifferentiated and amorphous continuum until it is “cut” by the 
diacritical act of speech and codified in the system of differences 
which make up language56 
 
The act of speaking marks and differentiates the topology of experience, 
the distinctions and differences are then “codified” in language: 
semiology differentiates experience.  
 
Saussurean semiology is concerned solely with language.  Indeed, 
Saussure argued that semiology, in its mature form, would encompass 
linguistics.  Roland Barthes, whose early structuralist writings were 
profoundly influenced by Saussure, sought to widen the scope of 
semiology to include a range of signifying practices (cinema, advertising, 
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56 Robert E. Innis Semiotics: an introductory reader London: Hutchison & Co., 1986 p.26  
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press photography, fashion etc) and proposed an inversion of the 
relationship between semiology and linguistics: 
 
We must now face the possibility of inverting Saussure’s declaration: 
linguistics is not a part of the general science of signs, even a 
privileged part, it is semiology which is a part of linguistics: to be 
precise, it is that part covering the great signifying unities of 
discourse.57 
 
Rather than semiology constituting a structural science of signs, an 
overarching system for the analysis of language, Barthes suggests that 
semiology is a component of linguistics, which enables the signifying 
practices of range of discourses to be analysed.  This would enable, 
argues Barthes, a general science of signs to illuminate consistent overlaps 
in research between disciplines like anthropology, sociology, psycho-
analysis and stylistics.  A general science of signs could therefore be used 
in fields other than language, and indeed this opens up the possibility of 
semiology as a critical component in interdisciplinary research.  Barthes’ 
inversion redefines semiotics as a practice which facilitates the analysis of 
a range of disciplines and thus it is the domain of interdisciplinarity: the in-
between of academic discourses. 
 
Later in his career, Barthes wrote in a more post-structuralist vein and in 
‘From Work to Text,’ first written in 1971 and later expanded and 
developed into ‘Theory of the Text’, he challenges this notion of the 
theorist/author operating from a position outside of language.  In this 
piece of writing, Barthes calls for a new object of interdisciplinary research 
which is “the Text.”  The Text is a literary object which challenges the 
                                                
57 Roland Barthes Elements of Semiology Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (trans), New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1968 p.11 
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classical model of the writer who is able to construct the novel or other 
form of writing, from a position outside of the work.  In order to elucidate 
the radically contingent nature of the Text, Barthes uses the differing 
conceptions of Newtonian and Einsteinian science to guide us.  He writes: 
 
Just as Einsteinian science demands that the relativity of the frames of 
reference be included in the object studied, so the combined action 
of Marxism, Freudianism and structuralism demands, in literature, the 
relativization of the relations of writer, reader and observer (critic).  
Over against the traditional notion of the work, for long – and still – 
conceived of in a, so to speak, Newtonian way, there is now the 
requirement of a new object, obtained by the sliding or overturning of 
former categories.  That object is the Text.58 
 
The Text is a new object which is not to be defined by fixed subject object 
relations.  The work, tended to be thought in terms of the subject (author, 
reader, critic), who is played out as Newtonian scientist by Barthes, writes 
or observes the work in a detached manner with a clear, externalising 
relationship with the object of study.  However, according to the model of 
Einsteinian science, the observer necessarily becomes part of the 
observation.  Just as the laboratory does not engender neutrality in an 
experiment, Barthes argues that the Text should annihilate the ‘false’ 
distance between subject and object.  The subject and object are 
conflated, the neutrality of language is called into question, and the 
authority of the writer is undermined. 
 
The dissolution of subject/object relations is a thematic which has 
considerable relevance to this thesis insofar as we will move towards the 
                                                
58 Roland Barthes ‘From Work to Text’ in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998 p.941 
 63 
position that the practitioner is embroiled within the work59.  Indeed, the 
imbrication of the practitioner in the photographic process is an idea that 
we will explore in greater detail during the subsequent chapter.  In 
addition, rethinking the landscape in terms of the relational structure of 
text, entails that landscape is not an object but rather a nexus of relations 
in which landscape, in non-essentialist terms, is a construct of constantly 
changing relations.  The notion of the text as a nexus of shifting relations is 
also of critical import to our later discussions on the nature of 
photographic practice. 
 
Although Barthes argues that the Text is a new object, we should be 
careful not to think of this in the purely material sense.  Barthes 
differentiates between the literary work as a material object, and the Text, 
which may or may not be a singular piece of literature, but which cuts 
across many works through a network of references.  The work is a 
“fragment of substance,”60 it has a material presence, in the form of a 
book, which can be held or has its place in the library, whereas the Text is 
what Barthes describes as a “methodological field”61.  Whilst the material 
presence of the work enables it to be held in the hand, according to 
Barthes the Text can only be held in language.  As we shall see in due 
course, this has critical import for visual practice insofar as we might argue 
that the viewer is held within the text of practice.  Therefore it will be 
significant that we explore the notion of the visual and writing later in the 
thesis.  
 
                                                
59 Barthes writes that the author (the example he gives if of a novelist) is by no means 
entirely banished from the Text but is able to return to is as a “guest”.  He goes on to 
write: “he is inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, figured in the carpet” Ibid. 
p.944 
60 Ibid. p.942 
61 Ibid. 
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So, for Barthes, the relative relationship between the Sign and the work 
and the Sign and the Text are at variance from one another.  The work, in 
Barthes words, functions as a “general sign,”62 either via the signification of 
the signified revealed through philology, or the interpretation of secretive 
signification through hermeneutics.  The Text, on the other hand, does not 
close on the signified, rather Barthes describes it as “dilatory”,63 that is to 
say, it delays the closure of meaning.  The Text does not allow meaning to 
settle, i.e. it frustrates the denotative function of the sign, disrupting the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified.  The Text disseminates 
the signifier in a chain of deferred meaning.  The signifier is not a vehicle 
for meaning, rather meaning in the Text is infinitely deferred enabling the 
field of the Text to function as an “irreducible”64 plurality. Barthes writes: 
 
The Text…practices the infinite deferment of the signified, [it] is 
dilatory; its field is that of the signifier and the signifier must not be 
conceived of as ‘the first stage of meaning,’ its material vestibule, but, 
in complete opposition to this, as its deferred action. 65 
 
The meaningful field of the Text is not the Sign but the signifier and as such 
‘deferred action’ of which Barthes writes is the closure of meaning.  The 
perpetual openness of text enables a plurality of possible meanings.  Thus 
the Text is constantly mobile, held in the moving discourse of language.  
Barthes writes that the “logic regulating the Text is not 
comprehensive…but metonymic.”66  Which is to say, the Text is never 
complete, all-encompassing, definitive, total.  The logic which regulates 
the Text is its tolerance for metonymic substitution, that is to say, the 
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expansiveness of the Text derives from its capacity to support, as Barthes 
goes on to write, “contiguities, associations and carrying overs.”67  Thus the 
text is not a special kind of work or type of literature, Barthes characterises 
it as a movement which does not stop.  “[T]he Text is experienced only in 
an activity of production.”68  The Text is too restless to be defined by a 
space taken up on a library shelf.  It oscillates in the space between 
discourses: it is the very space of interdisciplinarity. 
 
Let us now turn back to the question of landscape and look at it 
specifically in relation to what has been discovered in our explorations of 
text found in the writings of Roland Barthes.  The landscape as a text, 
knotted and woven together – the –ship of landship denoting a collection, 
tied together as in “sheaf” implies that spaces coalesce to form 
collections which cluster around given social activities.  Therefore, areas of 
overlap and the differentiation between synthetic spaces become 
increasingly significant.  Thus the text of the landscape does not embody 
a singularity of meaning but represents both change over time motivated 
by changing use(s), and the contingency of the viewer/viewpoint.  The 
meaning of text of the landscape is plural.  To return to Roland Barthes, 
the Text is an “irreducible (and not merely acceptable) plural”69. 
 
Barthes describes the Text’s weave of signifiers as a “stereographic 
plurality”70.  However, the pluralism of the text is not simply ambiguity; 
pluralism is inscribed into the very fabric of the Text.  Barthes draws a 
comparison between the reader of the Text and a “passably empty 
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subject”71, i.e. himself, walking along a valley.  The walker hears sounds 
emanating from dispersed sources: children shouting; the faint calls of 
birds; he sees light and colours from the vegetation; the clothing of others.  
He experiences a multiplicity of sense impressions of which he writes: 
 
All of these incidents are half-identifiable; they come from codes 
which are known but their combination is unique, founds the stroll in a 
difference repeatable only as difference.72    
 
Thus Barthes uses the landscape as a metaphor or model of the Text.  The 
walker inhabits the Text of the landscape, the varying sense impressions 
emanating from all directions are an illustration of the manner in which the 
Text cuts across a number of works.  But the intertextuality of the Text is its 
movement, the stereographic plurality of the landscape as Text implies a 
multiplicity of viewpoints, the weave of signifiers fabricate a surface 
accessible from many positions.  The landscape as text overthrows the 
notion of a fixed relation between reader (viewer) and text.  The reading 
of the landscape as Text is founded in a difference repeatable only as 
difference. 
 
In addition, according to Barthes, the Text can only be itself in difference.  
The reading of the text is “semelfactive”73, that is to say, instantaneous, 
momentary.  If we think the landscape in terms of this punctual or non-
durational reading, we begin to read it as a changing field subject to 
constant deferral, there is no definitive reading.  The pluralism of the 
landscape as Text entails that each viewer, or reader passes in and 
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through it from a multiplicity of perspectives under constantly varying 
conditions, and each time re-reads the Text anew. 
 
The paradigm shift from structuralism to post-structuralism in Barthes’ 
thought is reflected in his changing ideas regarding the relationship 
between language and its discourse.  Barthes concludes in ‘From Work to 
Text’ that a theory of the Text should, at the very least, throw the very 
concept of metalanguage into doubt, and the discourse on the Text 
“should itself be nothing other than text, research, textual activity”74, that 
is, the theory of the Text should not propose an alternative, external 
vantage point from which to comprehend, or decode the Text.  Rather, 
the discourse on the Text should be, as Barthes puts it, “nothing other than 
text”75 itself.  For, he goes on to write, “the Text is that social space which 
leaves no language safe, outside, nor any subject of the enunciation in 
position as judge, master, analyst, confessor, decoder.”76  This has a 
bearing on this thesis insofar as it questions a range of assumptions 
regarding the position of the reader: viewer of landscape, 
photographer/camera, and also reader within an exhibition.  It is therefore 
a point to which we will inevitably return. 
 
Just as we are inside the social space of the Text i.e. shared and therefore 
changing, the notion of the landscape as Barthesian Text reprises the idea 
of the landscape as social, changing and in some sense an immersive 
space.  Shifting our thoughts about landscape from ‘landscape as 
picture’, with an implied (ideal) viewer, to landscape as text, re-places 
the viewer/subject within the shared space of the landscape.  The space 
of landscape is shifted from a special geographical location to the locus 
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of a discursive practice.  The viewer is no longer merely a reader but a 
writer of the landscape, and as Barthes concludes, “[t]he theory of the 
text can coincide only with a practice of writing.”77  As we have already 
seen, Barthes writes that the Text is ‘dilatory’ in nature, the signified is 
subject to infinite deferral.  The Text is a “methodological field,” a field of 
signifiers which is constantly mobile.  The Text never rests or allows its 
meaning to be closed off: the Text remains mobile, each signifier refers to 
another; a signifier of the signifier. 
 
As we have already seen, thinking about the landscape as a picture is just 
one way to consider landscape.  Through an investigation of the 
etymology of the word we have opened other possibilities for 
understanding the term, beyond that of the modern etymology.  As it 
transpires, there are ideologies and assumptions latent in the word which 
this overview sought to reveal.  From landscape as picture we have 
passed to an understanding of landscape which takes into consideration 
the older etymology of land shaped by people.  This, in conjunction with 
John Brinkerhoff Jackson’s argument that skip/scape refers to a collective, 
presents us with the possibility of interpreting and engaging with 
landscape as a collection of traces of human activity.  Landscape is a 
social space which is shaped over time by progressive habitation, farming 
etc.  This particular notion of landscape, inscribed by human activity 
opens up the possibility of thinking about the landscape in terms of text, 
which is a significant point which we shall pursue. 
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V Concluding remarks 
 
What is to be gained by recasting the landscape in these terms?  As we 
have already noted from our investigations of Roland Barthes, 
underpinned by a reading of Saussure, the notion of text is suggestive of a 
shared space, a space where meaning is generated rather than passively 
received and understood.  This idea of text as a generative space also 
begins to question any notion of knowledge as fixed, comprehensive and 
total.  If texts are fluid, rewritten by the reader as they are read, a 
knowledge of text is necessarily unstable, contingent: built, lost and rebuilt.  
Knowledge in this regard is as shared and mutable as the space which 
engenders it, in a constant state of flux. 
 
Whilst Roland Barthes would leave the door open for a stable reading or 
interpretation through his differentiation between work and text, Jacques 
Derrida, as we shall see in due course, would not.  We will investigate this 
in a later chapter but firstly it would be prudent to review the implications 
of landscape as text and where this takes the general argument of the 
thesis. 
 
Redefining the landscape as text facilitates a renewed engagement 
between the land and the camera.  I find that it presents the possibility of 
thinking the relationship between landscape and photographic practice 
as intertextual: practice between the text of landscape and the text of 
the photograph.  Photograph as text implies that the camera is a 
machine for writing as opposed to picturing: an inscriptive practice.  It will 
be towards this question that we turn our attention in chapters three and 
four which will deal with the notion of photography as writing and the 
relationship between landtext and photowriting as intertextual.  The 
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progress made in understanding Saussure and Barthes will be further 
developed through an enquiry into Derrida’s notion of écriture: 
photography in the expanded field of writing. 
 
During the course of this chapter we have also investigated the extent to 
which we rely upon uncritical or unconsidered understanding of nature as 
a framework for the comprehension of landscape.  The modern dictionary 
definition of landscape as a picture of natural inland scenery has been 
found to be problematic in its reliance upon both landscape as view and 
the natural.  Even in the (contested) modern etymological conception of 
landscape, the idea that Dutch landscapes were totally natural is clearly 
open to dispute.  To the Dutch landscape painter the land’s shape was of 
interest whether natural or artificial.   
 
Through a brief investigation of Foucault’s heterotopia we considered the 
idea that Nature, as expressed in the ideology of the National Park is a 
contradiction.  Utopian ideals about the preservation of nature, such as in 
the National Park, can lead to contradictory practices which bring to light 
the concept of these places as contested spaces.  We looked at two 
quite different images from Yosemite by Ansel Adams and Stephen Shore.   
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Bearing in mind what Barthes writes about the need to decipher myth, in 
terms of reading the text of landscape, Adams could be described as the 
reader of myths who is complicit in the ideology, in this case the myth of 
Nature.  On the other hand, I would consider Shore a ‘mythologist’ in 
Barthesean terms, a reader of myths: 
 
This type of focussing is that of the mythologist: he deciphers the myth, 
he understands the distortion.78 
 
 
 
Questioning the clearly defined view of nature leads me to ask questions 
of photography which is often treated as a form of natural representation.  
                                                
78 Roland Barthes ‘Myth Today’ in Mythologies Annette Lavers (trans and selected) 
London: Vintage, 2000 p.128 
Jackson, Wyoming, September 2, 1979, Stephen Shore, 1979 
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Just as landscape has metaphor and ideology secreted in the word, the 
latencies and assumptions of a photographic representation considered 
to be natural are open to question. 
 
With this in mind, I intend to investigate and question the notion of the 
photograph as a natural representation, or as Barthes would have it, a 
natural presentation.  I will therefore question the photograph’s being-as-
presence, looking to the ideas of Bruno Latour regarding nature and Vilèm 
Flusser on photography to assist me in coming to a more instrumental, and 
thus opaque, characterisation of photography.  The role that Roland 
Barthes plays in this thesis is of interest insofar as I find his writing on text 
and authorship informative and constructive.  However, despite the 
beauty and moving writing to be found in Camera Lucida, it is my 
contention that this work does not help but indeed hinders the progress of 
a theory of photography as writing.   
 
The world, experienced through a field of language, an intertextual and 
mobile reading of landscape, sustains the idea of the landscape as text.  
The cultural interventions which inform the contemporary landscape can 
be thought of as writing or inscriptive practices.  Activities such as 
ploughing, building, walking, make (i.e. shape) the landscape. So cultural 
practices are written into the world, indeed we might go so far as to say 
that cultural practices are the world humanly understood. 
 
So for Barthes text is the endless movement of language.  We always find 
ourselves situated within discourse, there is no preface, no origin, no 
beginning.  The open structural framework of language, built on the 
principle that the sign is open, that the signifier signifies yet another 
signifier, slides and evades a permanency of meaning.  Landscape, as is 
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language, is rewritten and rewrites itself through the process of its own 
creation.  The spatio-temporal nature of the landscape is overlaid making 
a palimpsest of meaning that is continually deferred through overwrite, 
overlay and erasure.  There, in the landscape, the signified always already 
functions as a signifier.  The anti-essentialist conception of landscape 
which emerges here would understand there to be no originary wild 
landscape but surfaces of ever changing inscription. 
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I Ways of Seeing Photography 
 
Following on from the question posed in chapter one regarding 
landscape as text, I now intend to focus my attention on three key areas 
relating to this.  Firstly, I will return to the work of Roland Barthes but this 
time I will look more closely at his photographic writings, in particular his 
final, elegiac work Camera Lucida.  My aim is to demonstrate that 
Barthes’ understanding of photography is strongly premised on a desire for 
presence.  The book is akin to a quasi-theological discourse in which 
photography is given the role of transparent mediator between two 
worlds: the world of the living and the world of the dead.  Barthes 
compares the photograph to a divine imprint, a shadow on Christ’s 
sweatcloth, which has the power to resurrect the body in an eternal now.  
Compelling as this is, there are serious problems with this way of thinking 
about photographs.  On the one hand, the photograph’s means of 
production, its apparatus, is denied, which I believe has serious import for 
photographic practice.  On the other hand, the desire for presence to be 
found in Barthes’ Camera Lucida is emblematic of a broader concern in 
philosophy, which Jacques Derrida called the metaphysics of presence.  It 
is towards this question and its attendant implications for photographic 
practice that I will turn in chapter three.  
 
My second area of enquiry in this chapter will be the writing of Vilém 
Flusser and Bruno Latour, unlikely bedfellows perhaps, but reviewing both 
writers together enables a counter argument to Barthes’ ideas to be 
formulated.  Although this chapter is concerned with photography, 
discussions of my own practice will be deferred until later in the thesis.  This 
is largely due to the fact that I intend to establish my position on 
photography before I go on to discuss my own work.  The deliberations in 
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the pages that follow are critical in terms of my emerging practice and 
my own understanding of the broad concerns of the photographic 
enterprise. 
 
The conception of the landscape as text, which was explored in the 
preceding chapter, has opened up a way of thinking about landscape as 
a movement which does not stop.  However, the landscape as text, a 
surface inscribed by changing cultural uses, may be momentarily arrested 
by photography: the photographed moment endures.  The action of 
fixing an image of the world seen photographically through the surrogate 
eye of the camera seems to insist upon the relation of seer and seen, 
subject and object.  Whether we rewrite the landscape as a text or not, to 
think of the camera as a pseudo subject, a mechanical Cyclops, 
necessarily posits that what the camera ‘looks at’, in this case the land, is 
an object, and thus we return to the problematic of the landscape 
objectified as view, albeit through another route entirely.   
 
Thinking photography as a visual register entails that photographic seeing, 
considered to be distinct from ordinary vision, enables us to see reality in a 
way that we have not seen it before.  For Susan Sontag, the camera lifts 
off our “dry wrappers” of “habitual”79 ordinary vision and it reveals the 
world to us: the reality that photographs show us, as we will see later, is, 
according to Sontag, hidden.  However, the camera itself has another 
habit of seeing which Sontag describes as  
 
Both intense and cool, solicitous and detached; charmed by the 
insignificant detail, addicted to incongruity.  But photographic seeing 
has to be constantly renewed with new shocks…so as to produce the 
                                                
79 Susan Sontag On Photography Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002 p.99 
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impression of violating ordinary vision.  For, challenged by the 
revelations of photographers, seeing tends to accommodate to 
photographs.80 
 
Sontag’s notion that ordinary vision assimilates photographic seeing is 
pertinent insofar as it betrays a certain attitude towards photographic 
images.  That is, over time, as we become used to seeing the world 
photographically we begin to forget the differences between these two, 
as Sontag would have it, modalities of vision.  And although Sontag 
argues in favour of the revelations of the photographic, the idea that 
photographic seeing is itself a habit, implies that the camera sees 
according to its own conventions, we might therefore ask, does the 
camera see at all?   
 
The concept of the camera as a surrogate eye, a mechanical seer, 
becomes particularly problematic when the interventions of the camera 
are written out of the process and photographs are treated as though 
they facilitate unmediated contact with the subject.  In terms of this thesis, 
the subject/object dichotomy implied by the camera as mechanical eye 
requires further interrogation.  For the photographic image, taken as an 
unmediated form of contact with the subject, is transparent: we see the 
subject through it, rather than an opaque photographic representation of 
it.  The transparency thesis argues that photographs give us natural 
images, which cannot be taken as representations.  The implications of 
this will be investigated during this chapter, principally in dialogue with 
Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida.  The evidentiary power of photography is 
seemingly incontrovertible: even in the case of an image being out of 
                                                
80 Ibid. 
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focus, André Bazin argues that the photograph still has the power “to bear 
away our faith”81.   
 
Writing in The Pencil of Nature, the photographic pioneer William Henry 
Fox Talbot described photography as a process by which nature inscribes 
itself, and if we are to believe that nature inscribes itself photographically, 
we can argue that photographs give us images which presence the real, 
in itself: in the photograph, nature is present to itself.  It was from this idea 
of photography as the pencil by which nature faithfully inscribes itself that 
the sense of the reliability (and transparency) of photographs has been 
derived.  Thus in Fox Talbot’s conception of the photograph, we have the 
notion that photography is a natural process of inscription.  André Bazin 
writes that 
 
All the arts are based on the presence of man, only photography 
derives an advantage from his absence.  Photography affects us like 
a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose 
vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their beauty.82 
 
For Bazin, it is not possible to separate the aesthetic of the photographic 
image from its ‘earthly origins’, for him too photographs are natural 
images, caused by the phenomena of the world.  Photography, from this 
standpoint, is a form of natural science, it is part of the chemistry of the 
world.  The fixed silver shadow of the subject renders it immortal; the 
photograph brings the past to presence, which it stores in a chemical 
museum.  In the words of Roland Barthes: 
 
                                                
81 André Bazin ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’ What is Cinema? Volume 1 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2005 p.14 
82 Ibid. p.13 
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the loved body is immortalized by the medium of a precious metal, 
silver (monument and luxury); to which we might add the notion that 
this metal, like all the metals of Alchemy, is alive.83 
 
According to both Barthes and Bazin, what is distinctive and unique about 
photography is that it brings the subject to the viewer.  The subject is cast 
in silver; incarnated.  However, as Sontag points out in On Photography, 
the programme of photographic realism is full of disagreement. 
 
This revelatory character of photography generally goes by the 
polemical name of realism.  From Fox Talbot’s “natural images” to 
Berenice Abbott’s denunciation of “pictorial” photography to Cartier 
Bresson’s warning that “the thing to be feared most is the artificially 
contrived,” most of the contrary declarations of photographers 
converge on pious avowals of respect for things-as-they-are.84 
 
In spite of the polemical disagreements about the nature of photographic 
realism, as Sontag makes clear, the contradictory statements that 
photographers make about their relationship to the real actually cohere 
around the common respect for ‘things-as-they-are.’  According to 
Sontag, the revelations of photography amount to an unveiling of 
reality85, the photographic image “shows us reality as we had not seen it 
before.”86  Now, as Sontag demonstrates, it would be wrong to imply that 
Fox Talbot’s notion of the photograph as a natural image is in some sense 
universally accepted by photographic practitioners.  However, this 
conception of photography is canonised in the late writing on 
photography by Roland Barthes.  It is Barthes’ respect for things-as-they-
                                                
83 Roland Barthes Camera Lucida Richard Howard (trans), London: Vintage, 2000 p.81 
84 Susan Sontag On Photography Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002 p.119 
85 Ibid p.121 
86 Ibid. p. 119 
 81 
are, or properly, things-as-they-were (i.e. the referent in Barthes’ 
terminology), which enables his mother to be resurrected in the Winter 
Gardens in a photograph, which is the central, if absent image, in 
Camera Lucida.  For Barthes, the referent adheres to the photographic 
image which leads him to describe the photograph (along with the view 
of a landscape seen through the pane of a window), as “belonging to 
that class of laminated objects whose two leaves cannot be separated 
without destroying them both”87.  As we shall see later, it is through this 
particular photograph that Barthes is reunited with his mother: the thing-
as-it-was touches him from a time which precedes his own existence. 
 
It is important to note that Barthes’ commitment to photographic realism is 
not simply premised upon the ability of the photograph to copy or render 
a fixed analogue of the real.  Barthes’ realism is founded upon the 
photographic touch, which emanates from the subject: 
 
The realists, of whom I am one and of whom I was already one when I 
asserted that the Photograph was an image without a code – even if, 
obviously certain codes do inflect our reading of it – the realists do not 
take the photograph for a “copy” of reality, but for an emanation of 
past reality: a magic, not an art.88 
 
This commitment to the realism of photographs, in virtue of their capacity 
to bring the subject into contact with the viewer, facilitates a contiguity 
between spacetimes which effectively brings the subject to presence.  
The photograph testifies to the subject’s very existence, it is, for Barthes, 
physis not thesis.  I hope to demonstrate that the notion of the photograph 
as a natural image is problematic insofar as it denies the artificial, 
                                                
87 Roland Barthes Camera Lucida Richard Howard (trans), London: Vintage, 2000 p.6 
88 Ibid. p.88 
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constructivist character of photographic practice.  I would argue against 
Barthes, along with the realist’s detractors, and say that photography is in 
fact “Thesis, not Physis” 89.  Indeed, later in this chapter I will explore the 
idea that the practice of photography is often collapsed into the 
photograph itself, the process disappears into the object: critics and 
writers disassociate the image from its method or means of production.  
The end of photography (i.e. the image) is treated as though it had no 
means, or at least the means have no bearing, upon the final product. 
 
My principal aim in the exegesis of Barthes’ ideas on photography is to 
demonstrate the duality in his thought when writing on intentional and 
non-intentional photographic images.  This develops into a systematic 
reassertion of the sovereignty of the reader through his utterly subjective 
account of the significance of the punctum in his personal readings of 
photographs.  Barthes’ notion that the photograph resists the status of 
sign, especially in non-intentional photographs (such as the image of 
Barthes’ mother) will be especially significant for the development of my 
argument that photography is a practice which writes the world which will 
be undertaken in chapter three.  The dualistic tensions of Barthes’ theories 
on photography, between intentional and non-intention images, will be 
considered in view of Barthes’ differing photographic projects and his 
invocation of the studium and the punctum in Camera Lucida.  I observe 
that there is a peculiar duality in Barthes’ writing which emerges in the 
tensions between the Text and its project of decentring the author (and 
ultimately the subject), and the reassertion of the author in his final book, 
Camera Lucida.  Barthes, the Author, is reborn in grieving for his mother 
and throughout Camera Lucida his subjective responses to specific 
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photographs demands a theory of photography at the centre of which is 
Roland Barthes himself.  As Colin MacCabe puts it: 
 
Camera Lucida not only dedicates itself to Sartre’s L’Imaginaire but 
presupposes as its method a traditional phenomenology in which 
Barthes takes his own reaction to photographs as the fundamental 
given of his study.90 
 
It can be argued that Barthes’ need for the presence of his mother and 
the transparency of the photographic image leads him to undermine the 
practice of photography.  He writes from the perspective of the Spectator 
of the photograph rather than its Operator.  And whilst Barthes does 
engage in the discussion of photography as a chemical process, his 
disregard of the lineage of the medium through painting and the camera 
obscura amounts to a blind spot in his thinking about photography: he 
cannot see the instrumentality of the camera in the very images he loves.  
It is not necessarily my intention to reassert the authorial role of the 
photographer, rather I contend that in forgetting the instruments of 
photography we misunderstand photographs.  If we recall Sontag’s 
argument that photographic seeing has been assimilated into ordinary 
vision through the accommodation of, or forgetting of, the differences 
between the two.  Whilst his chapter will not itemise the differentials 
between ordinary vision and photographic seeing, later on Vilém Flusser’s 
argument that photography is an apparatus driven practice will be 
investigated.  We will see in due course that this opens up the possibility of 
thinking photography as a kind of writing in terms of its capacity to signify 
theoretical concepts.  However, as I will demonstrate, the argument that 
                                                
90 Colin MacCabe ‘Barthes and Bazin: The Ontology of the Image’ in Writing the Image 
After Roland Barthes Jean-Michel Rabaté (ed) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1997 p.73 
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this thesis puts forward in favour of photography as writing is structural, 
rather than conceptual.  But we should bear in mind that Flusser warns 
that if we disregard the history and industry of photography we will have 
no freedom in our use of the medium, we will be constrained by the 
photographic apparatus.  I intend to explore the Flusserian instrumentality 
of photographic images in comparison with a reading of photographs as, 
what Bruno Latour calls a “matter of concern”91.  For Latour, the matter of 
concern rather than matter of fact is a means by which problems can be 
understood in terms of networks or complexes instead of clearly 
demarcated zones of enquiry.  Considered in this way, photography 
becomes a problematic which includes both images and their methods 
of production.  Arguably, in part it is Barthes’ blindness to the instruments 
of photography which enables him to accept the photograph as natural; 
magic rather than art. 
 
According to Flusser, the photographer plays against92 the camera and its 
programme in order to try to create informative, that is, new images 
which will enrich the photographic universe.  Therefore, a philosophy of 
photography is an absolute necessity for Flusser: 
 
The task of a philosophy of photography is to reflect upon this 
possibility of freedom – and thus its significance – in a world 
dominated by apparatuses; to reflect upon the way in which, despite 
everything, it is possible for human beings to give significance to their 
                                                
91 Bruno Latour third lecture in the Nature Space Society series at Tate Modern 2004 
webcast at 
www.tatemodern.org.uk/onlineevents/webcasts/nature_space_society/bruno_latour/default.
jsp accessed 19.04.2005 
92 Vilèm Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography Anthony Mathews (trans) London: 
Reaktion Books, 2006 p.27 
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lives in face of the chance necessity of death.  Such a philosophy is 
necessary because it is the only form of revolution left open to us.93 
 
As we shall see later in the chapter, Flusser warns against photographic 
illiteracy which suggests that not only are photographs legible for 
meaning, but that there is something significant at stake should they be 
misread.  I intend to take Flusser at his word and propose that we can find 
in his text evidence that photographs signify concepts rather than 
phenomena, which enables us to rethink the practice of photography as 
a written practice rather than a practice of seeing.  Flusser argues that this 
is why technical images, such as photographs, are ontologically different 
to traditional, hand made images.  This, as I shall demonstrate in the third 
chapter, will have a profound impact upon our conceptualisation of the 
relationship between the landscape and its photographic inscriptions.   
 
II The Persistence of the Referent 
 
In his final book, Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes turns his attention away 
from theorising particular cultural practices of photography, that is, media 
and advertising photographs, towards a meditation on the meaning of 
personal photographs.  The generative moment of the book, which is 
retold in the second section, is an evening in November, just after the 
death of his mother.  Barthes is sorting through old photographs in her 
apartment with little hope that he will find an image which will enable him 
to completely remember her: 
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one of the most agonizing features of mourning, which decreed that 
however often I might consult such images, I could never recall her 
features94 
 
He is alone, going through her photographs one by one, searching in vain 
for “the truth of the face I had loved”95 and suddenly, his mother’s face is 
unexpectedly revealed to him in a photograph of her as a young girl.  The 
faded photograph with blunted corners showed Barthes his mother, truly. 
 
Something like an essence of the Photograph floated in this particular 
picture.  I therefore decided to “derive” all Photography (its “nature”) 
from the only photograph which assuredly existed for me, and to take 
it as a guide for my last investigation.96 
 
Barthes’ final meditation on photography becomes a search for the 
essence of photographs, the genius of photography.  The bereaved 
Barthes has only this image of his mother to testify to her existence, for him, 
the alchemical mausoleum of the photograph must contain an essence 
of her, for it is his only assurance of a durable connection between himself 
and his mother: the Winter Garden Photograph is her lasting presence.   
 
Indeed, as far as Barthes is concerned, without the subject, the 
photograph is effectively empty, it is a “weightless, transparent 
envelope”97, in danger of floating away without the referent to act as 
ballast.  But what is significant in Camera Lucida is that of all the images 
that Barthes saw, only one holds the complete essence of his mother, this 
image of her at the age of five, taken in 1898.  Barthes’ idea that The 
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95 Ibid. p.67 
96 Ibid. p.73 
97 Ibid. p.5 
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Photograph can bring the subject to presence is reminiscent of Susan 
Sontag’s argument that the realism of photography is a unique system for 
disclosing the real: 
 
All that photography’s program of realism actually implies is the belief 
that reality is hidden.  And, being hidden, is something to be unveiled.  
Whatever the camera records is a disclosure. 98 
 
However, for Barthes, the disclosures of photography are not automatic, 
which is demonstrated by the fact that only one of the images of his 
mother truly encapsulates all that (for Barthes) she stood for.  He writes 
how he finds partial disclosures of her in a number of old photographs but 
in these he “recognized her differentially, not essentially.”99  And in their 
partial truths, these photographs are false: 
 
Photography thereby compelled me to perform a painful labor; 
straining towards the essence of her identity, I was struggling amongst 
images partially true, and therefore totally false.100  
 
The notion of the subject in difference suggested by Barthes’ words will be 
highly significant later in this thesis.  However, for the meantime, let us 
observe that it is critical that Barthes’ rediscovery of his mother in the 
Winter Garden Photograph puts him in contact with her from a time prior 
to his own existence.  As we will see in due course, this photograph is 
Historic for Barthes.  The disclosure of his mother’s essence in this image is a 
kind of anamnesis, or recollection, indeed Barthes writes of the general 
capacity of photographs to provoke this: 
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No anamnesis could ever make me glimpse this time starting from 
myself (this is the definition of anamnesis) – whereas, contemplating a 
photograph in which she is hugging me, a child, against her, I can 
waken in myself the rumpled softness of her crêpe de Chine and the 
perfume of her rice powder.101 
 
But anamnesis, especially in the Catholic theological sense constitutes far 
more that a recollection.  Anamnesis brings the past into the present; for 
example, it is through the sacrament of the Eucharist that Christ is brought 
to presence.   
 
According to Catholic theology, the Eucharist, the consecrated 
bread and wine, is not just a token that helps us remember Jesus by 
going back to the now of then: it actually makes him present under a 
different form now.  By definition, a sacrament is a sign that does more 
than point to something else…it makes the mystery pointed to present, 
makes then now.  In technical language, it effects what it signifies.102 
 
The body of Jesus Christ is brought to presence through the ceremonial 
usage of bread and wine: Christ literally is the bread and the wine.  And 
for Barthes, the loved body of his mother is brought to presence through 
the time capsule that is the photograph.  However, significantly this does 
not rely upon a sacramental transformation, for Barthes’ mother is not 
transmogrified in the sepia of the photographic image, rather he sees 
through this brown colouration to the essence of his mother.  The 
Barthesean photograph transects time and space to bring a universe, 
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otherwise inaccessible, into the experiential, perceptual space of the 
viewer. 
 
Barthes attributes the evidentiary power of photographs to the fact that 
these images are not humanly made (unlike drawings).  His fascination 
with photographs as magical emanations endows them with a spiritual 
quality. 
 
Photography has something to do with resurrection: might we not say 
of it what the Byzantines said of the image of Christ which 
impregnated St. Veronica’s napkin: that it was not made by the hand 
of man, acheiropoietos?103 
 
Here Barthes refers to the story of St. Veronica upon whose veil Christ 
wiped his face and left an imprint, a true likeness, (vera icon).  Christ’s 
image is made manifest upon the veil by divine touch and those who look 
upon it are, in turn, touched by him.  It seems that, for Barthes, 
photography is not simply mechanical, but spiritual.  The photograph is a 
physical manifestation of the subject, which travels, unchanging, through 
time: the paper upon which it is printed is a reliquary of the once living 
body.  The immediacy of the true likeness has the power to resurrect the 
subject. 
 
For Barthes, writing in Camera Lucida, the Photograph of the Operator is 
of little interest as it lies outside of his experience, therefore, he writes from 
the position of the Spectator.  Indeed, according to Barthes, the chemical 
revelations of the photograph, which are received by deferral by the 
Spectator, are precisely what makes photographs compelling.  For the 
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Spectator of the photograph, the optical device is subordinate to the 
chemical process, the means by which the subject can be frozen in time.  
For the noeme of photography is, as far as Barthes is concerned, “That-
has-been”104; it is a mausoleum.   
 
The power of photography for Barthes, is therefore its capacity to 
“recover”105 the image of a loved body from the past.  He writes in 
‘Rhetoric of the Image’ that “the image is re-presentation, which is to say 
ultimately resurrection”.106  According to Barthes, the “That-has-been” of 
photography opens a new space time, which brings here-now into 
contact with there-then, the noeme of photography is its capacity to 
bring these temporal discontinuities into spatial contiguity: 
 
What we have here is a new space time category: spatial immediacy 
and temporal anteriority, the photograph being an illogical 
conjunction between the here-now and the there-then.107 
 
The ideal Barthesean photograph is not a simulacrum but a manifestation 
of the subject; the photograph, in these terms, brings the subject into an 
eternal now.  But, as we have already seen, not all of the photographs 
Barthes encountered on that evening in November possessed the power 
of the 1898 image; the other photographs contained only partial 
disclosures of his mother.  It is Barthes’ exclusion from the experience of 
the originary moment of the photographic which is significant.  Thus the 
very definition of the 1898 image as Historical is pivotal to Barthes’ interest 
in it: 
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Thus the life of someone whose existence has somewhat preceded 
our own encloses in its particularity the very tension of History, its 
division.  History is hysterical: it is constituted only if we consider it, only 
if we look at it – and in order to look at it, we must be excluded from it.  
As a living soul, I am the very contrary of History, I am what belies it, 
destroys it for the sake of my own history (impossible for me to believe 
in “witnesses”; impossible at least, to be one…That is what the time 
when my mother was alive before me is – History.108 
 
The hysterical nature of History which Barthes speaks of is the division in 
time, which is allied to the moment of his birth.  History is annihilated by the 
birth of the individual and the hysteria of History is its association with the 
womb, the womb of Barthes’ mother, through which he was brought to 
presence.  Barthes cannot see his mother in those other photographs 
because he cannot witness her from within his own lifetime.  It is only the 
separation from his mother, through an intervening History, which triggers 
his ability to act as witness to her benign and generous nature revealed in 
this faded photograph.  Barthes needs this temporal separation in order to 
see clearly. 
 
The disclosure of Barthes’ mother in the Winter Garden Photograph, sets in 
motion the writing of his last book which is a rediscovery of Barthes’ 
relationship with his mother through the photographic medium.  Camera 
Lucida is more a psychological exploration of photography and less a 
sociological investigation into the role of the family photograph.  In 
Barthes’ late photographic universe, the persistence of the referent is 
crucial: the studium of photography is merely of polite interest to him; 
whereas the punctum of certain photographs subjectively moves him, 
                                                
108 Roland Barthes Camera Lucida Richard Howard (trans), London: Vintage, 2000 p.65 
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their details poignantly wounding him.  The studium and the punctum are 
thus two key themes of photography for Barthes, the studium is always 
coded, encrypted, whereas the punctum is not.  It is personal; the referent 
motivates the observer via the punctum, rather than the observer’s 
“sovereign consciousness”109 directing the referent via the studium. The 
studium mediates the emotional response to photographs by the codified 
structures of politics or history.  The studium is an ‘average’ effect of 
cultural training. 
 
It is by studium that I am interested in so many photographs, whether I 
receive them as political testimony or enjoy them as good historical 
scenes: for it is culturally (this connotation is present in studium) that I 
participate in the figures, the faces, the settings, the actions.110 
 
However, the punctum ruptures the studium and motivates the Spectator 
directly.  The punctum is in the detail of the image and it is entirely 
subjective: 
 
The second element will break (or punctuate) the studium.  This time it 
is not I who seek it out (as I invest the field of studium with my 
sovereign consciousness), it is this element which rises from the scene, 
shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me.111 
 
The punctum is accidental, it cannot be controlled by the photographer, 
or indeed the Spectator, the punctum undermines the intentional 
meaning of the photograph.  The punctum is ‘supplementary’ to the 
referent, it is a punctuation within the experience of looking at the 
photograph: pointedly emotional: 
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A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also 
bruises me, is poignant to me).112 
 
Thus the punctum of the photograph, in opposition to the pure studium of 
media or advertising photography, is personally significant, that is, the 
experience is incommunicable to any other person.  Barthes says:  “What I 
can name cannot really prick me.”113  This, argues James Elkins in 
Photography Theory, suppresses discussion, theory and discourse: “the 
punctum is solipsistic…it closes down dialogue and discourse”114.  The dart 
of the punctum shoots from the referent to Roland Barthes, sometimes 
catching him unawares, but always catching him: the referent touches 
Barthes through the photograph. 
 
The photograph is literally an emanation of the referent.  From a real 
body, which was there, proceed radiations which ultimately touch 
me, who am here; the duration of the transmission is insignificant; the 
photograph of the missing being, as Sontag says, will touch me like the 
delayed rays of a star.  A sort of umbilical cord links the body of the 
photographed thing to my gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a 
carnal medium, a skin I share with anyone who has been 
photographed.115 
 
The radiation of light from the referent, cemented and carnalised by the 
medium of photography, ties the body of the photographed to the gaze 
of the observer like a thread.  Barthes calls it a kind of umbilical cord, 
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recalling the generative image of the book.  Insofar as the punctum is the 
cause of a purely subjective response to the referent in the photograph, 
the photographic image cannot be thought as a sign, indeed the 
punctum undermines the photograph’s capacity to function semiotically.  
The photograph is, to use the words of Rosalind Krauss, “the index that is 
caught at the heel by the object from which it is cast”116 and for Barthes, 
the pure contingency of the photograph puts it outside meaning because 
it is unable to signify the general.  The photograph is unmarked: 
 
Photography is unclassifiable because there is no reason to mark this 
or that of its occurrences; it aspires, perhaps, to become as crude, as 
certain, as noble as a sign, which would afford it access to the dignity 
of a language: but for there to be a sign there must be a mark; 
deprived of a principle of marking, photographs are signs which don’t 
take, which turn, as milk does.  Whatever it grants to vision and 
whatever its manner, a photograph is always invisible: it is not it that 
we see.117 
 
Therefore, according to Barthes, the photograph cannot be a sign 
because signification relies upon differentiation and markedness.  In order 
for there to be a sign, the signifier and the signified must be semiotically 
marked, or codified, that is, differenced from all other signifiers and 
signifieds.  For Barthes, photographs are unmarked insofar as they are 
indistinguishable from the world.  The photograph is a sign which does not 
take, that is to say, the signifier and the signified do not stick but separate, 
curdling like milk.  The referent is held in suspension in the transparent body 
of the photograph, floating in the whey in the form of a solidified curd.  
This leads Barthes to contend that it is always the subject, not the 
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photograph that the Spectator sees.  The putative transparency of 
Barthes’ photograph sets up a relationship between spectator and 
photograph which renders the means of photographic production 
invisible. 
 
 
III Natural Icons 
 
For Barthes, the syntagm, or surface structure of the photograph is natural, 
it is an imprint or stencil of the referent.  It is given in virtue of the fact that 
the photograph is an analogue of reality.  As far as Barthes is concerned, 
the same could not be said of a painting or a drawing, for these kinds of 
images are connotative, or coded, from the outset, drawing is “rule-
governed”118. I will explore the problems with this in due course, but for the 
time being, let us look a little more closely at Barthes’ thoughts on this.  
Whilst the natural icon supports connotation, which we discussed briefly in 
chapter one in terms of Barthes’ writing on myth, fundamentally for 
Barthes, photographic images cannot function according to Saussurrean 
semiology because photographs are not arbitrary.  The photograph is an 
analogue of the world, or indeed an emanation of it.  Therefore 
photographs do not have a digital code, and, furthermore, they do not 
have a double articulation.  That is to say, photographic signs, i.e. signs 
which supervene on a putatively natural syntagm, are not underpinned 
by smaller units, as words are (phonemes in speech and graphemes in 
writing).  Thus photographs are not artificial like language but, essentially, 
Barthes argues, they are natural, uncodified. 
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the photograph (in its literal state), by virtue of its absolutely 
analogical nature, seems to constitute a message without a code.119 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the objects in the denotative, natural 
image generate meanings according to available cultural codes.  Albeit 
uncoded (in Barthes’ view), the intentional photograph does constitute a 
message.  In Barthes’ earlier writing on photography we can see that 
although the photograph is not linguistic, it supports second order 
signification, or myth.  And as we saw previously for Barthes, it is the 
manner in which the two messages in the photograph (the coded icon 
and the uncoded icon) interact with one another which invests the 
intentional photograph with a pseudo-truth.  The naturalisation of the 
symbolic message affords intentional images like advertising posters a 
certain power.  The natural manifestation - “a kind of natural being-there 
of objects”120 is allied with the practice of connotation which enables 
these indisputable copies of the world to support a range of meanings. 
 
Whilst we must remember that in ‘Rhetoric of the Image’ Barthes writes of 
intentional, culturally meaningful images, whereas in Camera Lucida his 
concern is far more personal, nevertheless, we can draw parallels 
between the images in each text.  The codified studium is an intentional 
image which supports cultural meanings, whereas, the uncodified 
punctum is the denotative, unintended received prick of a detail in the 
photograph which enables the past to be accessed from the present.  It is 
the denotative capacity of photographs which allows Barthes to be 
touched by the image of his mother, the touch is a “treasury of rays” 
which “emanated from…her hair, her skin, her dress, her gaze, on that 
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 97 
day.”121  It is important to stress that for any other reader, the Winter 
Garden Photograph would be pure studium, culturally not emotionally 
significant. 
 
Barthes’ realist ontology of photographic images rests upon his argument 
that the surface structures of photographs are natural.  However, Barthes 
does commit to a photographic realism which can be semiotically 
manipulated to generate pseudo truths.  The meaning of images, that is 
the myth of photographs, is, for Barthes, generated by practices and 
readings which play on their naturalness, enabling photographs to present 
powerful naturalisations of cultural messages: the photographic image 
bathes the message in  “lustral innocence”122.  Barthes’ notion that 
photographs transparently presence the subject, that they are incarnated 
in the natural surface of the image, gives us the idea that photographs 
are natural states of things.  In their literal state, Barthesean photographs 
are naïve and innocent analogues of the real; they are facts of the world, 
with juridical functions in society: seeing is believing.  The possibility of the 
separation of Barthes’ thesis on photography – early and late – is difficult 
insofar as his earlier writings seeks out the mythic function of photography, 
whereas his late commitment is to the living photograph which preserves 
the loved body.  This forces Barthes to write about two kinds of 
photography, a distinction which is untenable.  Indeed, Colin MacCabe 
argues that Barthes’ late writing on the subject does not adequately 
reference the influence of André Bazin.  In addition to this, it is MacCabe’s 
contention that Barthes does not construct a sufficient argument in 
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defence of the referent’s adherence to the subject123, which we shall 
touch on a little later. 
 
However, I conjecture that Barthes’ insistence on the transparency of 
photographs and his consequent denial of the photographic apparatus in 
Camera Lucida is deeply problematic, not because his argument writes 
the photographer out of the process, but because he writes a significant 
part of the process out of photography.  Although Barthes does argue in 
favour of the chemical process, this is purely from the point of view that 
this process enables the subject in the photograph to be manifested for 
the Spectator, it is upon this that, for Barthes, pure photographic 
contingency turns.  Indeed, his argument that the photograph of the 
Spectator is chemical, revelatory and unconcerned with the 
photographic apparatus, assumes that the photographic process is 
merely a means to re-present the referent in the amniotic fluid of the 
photographic image: the subject is revealed by development and fixing, 
by chemical processing.  
 
However, in Barthes’ ideal image of his mother a kind of mysterious 
mediation is brought into play.  The 1898 image is more than an analogue 
copy, the truth, the essence of his mother, is produced by the 
photographer, not the equipment itself: 
 
The unknown photographer of Chennevières-sur-Marne had been the 
mediator of a truth…he had produced a supererogatory photograph 
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which contained more than that what the technical being of 
photography can reasonably offer.124 
 
The analogue copy is supplemented by the action of the photographer 
who reveals much more in his image than could be technically expected 
of the medium.  The image of Barthes’ mother is not simply a copy; it has 
an aura.  Barthes goes on to write that “the Winter Garden Photograph 
was indeed essential, it achieved for me, utopically, the impossible 
science of a unique being.”125  The presence of his mother in the 
photograph, entails that the image attains the impossible: the complete 
expression of his mother’s uniqueness.  The photograph is a perfect state: 
but this state is utopian; it is imaginary. 
 
Barthes’ emotional investment in the image and his reticence to have it 
printed, means that in effect, we are discussing a non-existent image (or 
rather there is no evidence of its existence aside from Barthes’ testimony).  
But as he intimates in Camera Lucida, to reproduce the image would be 
inconsequential, for it would be read as pure studium: the photograph 
could not wound the emotionally detached viewer as it had Barthes.  
However, the photograph’s capacity to embody the perfect state of his 
mother’s being, is by Barthes’ own admission, imagined: his belief in this 
image is an act of faith.  Liliane Weissberg writes that 
 
Camera Lucida is a book not only about photography but also about 
an absent photograph, one that is merely described and perhaps 
wished for.  It stands for Barthes’ desire itself.126 
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The absent image parallels the absent mother and we are pressed to feel 
the acuteness of Roland Barthes’ loss. 
 
The photographic moment can only ever be experienced at a remove: 
both the operator and the spectator are excluded from it.  Barthes is 
blind, I believe intentionally, to the innovation, industry and science which 
enables his mother to be revealed and the mausoleum of the photograph 
to be entered.  As a practising photographer, I find it strange to think 
about the revelation of Barthes’ mother as a supplement brought into 
play by the photographer.  As we shall see in due course, the 
photographer is constrained by the apparatus, which as Vilèm Flusser 
argues, the photographer plays against in order to create novel images, 
which are nonetheless predetermined by the photographic programme.  
Whilst there are problems with Flusser’s argument, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter, the notion that the photographer was responsible for 
the mediation of a truth in The Winter Garden Photograph, on this one 
singular occasion, is deeply suspect.  But if the instruments of photography 
begin to be taken into consideration, we grasp that the photographic 
moment is not so much revealed as (re)constructed.   
 
Barthes discounts the Operator’s photograph insofar as it is beyond his 
experience: he is not a maker of photographs, not even an amateur.  He 
professes himself far too impatient for this; rather his function is as a 
consumer of images.  Whilst searching for an account of photographs 
which are personally meaningful for him, Barthes elides the mechanism of 
photography, the apparatus which makes the Photograph (of the 
Operator and Spectator) possible.  The weightless contingency of Roland 
Barthes’ photographic image, with their operators and apparatuses 
hidden from view, belies the method of its own production.  Barthes, so 
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desperate to find his mother, it seems, could only see his mother.  Blinded 
by the referent, the spectator of the Barthesean photograph sees only the 
past.  The photographed past comes up to meet us in the present: the 
photograph presences the past. 
 
IV The Photograph as Technical Image 
 
In Barthes’ late writings, the theory of the text and his emotional account 
of the significance of photography diverge.  This leads, on the one hand, 
to a body of work which explores text and its open structure, a field rather 
than a material object, and on the other, to the book Camera Lucida, 
which is emotional and personal.  Camera Lucida calls for a personal, 
almost sacred reading of photographs: punctum, rather than studium.  
The increasing opacity of the text, subject to dilatory diversions of 
meaning via a chain of signifiers, is offset in Barthes’ writings on 
photography by a movement from translucency to transparency.  The 
referent, bracketed by Saussurean linguistics is, in Barthes’ late 
photographic writing, resurrected in the photograph, a natural image.  
The photograph and the text peel away from one another; where the text 
is mobile, its meaning subject to deferral, the significance of the personal 
photograph is assured: it is a resurrection, an incarnation of the loved 
body laid down in salts of silver. 
 
However, even writing in Camera Lucida, Barthes cannot quite dispense 
with the cultural importance of photographs to incite thought.  He writes 
that in “ ‘good’ photographs the object speaks, it induces us, vaguely, to 
think.”127  Making the world speak through photographs is a theme to 
which we will return in later chapters, but for the time being let us simply 
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observe that for Barthes, the value of successful photographs is their ability 
to make the world speak, and to provoke thoughtfulness in the observer.  
He writes: 
 
Ultimately, Photography is subversive not when it frightens, repels, or 
even stigmatizes, but when it is pensive, when it thinks.128 
 
The revolutionary possibilities for photography lie in its capacity to be 
thoughtful.  The freedom of the photographic is as a thinking process, a 
medium which incites us to think, however vaguely.  This notion of 
photographic freedom arising from thoughtful revolution is the ultimate 
conclusion of Vilém Flusser’s Towards a Philosophy of Photography.  A 
philosophy of photography, in a world governed and controlled by 
apparatuses, is, in his words “the only form of revolution left open to us.”129  
Philosophically aware photography, that is reflexive practice, is an 
expression of freedom. 
 
I would now like to turn my attention to Flusser’s text in order to begin to 
question Roland Barthes’ thinking regarding the transparency of the 
photograph and what I perceive to be his blindness in the face of the 
instrumentality of photography.  As we have seen, for Barthes, it is as if the 
camera does not exist and although he purports to be writing from the 
point of view of the Spectator rather than the Operator, the absence of 
engagement with the mechanics of photographic images constitutes a 
fundamental lack of understanding regarding the significance of how 
they come to be.  I intend to focus on Towards a Philosophy of 
Photography by Vilém Flusser because the apparatus plays an important 
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role in his thinking about photography.  In this book, the photograph is 
imbricated in its techniques of production and by focussing my attention 
on this reading of photography, we begin to find a way of illuminating 
Barthes’ blind spot.  The apparatus of photography elucidated by Flusser 
will then be looked at in relation to the writing of Bruno Latour whose 
notion of the imbroglio is of direct relevance.  However, firstly, I will look at 
Flusser’s ideas regarding the photograph as technical image, an image of 
concepts rather than natural analogue.  I will then consider what the 
significance of this might be in terms of the conception of photographic 
realism. 
 
The photograph is a technical image, and, according to Flusser, technical 
images are produced by apparatuses.  The significance of the camera in 
terms of a philosophy of apparatuses is the fact that it can be treated as 
a “prototype”130 for the analysis of other apparatuses:  
 
those apparatuses that, on the one hand, assume gigantic size, 
threatening to disappear from our field of vision (like the apparatus of 
management) and, on the other hand, shrivel up, becoming 
microscopic in size so as to totally escape our grasp (like the chips in 
electronic apparatuses).131 
 
The technical image is produced by the apparatus of the camera and as 
such, it is informed by its apparatus.  Flusser argues that technical images 
are “metacodes of texts which…signify texts, not the world out there.”132  
Rather than accepting the photograph as a natural image which is 
uncoded, as Barthes argues photographs are in their literal state, Flusser 
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states that the technical image is in fact difficult to decode because it is 
treated as though it is objective.  But according to Flusser, this is simply an 
illusion. 
 
Technical images are difficult to decode, for a strange reason.  To all 
appearance, they do not have to be decoded since their 
significance (the finger) is the cause and the image (the copy) is the 
consequence.133 
 
Barthes argues that the referent persists in the photograph, that it is made 
apparent through the surface of the photographic image.  The putative 
transparency of photographic images causes them to be treated as 
though they are windows through which the world, as it really is, can be 
seen.  By thinking photographic images in this way, as we saw in the 
earlier analysis of Barthes, we are in danger of misapprehending 
photographs due to a lack of critical enquiry into their status as the 
technical products of apparatuses.  Flusser writes that to think the 
photograph as window entails that “[t]heir criticism is not an analysis of 
their production but an analysis of the world.”134  Indeed, as we will see in 
due course, there is an argument to be made that the referent does not 
persist in the photograph at all, the photograph is the text of a text. In any 
case, the significant point here is that the technical image demonstrates 
that photographs are indeed rule governed, they are humanly made.  
 
Technical images, argues Flusser, are ontologically different to traditional 
images because as the products of apparatuses they are informed by 
applied theoretical texts. 
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The technical image is an image produced by apparatuses.  As 
apparatuses themselves are the products of applied scientific texts, in 
the case of technical images one is dealing with the indirect products 
of scientific texts.  This gives them, historically and ontologically, a 
position that is different from that of traditional images…Ontologically, 
traditional images signify phenomena whereas technical images 
signify concepts.135  
 
Thus the scientific, political, social and historical dimension of photography 
is tied to the development of photographic equipment and materials, 
which affects the photographic way of seeing, which has been 
eloquently demonstrated by Susan Sontag to be distinct from ordinary 
vision.136  However, as Flusser states above, technical images differ from 
traditional images in virtue of the fact that they are produced by 
apparatuses.  The ontological difference between these kinds of images 
is, for Flusser, based upon the fact that traditional images signify 
phenomena, whereas technical images signify concepts.  Therefore, if we 
are to apply Flusser’s definition of technical images to photographs, the 
notion of photographic seeing must be treated as metaphorical.   
 
Indeed, according to Jonathan Crary, writing in Techniques of the 
Observer, the model of the ideal spectator as an extension of the camera 
obscura is radically undermined by the developments in understanding 
visual perception which took place at the start of the eighteenth century.  
It was at this time that discoveries were made regarding the stimulation of 
the visual cortex by means other than through the eyes.  The camera 
therefore merely simulates the eye, which, for Flusser, is only one aspect of 
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the camera as apparatus.  As the technical image signifies concepts, 
photographs are more like ways of thinking than ways of seeing: the 
camera gives us theoretical images which are there to be decoded, 
rather than facilitating transparent visual access to the real.  To treat the 
photograph as the product of technicised, monocular vision amounts to a 
misinterpretation of the camera as a disembodied spectator.  Not only 
does this miss the cerebral, interpretive aspect of vision, this definition of 
the camera is problematic insofar as it gives us an image of the camera 
as an ideal subject which objectifies the world under its monocular gaze.  
Instead of thinking photography in terms of photographic seeing, or 
photographs as representations of vision, I believe that it is more 
productive to think of the practice of photography as inscriptive, and by 
extension, following Flusser, as the inscription of photographic concepts. 
 
According to Flusser, the image made by the camera, facilitated by the 
functionary (the photographer), is inscribed by the science(s) that 
enabled their invention: optics (and later, with the advent of colour 
photography, chemistry).  The concepts which photographic images 
demonstrate are optical and chemical theories. 
 
‘Black’ and ‘white’ are concepts e.g. theoretical concepts of optics.  
As black-and-white states of things are theoretical, they can never 
actually exist in the world.  But black-and-white photographs do 
actually exist because they are images of concepts belonging to the 
theory of optics, i.e. they arise out of this theory…Grey is the colour of 
theory: which shows that one cannot reconstruct the world anymore 
from a theoretical analysis.  Black-and-white photographs illustrate this 
fact: They are grey, they are theoretical images.137 
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If we cannot reconstruct the world from a theoretical analysis, as Flusser 
states, it can be argued that photographic representations of the world 
present us with new constructions of the world.  The grey, theoretical 
image, far from being a lifeless and drab reconstruction of the world is in 
fact the opening onto a new world, a world that has been inscribed on a 
light sensitive surface, granular and opaque.  The photograph is not 
natural and unmarked, it is a cultural inscription, marked out by the 
technology which created it: the photograph is written. 
 
If photography owes little to ordinary vision, but is a means of recording 
that we happen to call photographic ‘seeing’, it could be said that 
photography represents, not vision, but its own conditions of existence.  
 
Photography has its own idiom; indeed one could even say it is its own 
idiom.  To argue that photography is its own idiom is to propose that 
photographic images are the private property of the camera.  Although 
seemingly strange, there is an element of logic in this, particularly in view 
of Flusser’s argument that the camera is a black box: it is impenetrable by 
the photographer who merely inputs data from the outside.   
 108 
 
 
The technical interpretations of the photographic intervention are the 
presentations of the grammar of the medium itself.  Perhaps uniquely 
amongst the visual arts, photography is idiomatic in the etymological 
sense of the word.  The secretive, mechanised box, inscribes its own reality 
onto light sensitive materials.138  The properties of the images are private in 
the sense that they are photography’s own, that they emerge from the 
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darkness and it is only by photographic method that they can be 
revealed.  Photography inserts its own habits of recording, which we 
erroneously accept as analogous to our vision.  But even if the camera 
had an eye, it would not be innocent.  Indeed Flusser writes: 
 
There is no such thing as a naïve, non-conceptual photography.  A 
photograph is an image of concepts.  In this sense, all photographers’ 
criteria are contained within the camera’s program.139 
 
Photographic realism is not necessarily the manifestation of the world, or 
even the world seen, but the revelation of the world inscribed 
photographically.  The photograph is a picture of the world from inside the 
darkened box of the camera, which is sealed and operated from the 
outside: it excludes the photographer at the very point where visionary 
control is desired.  The camera points in on itself, it ingests the world and 
the photographic intervention lies latent in the surface of the film until the 
appropriate chemicals reveal and solidify it.   
 
 
What photography shows us is its own discourse on the world, partially 
hidden, in wait inside the darkened camera.  And the photograph 
                                                
139 Vilém Flusser Towards a Philosophy of Photography Anthony Mathews (trans) London: 
Reaktion Books, 2006 p.36 
The Continued Saga of an Amateur Photographer, Stephen Pippin 
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manifests the momentary blindness of the photographer, an image of the 
blink in the photographer’s vision: a blind spot.  As I will demonstrate in a 
later chapter, this blindness is a generative trope within my own practice.  
It is a means by which I explore the landscape photographically enabling 
the deconstruction, and reconstruction, of the view. 
 
V The Culture of Nature  
 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, the notion that the photographic 
syntagm is natural and it produces a magical emanation of the subject, is 
central to Barthes’ writing on photography.  At the start of the first 
chapter, it was intimated that certain binary oppositions would be 
investigated throughout the course of this thesis, in particular, 
nature/culture, which impacts not only on photography but also 
landscape.  As I hope to demonstrate in the chapter which follows this, 
we will see that these binary oppositions are not fundamental or essential, 
but, as we saw in the previous chapter, as Jacques Derrida argues, they 
are produced by différance.  However, for the time being at least, I intend 
to discuss the idea posited by the contemporary French philosopher Bruno 
Latour, that ‘nature’ is contested, it is a term which is subject to dispute.  
Latour’s argument is, to an extent, Derridean, as he contends that systems 
and institutions produce truths rather than disclose them.  I would now like 
to spend some time presenting Latour’s argument regarding the 
relationship between nature and politics in order to demonstrate that our 
reliance on an uncritical definition of nature is problematic.   
 
Now one might legitimately ask, what has this to do with photography?  It 
is my contention that what Latour says about nature is consistent with 
Flusser’s argument regarding the photograph and in tandem these 
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arguments nullify Barthes’ claims for the transparency of photography.  In 
short, Latour’s means of questioning ecology’s capacity to know nature 
transparently is consistent with our questioning of the Barthesean 
Photograph’s capacity to transparently show the world.  In addition, 
Latour’s argument regarding the politics of nature forces us to reconsider 
our relation with the natural world.  Although the focus of this thesis is on 
landscapes which lie broadly within the concern of the ‘new 
topographers’, that is man-altered landscapes, what J.B. Jackson terms as 
‘synthetic spaces’, it is important not to gloss over or ignore the 
significance of nature within the thesis.  
 
According to Latour, it is only the West which has conceptualised a 
separation between humans and the natural world, i.e. culture, and 
nature, “humans and non-humans”140.  Nature is treated by the West as 
an original category: the teleological movement of Western civilization is 
the transition from nature to culture, indeed, in terms of etymology of the 
word, culture originates in the cultivation of the natural.  The 
conceptualisation of culture as a “cultivation of the mind, manners, 
etc.”141 arises in the sixteenth century, whilst during the century prior to this, 
culture denoted a piece of tilled land.  Thus bound in the term culture we 
have notions of the cultivation of land and mind, and the improvement of 
nature: the body becomes an extension of the land, a place of 
refinement and improvement, gradually being moulded and tilled until 
the natural body is cultured.  The socialised (and intellectualised) body is 
defined, and indeed defines itself, in contradistinction to nature.  The 
category ‘nature’, is the ground from which human culture, in the West, 
                                                
140 Bruno Latour We Have Never Been Modern Catherine Porter (trans), Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993 p.104 
141 Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, Charles Talbot Onions (ed), Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978 p.235 
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emerges.  The state of nature is written as the origin or wellspring of 
Western civilization: the land tilled by history and progress (and sin). 
 
In Bruno Latour’s book The Politics of Nature, his hypothesis is that the terms 
politics and nature need to be rethought to enable a comprehensive 
theoretical enquiry into political ecology and the problem of how to 
make the Sciences democratic.  Although politics, and indeed political 
ecology are not central to this thesis, Latour’s conception of the relation 
between the instruments and protocols of Science and the natural world 
is, I shall demonstrate, pertinent.  In The Politics of Nature, Latour seeks to 
reconfigure the Gordian knot generated by dichotomies such as ‘man 
and nature’ or ‘subject and object’.  He writes: “I am going to shake it 
around in a lot of different ways.  I shall untie a few of its strands in order to 
knot them back together differently.”142 
 
Nature, is the site of cultural and political disagreements and according to 
Latour, part of the problem for political ecology is generated by the 
absence of any kind of challenge to the concept of an external, unified 
nature.  However, he argues that nature is an extremely complex term, 
which is culturally and politically motivated, and multivalent insofar as it is 
constituted by the user’s viewpoint.  When Ferdinand de Saussure 
discussed his endeavour to theorise linguistics from the position of the 
speaker, he stated: 
 
Far from it being the object that antedates the viewpoint, it would 
seem that it is the viewpoint that creates the object143 
                                                
142 Bruno Latour The Politics of Nature how to bring the sciences into democracy 
Catherine Porter (trans), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004 p.3 
143 Ferdinand de Saussure ‘The Linguistic Sign’ from Course in General Lingustics reprinted 
in Semiotics: an introductory reader ed Robert E. Innis London: Hutchison & Co., 1986 p. 
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This parallels Latour’s notion that nature is defined according to the use to 
which it is to be put.  The definition of nature is dependent upon the 
individual speaker, or group of speakers.  In this sense, the varying 
conceptions of nature is parole rather than langue, and from our earlier 
investigations, we have explored the notion that Roland Barthes would 
say that it is myth. 
 
This slippery definition of nature,144 clustered around varying viewpoints 
gives rise to a complex embroilment of politics, nature and science, in 
which political ecology is not at all clearly defined.   
 
To be close to nature is not to be close to outside, indisputable entities 
but to be inside dispute.145 
 
The Latourean imbroglio is a confusion of politics, science and nature 
which cannot be adequately analysed by an intellectual field which is 
separated into distinct etymological frameworks, and arranged 
according to different disciplines.  Latour argues that this separation (the 
slicing of the Gordian knot) has produced a “crisis of the critical stance”146 
because these complex, hybrid intellectual situations are almost 
unthinkable due to the way that they are divided by the different 
epistemic frameworks: their totality cannot be embraced.  A single 
                                                
144 Latour also argues that culture cannot be defined: “How can one not establish a 
radical difference between universal Nature and relative culture?  But the very notion of 
culture is an artefact created by bracketing Nature off.  Cultures – different or universal – 
do not exist, any more than Nature does.” We Have Never Been Modern p.104 
145 Bruno Latour third lecture in the Nature Space Society series at Tate Modern 2004 
webcast at 
www.tatemodern.org.uk/onlineevents/webcasts/nature_space_society/bruno_latour/default.
jsp accessed 01.07.2008 
146 Bruno Latour We Have Never Been Modern Catherine Porter (trans), Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993 p.5 
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episteme cannot encompass the entire problematic, in effect the whole 
situation is unable to be seen from a singular viewpoint: 
 
Can anyone imagine a study that would treat the ozone hole as 
simultaneously naturalized, sociologized and deconstructed?  A study 
in which the nature of the phenomena might be firmly established 
and the strategies of power predictable, but nothing would be at 
stake but meaning effects that project the pitiful illusions of a nature 
and a speaker?…We may glorify the science, play power games or 
make fun of the belief in reality, but we must not mix these three 
caustic acids.147 
 
It is as though the episteme, theorised according to Michel Foucault as “a 
time- and culture-bound framework of discourse”148 is unable to contain 
this multiplicity of viewpoints, which perpetuates the “crisis of the critical 
stance”149 which Latour writes about.  This leads to a number of epistemes 
being brought into play which inevitably run into conflict.  I would argue 
that this crisis of objectivity is the inevitable result of interdisciplinarity.  
Interdisciplinarity forces us to assume multiple viewpoints and challenges 
fixed intellectual positions. 
 
Latour and his colleagues, described by Latour himself in We Have Never 
Been Modern, as intellectual hybrids, have been committed to the study 
of the proliferation of these complex hybrid networks, attempting to retie 
the Gordian knot which has been sliced by the respective 
epistemological positions: 
 
                                                
147 Ibid. p.6 
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Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993 p.5 
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Whatever label we use we are always attempting to retie the Gordian 
knot by crisscrossing…the divide that separates exact knowledge and 
the exercise of power – let us say nature and culture.  Hybrids 
ourselves, installed lopsidedly within scientific institutions, half engineers 
and half philosophers, ‘tiers instruits’ (Serres 1991) without having 
sought the role, we have chosen to follow the imbroglios wherever 
they take us.  To shuttle back and forth, we rely on the notion of 
translation, or network.150 
 
The retying of the Gordian knot is the progressive interweaving between 
disciplines to create networks which facilitate connectivity between 
separate epistemes.  This intertextual metaphor for interdisciplinarity is 
pertinent as it demonstrates the multiple and sometimes conflicting roles 
required in interdisciplinary practice.  Additionally, this shows the difficulty 
of interdisciplinary practice when divergent lexica are mobilised, which 
we encountered earlier through Roland Barthes.  The notion of 
interdisciplinary practice as a network or tissue of relations will be explored 
in greater depth during chapter five.  This chapter will explore relational 
aesthetics, particularly in terms of the openness of practice based 
outcomes in a gallery setting.  The retying of the Gordian knot undertaken 
by Latour and his colleagues alerts us to the need for the interdisciplinary 
practitioner to go between disciplines rather than to use one discipline to 
critique another.  Interdisciplinary practice is, in this regard, the site of a 
dialogue between practices. 
 
VI Natural Icons in Dispute 
 
Finally, during the remainder of this chapter I will investigate the 
implications of Latour’s understanding of nature in terms of the 
                                                
150 Ibid. p.3 
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photograph as natural icon.  As far as Latour is concerned, nature has not 
provided mankind with the political order that was expected (i.e. the 
natural hierarchy or order of things).  He contends that we find ourselves 
outside of nature, indeed nature is inside of culture in the form of 
glasshouses, the Biosphere 2 project in Arizona, the Eden project, National 
Parks and even landscapes: nature as representation is inside of culture, it 
is artificial.  Nature is a “composite collection”151, a representation of our 
relationship with non-humans.  According to Latour, the definition of 
nature depends upon position, vocabulary and ideology, it is contested.  
Therefore, to be close to nature, in a Latourean sense, is to be at the heart 
of conflict regarding what constitutes the natural.  For Latour, the 
universalising, totalising category ‘nature’ cannot be claimed to be 
completely separate from society.  Nature does not provide a fixed 
ground against which culture is offset, particularised as nature’s Other.  
The discipline of ecology has no privileged connection or interaction with 
nature.  Ecology does not know nature, transparently, as it were, but relies 
upon the mediations of the discipline of Science:   
 
this nature becomes knowable through the intermediary of the 
sciences; it has been formed through networks of instruments; it is 
defined through the interventions of professions, disciplines, and 
protocols; it is distributed via databases; it is provided with arguments 
through the intermediary of learned societies.152 
 
The instrumentality of the sciences mediates nature, that is, we know 
about nature via the apparatus of science.  The interventions of scientists, 
                                                
151 Bruno Latour third lecture in the Nature Space Society series at Tate Modern 2004 
webcast at 
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152 Bruno Latour We Have Never Been Modern Catherine Porter (trans), Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993 p. 4 
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the network of bodies of knowledge are practices which construct 
contradictory ideas of nature.  We come to know nature through science, 
and as Latour argues, by making the apparatuses which make nature 
known to us visible, we will begin to understand the need to make the 
sciences democratic. 
 
However, Latour posits that the ramifications of the crisis of objectivity are 
seen most clearly in the need for new kinds of objects.  The ‘old objects’ 
are well defined, with clear boundaries, these were conceived and 
produced by researchers, engineers, entrepreneurs, who immediately 
became invisible once the objects were completed and marketed.  
Latour states that these old, essential objects must give way to new, 
complex objects which 
 
take on the  aspect of tangled beings, forming rhizomes and 
networks…their producers are no longer invisible, out of sight; they 
appear in broad daylight, embarrassed, controversial, complicated, 
implicated, with all their instruments, laboratories, workshops and 
factories.  Scientific, technological, and industrial production has been 
an integral part of their definition from the beginning.153 
 
The crisis of the objectivity of political ecology demonstrates the need to 
move from old objects as ‘matters of fact’ to new objects, tangled, and 
complex with their method of production externally demonstrated, 
informing the framework for their reception and comprehension.  The 
scientist, producer, engineer, institution are all thrown into the spotlight, 
made visible as an integral part of the complex that is the object.  These 
new objects are, for Latour, not indisputable, like matters of fact, but 
rather disputable and controversial, they are ‘matters of concern.’  These 
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matters of concern wear their method of production on the outside, 
visible, implicated and problematic. 
 
The Latourean ‘matter of concern’ is relevant to our argument at hand 
insofar as what currently concerns us is the putative transparency of 
photography, the notion that through the photograph we have 
unmediated contact with the real.  Just as ecology does not have 
privileged access to nature, that is to say, we only know nature indirectly 
through ecology, the photograph does not necessarily put us in contact 
with the world as it truly is.  As we shall see in due course, the Latourean 
‘matter of concern’ resonates strongly with a model of photography 
which posits that the photograph is an image in which its maker and its 
apparatus are heavily implicated.  The photograph, thought as technical 
image whose means of production is not invisible but evident in its making 
calls the Barthesean natural icon into dispute. 
 
In what remains of this chapter I will now consider how we might begin to 
conceive photography in terms of Latour and Flusser’s ideas.  If we are to 
move away from the photograph as natural icon, how do we begin to 
define photographic images?  As I shall demonstrate shortly, Flusser 
provides us with a way in to thinking photographs as encoded inscriptions: 
photographic images as texts of the world.  As Barthes would have it, the 
syntagm of photographic images is natural: photographs are analogue 
copies of the world.  The denotative or natural sign points to the world ‘out 
there’ and in its transparent state the photograph is not aesthetically 
significant, nor is it communicative (aside from anthropological detail).  
The photograph is proof of existence and, significantly for Barthes, it 
reminds us of the future death of the living subject who is immortalised in 
the photograph.  The natural image refers to external, indisputable 
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entities, indeed the photograph as natural icon is a way of evidencing 
their indisputability.  Flusser’s invocation of the technical image as the 
product of apparatuses which signify concepts means that photographs 
cannot be considered in Barthesean terms, as natural signs, but in fact are 
opaque images which signify both their subject and their method of 
production.  
 
The Latourean differentiation between ‘matters of fact’ and ‘matters of 
concern’ can be used in the service of the argument at hand in order to 
rethink photography in terms of its method of production.  Rather than the 
mechanism of photography, with its optics, chemistry, industrial 
manufacture (etc) being invisible, photography gives us a kind of 
synthetic realism, a codification of the real.  The interventions of the 
medium codify reality: photographs are coded messages, inscriptions of 
the world. The photographic object undermines the dichotomy between 
subject and object, because the world photographed is the world inside 
the camera.  The photograph is the end of photography; an instrumental 
complex which, Latour might have argued, brings major companies, 
normalising politics of vision and representation, science, innovation and 
consumerism into play.  Thinking photography in terms of the Latourean 
‘matter of concern’, which productively places photography at the site of 
controversy and dispute, has its merits.  This has clear resonances with 
Roland Barthes’ intentions in ‘Myth Today’ and this strategy of placing 
photography within a contested intellectual space is precisely what Vilém 
Flusser does in Towards a Philosophy of Photography.   
 
For Flusser, photography is a vast industry which informs the images made 
by the medium, the camera is a tool used by the photographer.  
However, it is not a tool which is under the complete control of its 
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operator, nor, as we have already discussed, is it simply a machine for 
seeing.  The tool, once conceived of as a simulation of bodily organs, and 
thus an extension of the body has been transformed into something more 
technical, that is, the technical tool embodies theory. 
 
Tools in the usual sense are extensions of human organs: extended 
teeth, fingers, hands, arms, legs…They simulate the organ they are 
extended from…They are ‘empirical.’  With the Industrial Revolution, 
however, tools were no longer limited to empirical situations; they 
grasped hold of scientific theories: They became ‘technical.’154 
 
Although the apparatus is a product of industrialisation, Flusser argues that 
the essence of understanding apparatuses is that their development and 
impact continues into the post-industrial.  Apparatuses have become 
more involved with information rather than products of the industrial 
category work.155 In order to fully understand the apparatus, Flusser 
argues, it must be reconsidered in the context of post-industrial 
production: apparatuses do not change the world through work, they 
change its meaning. 
 
Their [apparatuses] intention is not to change the world but to change 
the meaning of the world.  Their intention is symbolic.  Photographers 
do not work in the industrial sense…but they do something: They 
create, process and store symbols.156 
 
He goes on to write 
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Reaktion Books, 2006 p. 23 
155 Ibid p. 25 
156 Ibid 
 121 
[The photographer’s] interest is concentrated on the camera; for 
them, the world is purely a pretext for the realization of camera 
possibilities.  In short: They are not working, they do not want to 
change the world, but they are in search of information.157 
 
The photographer, states Flusser, is not engaged in work whilst making 
these informative images, rather the camera is the photographer’s 
plaything: the photographer is a player: “not Homo faber but Homo 
ludens.”158  The apparatus of the camera can be controlled and fed by 
the photographer, but (as functionary159) he/she is in turn controlled by 
the mystery of its interior.  The blindness of the photographic moment, 
coupled with the enigma of the dark chamber of the camera, propels the 
photographic functionary to play the game in the continued search for 
information. 
 
Flusser argues that the “black box”160 of the apparatus of photographic 
production requires to be made visible in order for us to be able to 
productively criticise photographs and to avoid this illiteracy of technical 
imagery.  Flusser writes: 
 
The encoding of technical images, however, is what is going on in the 
interior of this black box and consequently any criticism of technical 
images must be aimed at an elucidation of its inner workings.  As long 
as there is no way of engaging in such criticism of technical images, 
we shall remain illiterate.161 
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This need to make the apparatus of photographic production visible, the 
“elucidation of its inner workings”162 is a striking parallel of what Latour 
writes about in The Politics of Nature.  As we discovered previously, Latour 
argues that new objects are not clearly defined.  On the contrary, their 
complex method of production needs to be a part of their definition.  The 
new object as a Latourean matter of concern can be extended to 
articulate the photograph as the product of the black box that is the 
apparatus of photography.  I wrote earlier of the photographer’s blind 
spot, the moment when the shutter opens, the photographer is excluded 
from the photographic moment.  At the point of register between light 
and light sensitive surface, the photographer has no visual contact with 
the scene through the camera.  This exclusion, the very darkness of the 
box, piques the interest of the photographer: 
 
It is precisely the obscurity of the box which motivates photographers 
to take photographs.  They lose themselves, it is true, inside the 
camera in search of possibilities, but they can nevertheless control the 
box.  For they know how to feed the camera (they know the input of 
the box), and likewise they know how to get it to spit out photographs 
(they know the output of the box).  Therefore the camera does what 
the photographer wants it to do, even though the photographer does 
not know what is going on inside the camera.  This is precisely what is 
characteristic of the functioning of apparatuses: The functionary 
controls the apparatus thanks to the control of its exterior (the input 
and the output) and is controlled by it thanks to the impenetrability of 
its interior.163 
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Flusser goes on to state that the lack of competence of the functionary to 
play the game turns the whole process into a Kafkaesque world.  By this 
Flusser means a world in which the photographer strives for freedom but it 
eternally eludes him due to the strictures of the photographic programme.  
The privacy of the image making apparatus, the in camera of the 
camera, amounts, as we have seen, to the exclusion of the 
photographer.  In Flusser’s account the photographer is a functionary of 
the apparatus, controlled by the technology as much as he/she is in 
control of it.  The photography game which Flusser talks about, seeks to 
exhaust the possibilities of the photographic programme in order to enrich 
the photographic universe.  However, for Flusser, only informative pictures 
are legitimate images in this process, therefore the non-informative image, 
or snapshot, falls out with the scope of Flusser’s analysis.  For him, the 
photographic programme is the totality of all possible informative 
photographs.  This is problematic insofar as an exact definition of what 
constitutes an informative image is missing from Flusser’s account.  In 
addition, there is no real indication why the snapshot is not informative, 
other than that it is a repetition of previous snapshots.  From this I take 
Flusser to mean that informative images are photographically innovative, 
and photographic innovation, it would seem, is finite.  The finitude of the 
photographic programme suggests that the functionaries may indeed be 
able to exhaust it, but, Flusser argues, the programme is rich, otherwise the 
game would be over too soon.  Therefore the functionaries are unlikely to 
deplete the programme, although their efforts will enrich the 
photographic universe, provided that is, their images are informative. 
 
According to Flusser, illiteracy in the face of technical images is only to be 
counteracted by the illumination of the dark workings of the camera, and 
the scientific, optical, industrial process/complex that is photography.  Like 
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Bruno Latour’s ‘matter of concern’ with its scientists, researchers and 
entrepreneurs, embarrassed and visible, implicated in that which has just 
been produced, in a sense, the photographic complex, as image + 
photographic workings (apparatus and chemistry) should function as a 
Latourean matter of concern, rather than a matter of fact.  Only then, if 
we are to heed Flusser, can we overcome photographic illiteracy and 
move towards a philosophy of photography. 
 
Flusser defines the photographer as a ‘functionary’ because he/she has 
crept inside the box in order to try to illuminate the workings of its 
interior.164  The photographer is therefore very much embroiled in the 
photographic process.  So, although photographs are treated as 
“symptoms of the world”165 they are in fact metacodes of texts.  Rather 
than pointing to the world, the photograph codifies it and the reader of 
the photograph employs imagination which Flusser states “involves the 
ability to transcode concepts from texts into images”166.  He writes that 
when we look at photographic images “we see concepts – encoded in a 
new way – of the world out there.”167 
 
The photographer, as functionary, uses the photographic apparatus to 
collect and store information and symbols which are newly encoded 
concepts of the world and the resulting technical images are 
imaginatively read by the viewer.  All informative photographs are simply 
the actualised possibilities of the photographic programme which the 
photographer has captured and stored whilst playing against the 
apparatus.  Crucially for Flusser, traditional and technical images differ 
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because they employ a different kind of magic: pre-historic and post-
historic magic respectively. 
 
Prehistoric magic is a ritualization of models known as ‘myths’; current 
magic is a ritualization of models known as ‘programs’.  Myths are 
models that are communicated orally and whose author – a ‘god’ – is 
beyond the communication process.  Programs, on the other hand, 
are models that are communicated in writing and whose authors – 
‘functionaries’ – are within the communication process168 
 
The functionary is inside of the photographic programme, which is a 
process of written communication.  The photographer, blind to the inner 
workings of his/her apparatus tries to decipher the camera’s inner magic 
from inside the apparatus, and indeed, the photographic programme.  
Thus, according to Flusser, the photographer becomes part of the 
function of the camera: the photographer is, to use a Latourean term, an 
imbroglio of the scientific, industrial, post-industrial photographic 
programme.  Photography is a form of writing and the photograph is a 
metacode which signifies the advanced texts which facilitated its 
production: it is the text of a text. 
 
Flusser’s Towards a Philosophy of Photography seeks to provoke a 
philosophy of photography which finds freedom for the photographer 
within the constraints of an apparatus driven practice.  He writes:  
 
A philosophy of photography is necessary for raising photographic 
practice to the level of consciousness…because this practice gives 
rise to a model of freedom in the post-industrial context in general.169 
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Both Latour and Flusser provide arguments which demonstrate that we 
should be sceptical of claims that the photograph transparently 
presences the subject.  The photograph as an inscription of the 
photographic programme renders it opaque: it is codified.  Like a kind of 
language, photographs represent the world inscribed by photographic 
means.  The photograph does not presence the world-in-itself, we cannot 
know the world transparently through the photograph, looking at 
photographs we can only know the world photographed, just as we can 
only know the world phenomenally through our senses.  What the 
photograph brings to the viewer’s experience is an image, a new 
photographic horizon, a synthetic reality.  In a sense I agree with Barthes 
that a critical feature of photography is its capacity to bring the world into 
the horizon of the spectator.  However, where I think the fundamental 
difference between us lies is that it is not the world, but a world, which is 
brought to our attention; a world photographically inscribed. 
 
 
VII Concluding remarks 
 
I began this chapter with an investigation into Roland Barthes’ writing on 
photography, in order to demonstrate that the natural syntagm of the 
photograph and its capacity to bring the body of its subject to presence, 
are two critical points in understanding the photograph in Barthesean 
terms.  Although Barthes makes a distinction between intentional and 
non-intentional images, there are commonalities in his writings on 
photography through which we can trace the tropes of the natural and 
presence.  This leads him to account for Photography’s noeme in terms of 
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a quasi-theological presence, a divine imprint: the photograph as a 
resurrection of the subject. 
 
The notion that photography is pseudo-natural was explored in Barthes’ 
analysis of intentional images in chapter one, where we looked at his 
writings on Myth.  It is my contention that in our commerce with 
photographs we treat them largely as though they are natural.  However, 
the photograph is produced by a vast industrial complex in which, if we 
take Flusser at his word and we are not alive to this fact, we are but 
players.  
 
Through an investigation of Vilèm Flusser and Bruno Latour, writing 
respectively on photography and political ecology, we began to unpack 
the idea ‘nature’ in order to illustrate the problem of nature considered as 
total and separate to ourselves.  Latour’s conception of the new object, 
imbricated within its network of producers and receivers, a ‘matter of 
concern’ rather than a ‘matter of fact’ was explored in parallel with 
Flusser’s ideas regarding the instrumentality of photography.  Just as we 
are unable to know the world in itself, science produces truths and 
photography produces realism, it inscribes the world in its own terms.  A 
photograph is not a truthful, natural image but a synthetic encoding of 
reality.  The photographic apparatus is another way of making the world 
speak. 
 
Although the idea that the Barthesean Photograph is an emanation of its 
subject has already been discussed, there is more to be explored, 
especially in terms of the photograph as a motif of what Jacques Derrida 
describes as the metaphysics of presence.  The play of absence and 
presence, of birth and death, mortality and the inevitable human desire 
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to immortalise the ‘loved body’ in the mausoleum of the photograph is an 
emotive rendering of the ongoing theme of presence in philosophical 
writing.  It is my intention to explore this in greater detail during the next 
chapter.  In contradistinction to Barthes, Flusser has enabled us to begin a 
discussion of photographs as the product of a practice which signifies 
concepts.  This is to say, photography is a form of writing.  It will be towards 
this idea of photography as writing, through recourse to the work of 
Jacques Derrida, which I will turn in the following chapter.  I intend to 
return to Barthes and Saussure and introduce the writing of Jacques 
Derrida alongside a key text on Surrealist photography by Rosalind Krauss.  
This is undertaken with a view to exploring the notion that photography is 
a means of writing the world. 
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I The Photograph that Breathes 
 
In order to develop our central thesis that the photograph is text, the next 
step in our argument will be to propose the idea that photography writes 
the world.  I contend that photographs are inscriptions of their subject, 
rather than, as Roland Barthes would have it, emanations of a past reality.  
Like the text, the photograph is opaque, which contradicts the realists’ 
understanding that photographic images touch us “like the delayed rays 
of a star”170.  I will argue that photographs belong to the economy of 
signification and that they can be understood, in terms of poststructuralist 
theory, as being written: they are texts.  This argument contests a number 
of assumptions about photography, such as, photographic 
representation, which we shall see in due course, is undermined by 
Derridean textuality.  In addition, if photographs are texts, the 
photographer’s role should be reconfigured as a writer, rather than 
observer and copier of the world.  Instead of engaging in the semiotics of 
the photograph, which is an area that has been widely covered by 
published texts, during this chapter I shall focus on the idea that 
photographic practice can be configured as Derridean écriture.  I intend 
to return to Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida in order to investigate and 
consider the duality in his writing on the text and the photograph, which 
amounts to a manichaeism that regards the ontology of texts and 
photographs as quite distinct.  This duality opens up some interesting ideas 
with respect to presence, which I believe offers a way in to a discussion of 
the photograph as a sign which is permanently deferred.  I intend to 
explore the resources of the sign from a Derridean perspective which will 
entail that the photographic sign is placed ‘under erasure’ and 
                                                
170 Roland Barthes Camera Lucida Richard Howard (trans), London: Vintage, 2000 p.81 
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photographic practice can begin to be considered in terms of the 
expanded field of writing: grammatology. 
 
Firstly, I will revisit the Winter Garden photograph, in order to explore it with 
respect to what Barthes describes as its supererogatory nature and begin 
to consider the impact of this ethical supplementation in the context of 
thinking and practising photography.  It is my contention that the 
photographic supplement gives rise to a paradox in Barthes’ 
argumentation with regard to the immediacy of the image and the 
alleged subjectivity of the punctum.  Therefore, I intend to question 
Barthes’ assertion that photographs cannot be signs.  Indeed, Rosalind 
Krauss writes about photographic images in terms of their indexical nature 
and yet, as she demonstrates in ‘The Photographic Conditions of 
Surrealism,’ this does not entail a complete rejection of the capacity of 
photographic images to signify.  I propose that the presence of Barthes’ 
mother in the Winter Garden photograph is deferred in virtue of the delay 
of the photographic sign: Barthes’ mother is part of the writing of the 
world.  As Derrida writes 
 
What defers presence…is the very basis on which presence is 
announced or desired in what represents it, its sign, its trace171 
 
If Derrida is right, the photograph, through which Barthes desires the 
presence of his mother, simultaneously announces and defers her 
presence due to the permanent delay or deferral of the sign, which is an 
idea that we will return to in due course.  The photograph is a sign of 
difference, which I will demonstrate later, is the différance of the world.  
However, before I go on to think about photographs in this way, I will 
                                                
171 Jacques Derrida Positions Alan Bass (trans), New York; London: Continuum, 2004 p.7 
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explore the idea that the Barthesean photograph can be thought of as a 
motif or indeed symptom of what Derrida describes as the metaphysics of 
presence.  That is to say, Barthes’ notion that the photograph brings the 
subject to presence is comparable to the latencies of presence in the 
thought of Plato, Rousseau and Saussure which are revealed by Derrida’s 
deconstructive reading.  Logocentrism, argues Derrida, privileges speech 
over writing, presence over the indicative detour.  These assumptions 
have parallels in photography considered in terms of an emanation of the 
subject: the subject is self identical in the photograph which, I argue, 
amounts to photography’s own metaphysics of presence.  However, if we 
think of the photograph in terms of writing, it is sameness in difference 
rather than the self-identical presencing of the subject which is the key. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, Bathes’ argument regarding the 
transparency of photographic images in Camera Lucida amounts to a 
denial of the material and instrumentation of photography, a blind spot in 
Barthes’ thought which bears remarkable similarities to the logical 
inconsistencies in Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology which are made 
plain by Derrida’s deconstructive reading in Of Grammatology.172 
 
In Camera Lucida, Barthes asserts that the Winter Garden image is a 
“supererogatory photograph which contained more than what the 
technical being of photography can reasonably offer”173.  That is to say, 
there is something supplementary provided by the unknown 
photographer which rendered the essence of the loved body (Barthes’ 
mother) photographically.  The photographer somehow pushes the 
medium to surpass its technical limits, facilitating the mediation of a truth.  
Thanks to the photographer, the photographic medium responds beyond 
                                                
172 Jacques Derrida Of Grammatology Corrected Edition Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(trans), Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 pp.27-73 
173 Roland Barthes Camera Lucida Richard Howard (trans), London: Vintage, 2000 p.70 
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the call of duty: this particular photograph is special.  In it, the subject is 
manifested, the being of the photograph is the subject.  The presence of 
Barthes’ mother emanates from the photograph: she is there shining 
weakly through the photograph, touching him with the light reflected 
from her, what he calls her “treasury of rays.”174  For Barthes, the 
photograph of his mother absolutely resists the status of sign, the 
laminated referent is only truly present for Barthes, and as we have 
already seen, for any other viewer this photograph would represent pure 
studium.  Barthes’ mother is brought to presence by the photograph and 
this serves to make her absence in life all the more poignant.  Somewhat 
ineffably, the Winter Garden photographer managed to bring something 
additional to bear, a supplement, which spoke to Barthes, alone. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, not all of the photographs which 
Barthes encountered on that November evening presented his mother.   
The manifestation of the subject in the photograph is reliant upon “that 
exorbitant thing”175, the air which accompanies the subject.  The air 
articulates the self-presence of the subject, therefore the true likeness, the 
true presence of the subject requires a supplement for its articulation.  The 
Winter Garden Photograph had a kind of aura, and whilst Barthes does 
not ever use this word, he describes the “sudden awakening”176 when he 
sees his mother in the photograph, as the “air”177.  This air is the 
supererogatory aspect of the photograph, the supplement which the 
photographer is responsible for capturing.  The air animates the essence 
of the human subject and it is this which distinguishes those partially false 
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images from The Photograph.  The air is the auric breath of the true 
photograph: 
 
Thus the air is the luminous shadow which accompanies the body; 
and if the photograph fails to show this air, then the body moves 
without a shadow, and once this shadow is severed…there remains no 
more than a sterile body.  It is by this tenuous umbilical cord that the 
photographer gives life; if he cannot, either by lack of talent or bad 
luck, supply the transparent soul its bright shadow, the subject dies 
forever.178 
 
As far as Barthes is concerned, the threads which tie the referent to its 
image must not be cut.  Images which preserve the auric breath of the 
subject, i.e. those which enable the subject to live on in the photograph, 
are animated by the umbilical chord connecting the subject and the 
photographer.  The once living subject in the photograph cannot be 
thought as an exterior image, a representation of its subject, it is, as we 
discovered in the previous chapter, a presentation.  In fact, for Barthes, in 
good photographs the subject (thanks to the air) really is alive.  The 
punctum, the subjective element which addresses the spectator also 
activates the blind field, which is the spacetime outside of the 
photograph.  However, for a photograph without the life giving umbilical 
chord all that remains is a “sterile body”179, dead, pinned within the frame 
of the photographic image.   
 
In spite of his interest in the activation of the blind field, that is, life outside 
of the frame, Barthes does not discuss the actual frame of the Winter 
Garden Photograph.  He does not disclose whether the picture had a 
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white border whose edges may have been crimped in the manner of 
many old family photographs.  Although a photograph is framed or 
cropped, the articulation of the blind field points to the life of the subject 
outside of the image: a continuity between image and world.  According 
to Barthes, the truth of the Winter Garden image causes the frame to drop 
away, presenting Barthes with his mother and her life prior to and beyond 
his experience of her.  As we have seen, if the punctum or the air are not 
present, the subject dies: it is no more that a brittle body encased in a 
vitrine: it is lifeless; studium.  The blind field suppresses the frame and the 
hermetic seal of the photograph is broken, which enables the subject to 
breathe. 
 
Now confronting millions of photographs, including those which have 
a good studium, I sense no blind field: everything which happens in 
the frame dies absolutely once this frame is passed beyond.  When we 
define the Photograph as a motionless image, this does not mean 
only that the figures it represents do not move; it means that they do 
not emerge, do not leave: they are anaesthetized and fastened 
down, like butterflies.  Yet once there is a punctum, a blind field is 
created (is divined): on account of her necklace, the black woman in 
her Sunday best has had, for me, a whole life external to her portrait; 
Robert Wilson, endowed with an unlocatable punctum, is someone I 
want to meet.180 
 
This unlocatable punctum exceeds articulation; it is inter-subjective: the 
subject in the Barthesean photograph speaks directly to the spectator, it 
does not require an intermediary.  Particular details in the image prick the 
Spectator, the photograph is the foretelling of a future death.  But, as 
previously discussed, the punctum is both inseparable from the 
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photograph and an addition, a supplement which is disclosed by the 
lucky, or talented, photographer.  It is this supplement which addresses 
itself directly to the Spectator. 
 
However, this leads to a peculiar tension in Camera Lucida between the 
notion of the photograph as an emanation and Barthes’ idea that the 
photographer is engaged in the revelation of a truth.  Barthes seems to 
want the photograph to be both immediate and yet mediated.  Indeed, 
the Winter Garden Photograph is the only image of his mother which truly 
reveals her.  As much as Barthes claims to be looking for the genius of 
photography, that is, what is special about photographs in general, his 
theory of photography is structured to account for just one image: the 
photograph (unseen by the reader) of his mother aged 5.  Its absence in 
print, as I will demonstrate later, is as much a claim for the private 
experience of photographs, as a critical tactic which Barthes uses in order 
to convey his personal beliefs about photographic images.   
 
The notion that the Winter Garden photograph is the image of a death 
foretold, demonstrates Barthes’ desire for the photograph to oscillate 
between absence and presence, underwriting his understanding of the 
medium, and thus his final book, with an indescribable melancholy.  
Barthes’ play of absence and presence, of birth and death, and the 
inevitable human desire to immortalise the loved body in the mausoleum 
of the photograph, is an emotive rendering of the theme of presence in 
philosophical writing.  The photograph is a testament to the (previous) 
existence of the subject: 
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Photography never lies: or rather, it can lie as to the meaning of the 
thing, being by nature tendentious, never as to its existence…Every 
photograph is a certificate of presence.181 
 
Insofar as the photograph testifies to the existence of the subject, and thus 
ratifies the subjecthood of the Spectator, the photograph expresses being 
as presence, even in death.  Just as the photograph is a certificate of 
presence, ironically it is also a certificate of death.  However, it is the 
punctum which annunciates the presence of the subject: the punctum or 
stigma, evokes resurrection, the subject is resurrected in the photograph.  
The subject in the photograph articulated by the punctum is temporally 
present (“temporal presence as point [stigmè] of the now”182). 
 
II Grammatology 
 
Barthes’ pursuit of a realist ontology of photography means that, as we 
have seen, he simply cannot advocate the photograph as sign.  This leads 
him to dematerialise the photograph, which enables the referent to 
persist.  As we touched on earlier, somewhat strangely, it is Derrida’s 
elucidation of the failings of Ferdinand de Saussurre’s account of 
signification which helps us to express the problematic of Barthes’ 
photographic realism.   
 
Barthes’ disavowal of the photographic material, his blindness to the 
instrumentality of photographs, and his privileging of the presence of the 
subject, amounts to a reduction of the exteriority of the photographic 
signifier.  As we saw in Chapter 1, Ferdinand de Saussure argues that 
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182 Jacques Derrida Of Grammatology Corrected Edition Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(trans), Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 p.12 
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language is not material, rather it is a system which is held collectively in 
the minds of its users.  Whereas the materiality of language is thoroughly 
challenged in Saussure’s account of meaning, in Barthes’ thesis on 
photography the materiality of the photograph is also denied: the 
photographic image does not exist; only the referent does.  Therefore the 
photographic image is not constituted by the granularity of its materials.  
Not only is Barthes blind to the instrumentality of the camera, he cannot 
see the grain of the photograph.  Indeed, Louis-Jean Calvet writes in his 
biography of Barthes that when discussing the work of a number of 
painters, such as Cy Twombly, Barthes tended to focus on the image 
rather than the material it was constituted by (i.e. paint): 
 
when he discusses a painter’s work, he never refers to the material, 
the texture of the paint, its thickness.  He always confines himself to 
images.  In fact, he could just as well have used two dimensional 
reproductions for the purposes of his analyses.183 
 
Just as Barthes appears to pay no heed to the physical structure of a 
painting, he treats the being of the photograph as if it were transparent, 
the weightless envelope which would float away were it not for the 
referent holding it down.  For Barthes, the photograph is not a sign 
because, as we saw in the previous chapter, the photographic signifier 
simply does not exist.  There is no body to the Barthesean photograph, 
only the loved body, the referent laminated in the photograph.  This 
notion that the photograph is laminated to the referent, that the 
photograph is self-identical to its subject, has peculiar resonances with 
Saussure’s theorisation of the unified sign, in which the signifier becomes 
strangely transparent to the signified.  The Saussurean sign, preoccupied 
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with the proximity of language to speech (the touch or imprint of 
language on the mind which enables self-presence in understanding i.e. 
in hearing one’s self speak) parallels the proximity of the subject in the 
ideal Barthesean photograph, present to the Spectator through the touch 
of the photographic emanation.  The exteriority of the photographic 
signifier is repressed by Barthes in order for him to write his realist ontology 
of photography.  The conception of the photograph as an opaque 
representation is suppressed, thus enabling Barthes to be psychologically 
moved by the emanation of his mother: Sausurre’s psychic account of 
language opens on to Barthes’ emotional and emotive reading of 
photography.   
 
In contradistinction to the self-presence of the subject in the ideal 
Barthesean photograph, this thesis argues that the photograph is text.  
Therefore, the subject in the photograph is non-essential: the subject in the 
photograph is the subject in difference.  As we saw earlier, Barthes himself 
concedes this point when he argues that many of the photographs of his 
mother were “partially true, and therefore totally false.”184  The 
supererogatory photograph itself relies on a supplement, something 
extrinsic to the subject, to bring the subject to full presence.  This bears a 
similarity to the Kantian parergon which Derrida critiques in The Truth in 
Painting.  We will explore this more fully during the next chapter, but for 
the time being suffice it to say, the subject, brought to presence in the 
ideal Barthesean photograph requires a supplement in order for it to be 
made manifest.  On the other hand, if we think of the photographed 
subject as the difference of itself, this enables us to understand the 
photograph as part of a general system of difference: writing rather than 
being, or photographic being as writing. 
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In order to explicate the parallel between Barthes and Saussure a little 
more clearly, let us now look at Jacques Derrida who represents 
Saussurre’s position on the unity of the sign as follows: 
 
When I speak, not only am I conscious of being present for what I 
think, but I am conscious also of keeping as close as possible to my 
thought, or to the “concept,” a signifier that does not fall into the 
world, a signifier that I hear as soon as I emit it, that seems to depend 
upon my pure and free spontaneity, requiring the use of no instrument, 
no accessory, no force taken from the world.  Not only do the signifier 
and the signified seem to unite, but also, in this confusion, the signifier 
seems to erase itself or to become transparent, in order to allow the 
concept to present itself as what it is, referring to nothing other than its 
presence.  The exteriority of the signifier seems reduced.185 
 
Thus, according to Derrida, the Saussurean sign naturally unites thought 
and speech, enabling the concept to be presented, made present as the 
utterance of a free subject, who in hearing himself utter, understands. That 
is to say, at the moment of speaking, speech is transparent to thought; 
thought is present in speech.  This position, which has dominated Western 
metaphysics since antiquity, is dubbed by Derrida as the metaphysics of 
presence and is one of the fixed centres in philosophical thought which 
he seeks to deconstruct.  Indeed, if we are to think of the photograph as a 
motif of the metaphysics of presence, that is, to throw the denial of the 
exteriority of the photographic signifier into the spotlight, there are a 
number of contradictions in the logic of the Saussurean sign which it 
would now be pertinent to investigate.  For example, as we see from the 
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above quote, Derrida is critical of the seemingly magical self-erasure of 
the signifier, which facilitates the transparency between the signifier and 
the signified. 
 
It is important to remind ourselves that Saussure’s theory of semiology was 
concerned with language, as an immaterial system which was held in the 
minds of its users, rather than its phonic or graphic material.  This results in 
Saussure treating writing as a separate system to language, which 
although is necessary as a representation of language, he argues its very 
supplementarity is dangerous: 
 
Writing, though unrelated to its inner system, is used continually to 
represent language.  We cannot simply disregard it.  We must be 
acquainted with its usefulness, shortcomings, and dangers.186 
 
Thus Saussure posits that language has an internal system represented by 
writing which is external to it.  Jacques Derrida reiterates Saussure’s 
position with the following words: “Writing, sensible matter and artificial 
exteriority: a ‘clothing’ ”.187  In seeking to invert the age old philosophical 
privilege of speech over writing, Derrida expands the field of writing 
beyond the physicality of the inscriptive mark (graph). Although Sausurre’s 
system of signification would appear to have difference at its core, 
Derrida argues that because the phonè holds a central position in 
Saussure’s semiology, his account is logocentric, that is, reliant upon the 
metaphysics of presence.  Thus Saussurean semiology has a paradox at its 
centre: the sign is arbitrary, yet reliant upon a natural associative bond 
between sound and sense.  Although the sign is premised upon difference 
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as the productive capacity of language as meaning maker, Saussure’s 
privileging of the presence of speech as critical to understanding is a core 
principle.   
 
Derrida argues that the paradox in Sausurre’s thought is driven by the 
prejudicial desire to exclude writing from the proper domain of the 
discourse on language.  The paradox in Saussure’s account begs the 
question whether or not the sign is indeed radically arbitrary after all.  
Writing as the exteriority of language is unrelated to the inner system 
(language per se) which implies a naturalism and transparency within the 
interior of language.188  Saussure’s semiology reiterates the binarism of 
inside/outside and the notion that meaning is premised upon the self 
presence of the speaker, yet at the same time he insists that the sign is 
arbitrary.  This paradox in Saussurean thought leads Derrida to argue that 
the interiority of language (represented) and exteriority of writing 
(representation) become ensnared in one another.  Indeed Derrida 
argues that in Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics the graph and the 
phonè are entwined to the extent that it is not clear where the boundary 
between that which is represented and representation itself falls.   
 
Representation mingles with what it represents, to the point where one 
speaks as one writes, one thinks as if the represented were nothing 
more than the shadow or reflection of the representer…In this play of 
representation the point of origin becomes ungraspable.  There are 
things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one 
to the other, but no longer a source, a spring.  There is no longer a 
simple origin.  For what is reflected is split in itself and not only as an 
addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, 
splits what it doubles.  The origin of the speculation becomes a 
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difference.  What can look at itself is not one; and the law of the 
addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is 
that one plus one makes at least three.189 
 
The relation between phonic language and writing is thus inverted and 
Derrida argues that speech becomes the ‘speculum’ of writing: speech is 
the mirror, the representation, of writing.  The notion of the supplementary 
nature of writing is overturned and speech is redefined as the image, or 
double, of writing. 
 
Derrida’s argument regarding the intermingling of representation and 
represented resonates strongly with our conception of photography as 
text.  The photographic ‘mirror’ sets off a play of reference between the 
subject and its image, this reflection, as Derrida writes, “splits what it 
doubles”.190  Not only does the photographic image add to or double the 
subject, the reflected subject is “split in itself”.191  That is to say, the subject 
having been reflected or represented photographically can no longer be 
considered to be a simple origin but difference.  The origin of the 
photographic speculation becomes a difference.  As we shall see in due 
course, for Rosalind Krauss this notion of the photographic double 
articulates écriture.  Indeed, the subject is differed virtually ad infinitum as 
the photographic negative facilitates successive duplications each one 
the difference of the next.  Thus photographic reproducibility becomes 
the reflecting pool of the subject in dissemination. 
 
Derrida seeks to undermine the philosophical position that thought is 
present to speech, that language is, by definition, presence, and writing, 
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in virtue of its representative function, absence: writing re-presents the 
absent presence (the speaker).  The recognition of the self-present and 
unified speaking subject, which occupies a concrete (neutral) and 
empirically navigable reality, is in fact a mis-recognition.  Thought is partial, 
fragmentary and individuation is an illusion. He argues that writing  
 
no longer designat[es] the exterior surface, the insubstantial double of 
a major signifier, the signifier of the signifier…Not that the word 
“writing” has ceased to designate the signifier of the signifier, but it 
appears, strange as it may seem, that “signifier of the signifier” no 
longer defines accidental doubling and fallen secondarity.  “Signifier 
of the signifier” describes on the contrary the movement of 
language192 
 
Thus for Derrida, writing continues to function as the signifier of the signifier 
but rather than this designating the supplementary, exterior relation 
between writing and speech, writing as the signifier of the signifier 
describes language in movement: the ceaseless play of signification.  This 
subtle shift in the concept of writing elucidated by Derrida, entails that the 
signifier of the signifier ceases to denote the representative relation, and 
begins to mark the deferral of meaning through the constant movement 
of language.  Writing is therefore a field of signifiers, each referring to 
another signifier rather than closing on a signified.  Thus Derrida’s notion of 
the origin of writing is a structure which “conceals and erases itself in its 
own production.  There the signified always already functions as a 
signifier.”193  Thus the field is unstable and therefore unknowable. 
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The exclusion of the graphic mark from the interiority of language 
resonates with Barthes’ desire for the self-identical presence of his mother 
in the ideal photograph.  However, it is ironic that Barthes’ thesis on the 
photographic touch relies upon a supplement.  The dematerialisation of 
the photograph facilitates the proximity of the spectator and the referent: 
the photographic touch.  As we saw in the previous chapter, this is 
problematic enough in itself.  However, additionally, in order to account 
for the significance of that special photograph, Barthes himself invokes the 
notion of supplementarity; the photograph’s supererogatory nature.  This 
enables Barthes to differentiate between studium and punctum, to allow 
photographs to have divergent meanings for different spectators in 
tandem with arguing in favour of the immortalising capacity as the 
envelope which keeps his Mother alive.  Thus the contradictory logic of 
supplementarity which runs through Saussure’s writing on the proximity of 
thought and speech is also evident in Barthes’ writing on the proximity of 
the subject and spectator. 
 
As we discussed in a previous chapter, an instrumental reading of 
photography demands that we are not wilfully blind to the industry and 
physicality of the medium.  The means of photographic images are 
significant, as previously explored, photographs give us a codified reality 
which we can begin to think in terms of writing.  In order to challenge 
Barthes’ account of photography which places such an emphasis on the 
importance of the presence of the referent, namely the referentiality of 
photography, we can turn to Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the unity 
of the Saussurean sign in order to find a way of understanding 
photography in terms of écriture.  The full significance of this expansive 
term will be investigated throughout the remainder of this thesis.  However, 
it should be noted that écriture is not used simply as a metaphor for 
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photography, but as a radical means of thinking photography that opens 
the way to understanding it in terms of photogrammatology.  I therefore 
now intend to briefly introduce Derrida’s deconstructive strategy in 
relation to Saussure’s argument regarding the unity of the sign which will 
also function as a useful precursor to the following section that 
investigates the photographic lacuna, specifically in relation to the writing 
of Rosalind Krauss. 
 
Derrida rigorously questions the Saussurean assumption that the sign is the 
unification of the signifier and the signified, that meaning is the unification 
of sound and sense.  He argues, contrary to Saussure, that the sign cannot 
unify the signifier and the signified, that between them there is always a 
gap or a delay, the caesura or lacuna which is necessary for 
understanding: 
 
the order of the signified is never contemporary, is at best the subtly 
discrepant inverse or parallel – discrepant by the time of a breath – 
from the order of the signifier194 
 
Thus between thought and speech, between concept and language 
there is a hiatus which makes understanding possible, yet frustrates the 
closure of meaning.  The spacing of the sign is productive absence: 
 
spacing is the impossibility for an identity to be closed on itself, on the 
inside of its proper interiority, or on its coincidence with itself.  The 
irreducibility of spacing is the irreducibility of the other…“spacing” 
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designates not only interval, but a “productive,” “genetic,” 
“practical” movement, an “operation”195 
 
The sign therefore cannot close on itself, it cannot be completely unified 
or self-contained but must always contain something other than itself.  The 
sign, placed under erasure is both presence and absence, self and other, 
sameness and difference.  The deconstructed or erased sign does not 
preserve the distinction between langue and parole, rather through this 
gesture Derrida undermines this difference in Saussure’s semiology, 
pressing for the transformation of semiology to grammatology. As Gayatri 
Chakavorty Spivak puts it “ “Writing”… is the name of the structure always 
already inhabited by the trace.”196  Writing as grammatology is the tool 
which enables the critique of semiology: 
 
The use of language or the employment of any code which implies a 
play of forms - with no determined or invariable substratum - also 
presupposes a retention and protention of differences, a spacing and 
temporalizing, a play of traces.  This play must be a sort of inscription 
prior to writing, a protowriting without a present origin, without an 
arché.  From this comes the systematic crossing-out of the arché and 
the transformation of general semiology into a grammatology, the 
latter performing a critical work upon everything within semiology - 
right down to its matrical concept of signs - that retains any 
metaphysical presuppositions incompatible with the theme of 
differance.197 
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By placing the ruling principle of Saussure’s semiology (the sign) under 
erasure(“the systematic crossing-out of the arché”198), semiology gives 
way to grammatology.  Due to grammatology’s status as protowriting 
without arché, that is, an inscription which allows the play of traces, or 
différance, it is able to function as a process which questions the 
metaphysical latencies of semiology.  Language is thus used by Derrida to 
explore its own logocentric limits while at the same time opening spaces 
for reading between signifiers. 
 
During chapter two we looked at Roland Barthes’ argument regarding 
photography’s incapacity to signify.  According to him, the signifier and 
the signified will not join; they curdle like sour milk.  However, as we have 
seen from Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Saussure, the sign is 
permanently open: the signifier and the signified are never unified.  This, as 
I hope to demonstrate in due course, not only opens the way for us to 
think about the photograph in terms of the sign in deferral, but it also 
enables a productive use of grammatology to be brought into play in 
conjunction with photography. 
 
III The Photographic Double, the Frame and the Space Between 
 
Taking her cue from Derrida, the theorist and critic Rosalind Krauss argues 
that the space between the signified and the signifier, which she 
describes as the “formal preconditions of the sign”199 is a critical 
component of Surrealist photographic practice.  Rather than striving to 
resolve the tensions inherent in a stylistic definition of Surrealism, in ‘The 
Photographic Conditions of Surrealism’ Krauss constructs an argument to 
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demonstrate that the practice of surrealist photographers defines 
Surrealism in a wider sense.  The condition of Surrealism generally is for 
Krauss, photographic per se.  Whilst surrealist photography is not a central 
concern of this thesis, the manner in which Krauss theorises both Dada 
photomontage and Surrealist photography has, I believe, a value which 
goes beyond the definition of these artistic movements.  Her tactic of 
questioning photography’s illusion of presence, which I will explore a little 
later, is significant in terms of my own resistance to the notion that the 
Winter Garden Photograph actually presences Barthes’ mother.  Also, 
Krauss’ distinction between Dada photomontage as an interpretation of 
the real and surrealist photography’s paradoxical practice of constituting 
reality as a sign i.e. nature as representation, or presence transformed into 
writing, has a broader resonance with my thesis of the landscape as text.  
 
As we have seen, Derrida argues that the asynchronous nature of the 
signified and the signifier frustrates any possibility of unity in the sign.  The 
ensuing gap generates the precondition of the sign, that is, the deferral of 
language, referred to by Derrida as différance, which simultaneously 
produces and denies meaning.  In ‘The Photographic Conditions of 
Surrealism’, Krauss writes about this spacing in terms of the photograph’s 
capacity to signify.  She argues that photography’s distinctive indexical 
relation to the world enabled the surrealists to subvert the real.  According 
to Krauss, this tactic of subverting the photographic index functions as a 
form of écriture.  So although Krauss argues that the photograph is 
indexically linked to its referent, in the instance of surrealist photography, 
this feature of the photographic is manipulated in order to question the 
reality of the real by proposing that reality is itself a representation.  This, 
according to Krauss, “constitutes the notion of the Marvelous [sic] or of 
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Convulsive Beauty – the key concepts of surrealism.”200  And as far as 
Krauss is concerned, a crucial strategy for the surrealist photographer in 
the destabilisation of photographic reality is to drive a space between the 
image and that which it represents by way of doubling i.e. by the use of 
sandwiched negatives and double printing.  The insertion of another 
space into the so-called seamless space of photographic realism is 
unsettling due to the appearance of the double, but it also has the effect 
of undermining the reality of the original: 
 
It is doubling that produces the formal rhythm of spacing – the two-
step that banishes the unitary condition of the moment, that creates 
within the moment an experience of fission.  For it is doubling that 
elicits the notion that to an original has been added its copy.  The 
double is the simulacrum, the second, the representative of the 
original.  It comes after the first, and in this following, it can only exist as 
figure or image.  But in being seen in conjunction with the original, the 
double destroys the pure singularity of the first.201 
 
The rupture of the unified photographic moment is activated by the 
addition of the double.  The gesture of doubling splits the illusion of the 
transparent photographic moment: it inserts space into time.  According 
to Krauss, it is this doubling which distinguishes Surrealist photography from 
its Dada predecessor.  However, in both forms of photography, (Dadaist 
photomontage and Surrealist doubling) breaks are introduced into the 
legible reality of the photograph.  This forces the image to be read as a 
sign rather than as a transparent presence: the spacing in these kinds of 
photographs radically undermines photography’s illusion of presence.  
Krauss writes that  
                                                
200 Ibid. p.112 
201 Ibid. p.109 
 153 
 
[t]he photographic image, thus “spaced,” is deprived of one of the 
most powerful of photography’s many illusions.  It is robbed of a sense 
of presence.  Photography’s vaunted capture of a moment in time is 
the seizure and freezing of presence.  It is the image of simultaneity, of 
the way that everything within a given space at a given moment is 
present to everything else…But spacing destroys simultaneous 
presence: for it shows things sequentially, either one after another or 
external to one another – occupying separate cells.  It is spacing that 
makes it clear…that we are not looking at reality, but at the world 
infested by interpretation or signification, which is to say reality 
distended by the gaps or blanks which are the formal preconditions of 
the sign.202 
 
As Krauss points out, the capacity of photographs to capture and seize 
presence is illusory, and her theory of Dada and Surrealist photography 
powerfully underscores this idea.  In addition, it reconfigures the 
relationship between the photograph and the eye.  As her essay ‘The 
Photographic Conditions of Surrealism’ demonstrates, the denial of 
photographic presence leads to a different way of seeing photographs.  
Rather than seeing through photographs, a tacit acceptance of the myth 
of photographic transparency, we are forced to read them.  In this 
context, photography is a form of writing which is legible for meaning, as 
opposed to a surrogate world made visible through photographic 
presence.  The manipulations of the surrealists ensured that  
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the photographic medium is exploited to produce a paradox: the 
paradox of reality constituted as a sign – or presence transformed into 
absence, into representation, into spacing, into writing.203 
 
The legacy of these photographers is the opening of what Krauss calls a 
‘fissure’ in reality. Photography’s distension of reality, the space which she 
argues is the precondition of the sign, entails that surrealist photographs 
are more than physical inscriptions i.e. writing in the superficial sense.  
According to Krauss, they can aspire to the condition of signs due to their 
ability to insert a “cleavage in reality.”204  The fissure introduced by these 
photographers ensures that the syntagm, or surface structure, of the 
photograph is not able to be seen as a seamless surface, a natural 
analogue, but a surface composed of units, gaps and repetitions.  Thus 
the image, argues Krauss, has its own syntax. 
 
As has been previously discussed, for Krauss, photography exemplifies 
surrealist practice per se, that is, all Surrealism is photographic by nature.  
For Krauss, it is photography’s capacity to distend reality, to transform the 
real into a sign, which is the critical ‘photographic condition’ of Surrealism.  
However, in order to account for all of Surrealism through its photographic 
practice, Krauss must also be able to explain the ‘straight’ Surrealist 
photographic print in terms of her thesis on doubling and spacing.  To this 
end, she writes: 
 
at the very boundary of the image the camera frame which crops or 
cuts the represented element out of reality-at-large can be seen as 
another example of spacing.  Spacing is the indication of a break in 
the simultaneous experience of the real, a rupture that issues into 
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sequence.  Photographic cropping is always experienced as a rupture 
in the continuous fabric of reality.  But surrealist photography puts 
enormous pressure on that frame to make it read as a sign205 
 
So for Krauss, photographic spacing is made apparent, not only in the 
photographic practice of doubling, but by the exclusions and inclusions of 
the frame.  Indeed, she argues that examples of ‘straight’ surrealist 
photographic practice such as Salvador Dali’s involuntary sculptures, 
which are close up photographs of rolled up bus tickets and kneaded 
putty erasers shot by Brassaï, and Man Ray’s series of photographs of hats 
for a book by Tristan Tzara are examples of “the world’s constant writing of 
erotic symbols, its ceaseless automatism.”206  I believe that Krauss’ 
argument that the frame is the annunciation of the photograph as sign is 
valid.  However, I do not think that this way of theorising photographs can 
in fact distinguish between different kinds of photographic practice.  
Where I consider there to be an unresolved problematic in Krauss’ 
argument is in the lack of distinction between photographic practices 
which do or do not exert “enormous pressure”207 on the frame which 
compels the photograph to be read as a sign.  As Krauss herself 
concedes, photographic cropping always introduces breaks into reality.  
Underpinning her understanding of surrealist photography is the belief that 
non-surrealist photographs are indexical, as Barthes puts it, “every 
photograph is a certificate of presence”208 – they testify to the existence 
of the subject in the photograph.  Therefore Krauss’ argument about 
surrealist photography’s capacity to distend the real indicates a 
commitment to the referentiality of photography and the notion that 
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photographic images are indexically linked to the real.  Her statement 
which follows is Sontagian in tenor: 
 
Surrealist photography exploits the special connection to reality with 
which all photography is endowed.  For photography is an imprint or 
transfer off the real; it is a photochemically processed trace causally 
connected to that thing in the world to which it refers209 
 
Although Krauss does not explicitly argue that photographs are realist she 
is committed to an indexical account of photography, which, is very 
similar to statements made by both Roland Barthes and André Bazin.  
However, the Surrealist concept of Convulsive Beauty, a startling 
disruption brought about by the appearance of the double, posits that 
reality is itself a representation.  The photographic condition of Surrealisim, 
the distension of reality, its infestation with interpretation, the uncanny 
doubling of the real forces us to question our eyes.  Rather than 
photography providing us with a transparent envelope through which we 
may look at the world, it produces the world as sign, and presence as 
writing.  Thus the automatic writing of the world is revealed by 
photography: 
 
What the camera frames and thereby makes visible is the automatic 
writing of the world: the constant, uninterrupted production of signs.210 
 
Following Derrida, Krauss is right to argue that the practice of 
photographic doubling and spacing, and the intervention of the frame 
produces photographic signification.  However, I do not agree that this 
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can account for a distinction between surrealist and other types of 
photography. Krauss argues that Surrealism forces the frame to function as 
a sign, yet she does not offer distinctive surrealist photographic techniques 
to support this. As Krauss herself points out, the frame functions in the same 
way in all kinds of photography, it ruptures our experience of reality.  
Therefore if spacing is the “theoretical apparatus”211 by which straight 
photographs are assimilated into surrealist practice, then I would argue 
that there is nothing distinctive about surrealist photographic practice: it is 
my contention that all photographs thus spaced can be argued to be 
signs.  All photographs are invaginated212 presences.  
 
The consequence of this is that all photographs signify, indeed not only do 
they signify or write the world, in their very capacity to double they 
fracture the subject itself.  As we saw earlier, Derrida writes: 
 
What can look at itself is not one; and the law of the addition of the 
origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is that one plus 
one makes at least three.213 
 
Photography is one of reality’s reflecting pools in which the world is 
ceaselessly written.  And in the process of writing the world, the world itself 
is refracted, differenced: reality is ruptured. 
 
IV Cleaving the Laminated Object 
 
The presence of the photographic frame (often merely as an absence) 
reminds us that we are looking at photographs rather than fragments of 
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reality.  As we have already seen, for Krauss, the ‘photographic condition’ 
of Surrealism turns upon the medium’s capacity, through spacing and 
doubling, to constitute reality as a sign, to defer photographic presence.  
The ensuing paradox, unsettling and sur-real, reinscribes the photographic 
index as a sign of reality: the surrealist photograph is a proxy for 
unconscious reality, the undisclosed real.  However, as has already been 
intimated, it is difficult to account for different photographic practices 
using Krauss’ argument.  Indeed, if we think of photography as being 
engaged in the casting of time, the camera’s shutter also introduces 
spacings, which become temporalised framings, scraps of the fabric of 
the world torn from time and place, fixed in an image.  This provides an 
opening for the assertion that all photographs are signs due to their nature 
as ruptured presences.  However, it is not just the frame which writes the 
world photographically but also the shutter.  Krauss herself writes, in an 
essay about the sculptor Rachel Whiteread, that  
 
Photography’s ‘this-has-been’…along with the instantaneous open-
and-closing of the shutter, produces the spacing, or the oppositional 
structure of a paradigm.214 
 
The relation of the photograph with time produces a specific kind of 
spatial structure, a spacing, an oppositional structure.  The click of the 
shutter produces the pattern which underwrites the images produced by 
the camera.  That is, the spatialisation of time is photography’s mode of 
production.  If we are to argue that photographic écriture is productivity, 
which we will indeed turn to in the final chapter, the photographic image 
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which is produced is time written.  The photographic ‘this-has-been’,215 the 
world in front of the camera is spaced, sliced into fragments and 
rearranged: photography has the oppositional structure of a grid.  For 
Rosalind Krauss, photographs are paradigmatically opposed, that is, they 
are cut from the world and laid out side by side. 
 
 
 
I have explored photographically the notion of time written, the 
spatialisation of the moving view, in a series of works which ruminated 
upon the manner in which travel structures new views.  Barthes’ writing on 
the blind field, in tandem with previous research on landscape, lead me 
to consider the exclusions of the view.  The overt presence of the 
photographic frame hints at that which lies beyond the boundary.  The 
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notion that another photograph lay beyond the frame propelled me to 
make some images of the landscape which were comprised of more than 
one shot.  Contrary to Barthes’ assertion that the punctum sustains the 
subject in the photograph, these “grid” images make apparent the 
selective nature of photography: they double, fracture and insert spaces 
into the view.   
 
The image overleaf, Uig from the Hebrides (Starboard), was made on 
board a ferry and as the result of the moving subject spatial incongruities 
occur which further emphasises the play in and between the frames.  The 
view of the landscape becomes, to use Krauss’ words, “a rupture that 
issues into sequence”216, cohering around the black of the frame, quite 
literally devoid of information, disclosed as absent presences.  These grid 
images are produced by scanning the landscape with the camera, out of 
necessity and, it must be said, choice, I must work ‘blind’: after the images 
were made, the gap which opens up resulting in the loss of the lower half 
of the man’s body was the source of personal fascination.  However, this 
way of working, which I think of in terms of a generative trope of blindness, 
provides certain freedoms.  This trope will be explored later in the thesis, 
particularly in relation to rethinking the view in Derridean terms. 
 
The overt photographic doubling of the subject, the representation 
fracturing and splitting the represented, echoes, once again, the 
Derridean notion of the reflecting pool.  This questions Barthes’ idea that 
the referent provides ballast for the ‘weightless envelope’ of the 
photograph.  On the other hand, the photograph as theorised by Krauss is 
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altogether more material.  Photographic images are garnered from the 
world: the index is tied to the referent from which, she writes, “it is cast”217.   
We have the sense of the physicality of photographs in Krauss’ account 
which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is missing from Barthes’ writing 
on photography.  The exteriority of the photographic signifier is repressed 
by Barthes in order to foreground the referent and preserve the illusion of 
the unity of image and body. But, as Krauss points out, the paradigmatic 
opposition of photography’s ‘this-has-been’ and the opening and closing 
of the shutter sets up a structural relation between the camera and its 
object.  The structural paradigm of photography is inside/outside, 
subject/object, camera/world: in the arrested photographic moment the 
subject is objectified.   
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For Barthes the genius of photography is concerned with the resurrection 
and enduring presence of the referent, whereas according to Krauss the 
opening and closing of the shutter inserts a temporal break between the 
subject and its image: the shutter inserts a space between the two.  This 
break ruptures and defers the presence of the subject, to which Barthes 
himself attests when he writes of the photograph: 
 
what I see has been here, in this place which extends between infinity 
and the subject…it has been here, and yet immediately separated; it 
has been absolutely, irrefutably present, and yet already deferred218 
 
Thus the photograph certifies to the fact of the presence of the subject 
before the camera, whilst simultaneously deferring this presence.  The 
deferral of which Barthes speaks describes the delay of the subject; the 
rays which emanate from it touch the spectator from a time before he or 
she existed.  As far as Barthes is concerned, the photograph establishes a 
continuity by way of contiguity, which, for him, is unavailable to other 
visual media.  However, although there are areas of overlap between 
Krauss and Barthes (she remains committed to the photographic index), 
the critical difference between Krauss’ thesis on Surrealist photographs 
and Barthes’ genius of The Photograph is the rupture initiated by doubling, 
framing and the shutter, which Krauss describes as “the movement, in 
which spacing “invaginates” presence.”219  The contiguity of subject and 
image, the photograph as Barthesean laminated object in which the 
subject and photograph are inseparable, is cleaved by Krauss’ thesis on 
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Surrealist photography, leaving the putatively unified photographic 
moment burst open. 
 
This space between the signified and the signifier destabilises 
photography’s claim to presence the subject: between frame and world, 
shutter and subject, there is a hiatus; an in-between.  Whilst Krauss’ thesis 
on Surrealist photography, does not, as I have already demonstrated, 
adequately account for distinctive photographic practices, it does, I 
believe, account for photography in general.  Thus spacing, either as 
photographic doubling, or as the insistence of the frame, or the flicker of 
the shutter, founds photography as a practice of écriture: the Barthesean 
photograph is ‘invaginated’ and delaminated by Krauss’ theory. 
 
So we have seen that photography in general is a practice of elisions and 
spacing, it is concerned with the exploration of the space between things 
and images and the generative play of absence.  The decision to 
photograph anything inevitably involves the exclusion of something else.  
 
The frame announces that between the part of reality that was cut 
away and this part there is a difference; and that this segment which 
the frame frames is an example of nature-as-representation, nature-
as-sign.  As it signals that experience of reality the camera frame also 
controls it, configures it.220 
 
Thus the frame demarcates the boundary between inclusion/exclusion, in 
order to represent something photographically it is necessary to elide 
something else: the frame is just another insinuation of the gap between 
reality and its sign. 
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In Barthes’ account, to enable the photograph to function as presence, 
the photographic interstice has to be suppressed, or transversed by the 
thread of causality, in order to bring the subject into contact with the 
spectator.  The punctum bursts across the hiatus pricking the viewer across 
time and space.  However, if we are to believe Krauss’ assertion that the 
frame is also a means by which reality becomes a representation, by way 
of the insertion of space, a margin between the photograph and the 
world-as-it-is, and the structuration of an oppositional paradigm, we can 
argue that all photographs are signs: photography is a practice of writing.  
 
It seems that, for Krauss, écriture is difference by the addition of the same: 
spacing differences the image from the world through doubling, the 
addition of the copy.  This is what Krauss means when she states that 
Surrealist photographic practice transforms reality into representation, 
nature into a sign.  Following Claude Levi-Strauss she considers the 
phonemic doubling expressed by infants – the repetition of the sound pa 
to form the word papa – as an indicator of meaning.  Thus photographic 
doubling functions in the same way as does the frame, it is “signifier of 
signification.”221  By the very intentional doubling, though visual rather 
than phonic, of the photographic act, meaning is signified.  Thus for Krauss 
the photographic trace is indexical and physical insofar as it doubles the 
world.  The invaginaion of the photographic sign cleaves apart the 
laminated leaves of the photograph and its referent.  With this in mind, I 
now intend to investigate the theoretical space which opens between 
these leaves.  I will investigate Krauss’ conception of the photographic 
trace and écriture alongside Derrida’s ideas regarding the trace and the 
role it plays in grammatology. 
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In many respects Krauss’ thesis on photographic écriture is not radical 
enough.  Although she argues that surrealist photographic practices 
destroy photography’s illusion of presence, Krauss holds on to a belief in 
the photographic index.  She needs photography to have a privileged 
engagement with the real in order for her thesis on surrealism to work.  
However, if her thesis on doubling and spacing is taken to be an account 
of photography as such, all photographs are écriture; they write the world, 
and as we shall see in due course, we can argue that they produce a 
world.  I now intend to look at Krauss’ thesis in relation to Derrida’s writing 
on différance in order to explicate the concept, introduced earlier, of the 
subject in difference.  The photograph, as we have already seen, can be 
taken as a reflecting pool which differs the subject from itself.  I will now 
look at this notion that the subject differs from its image, that it is in 
Derridean terms, sameness in difference. 
 
V Photography as physis in différance 
 
Perhaps we should pause to ask whether in thinking the photographic 
double in terms of the same but not identical, as a sign, do we not fall into 
the classical trap of continuing to think of the photograph in terms of 
presence, even if it is deferred?  That is, does the photograph function as 
a sign of that which it indexes, which acts as a proxy, as stand-in or 
surrogate for the subject itself?  As Derrida writes: 
 
We ordinarily say that a sign is put in place of the thing itself, the 
present thing – “thing” holding here for the sense as well as the 
referent.  Signs represent the presence in its absence; they take the 
place of the present.  When we cannot take hold of or show the thing, 
let us say the present, the being-present, when the present does not 
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present itself, then we signify, we go through the detour of signs.  We 
take up or give signs; we make signs.  The sign would thus be a 
deferred presence.222 
 
The photographic image considered in terms of classical semiotics as 
outlined by Derrida above, stands in for the subject itself.  The photograph 
represents the subject: in its absence.  Barthes cannot take hold of his 
mother, the being-present, therefore her image is signified through the 
detour of the photographic sign.  The photograph is the proxy of a lost 
origin.  Thus photography as écriture is, for Krauss, this deferral of presence. 
Photographs signify in virtue of the addition of the double: the 
photographic ‘babble’ is indicative of the fact that the photographer 
intends meaning.  However, as we shall see in due course, the conception 
of the photograph as sameness in difference entails that the photograph 
functions in excess of a classical semiotic reading.  Photographs do not 
simply act as surrogates or deferred presences: they transform the world.  
But for the meantime, let us continue with Rosalind Krauss before moving 
on to look further at Jacques Derrida’s writing on différance.  
 
Insofar as Krauss invokes the doubling, spacing and the grid to account 
for photography as écriture, the character of photography is 
semiological.  According to Krauss, the photographic double is not simply 
a copy of reality, that is, an analogue of the real, it is the very act of 
doubling by which Surrealist photography achieves its semiological 
function.  And yet, for Krauss, other photographic practices are to be 
described in terms of an indexical, presentational account.  In order to 
demonstrate this bifurcation of Krauss’ thesis on photography, let us return 
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to her example of the photographs of hats which Man Ray made for 
Tristan Tzara,.  That is to say, her conception of Surrealist photography as 
spaced, thus opaque, on the one hand, and straight photography as 
presentation, or manifestation of the subject itself on the other means that 
her thesis on photography is dualistic223.  Krauss herself argues that 
photography’s “vaunted”224 capacity to presence the subject is simply an 
illusion, and yet her argument clearly retains a kernel of this illusion in order 
for the photograph to function as a presentation.  For Krauss, doubling 
and spacing are processes available to the (Surrealist) photographer.  
However, it can be shown that doubling and spacing are photographic 
per se rather than merely being manipulations, and that the frame is not, 
as Krauss defines it, an “empty sign”225.  The problem is this: the hats’ 
production of “erotic symbols”226 is morphological (albeit unconscious) 
not semiological.  Also, the hats are already coded, they are cultural 
artefacts and therefore it is difficult to agree with Krauss’ pronouncement 
that “Surreality is nature convulsed into a kind of writing.”227  Hats, we 
might argue, are already text.  However, if we agree with her that the 
condition of surreality is photographic, it follows that the photographic 
intervention twists nature into writing. 
 
Krauss’ account is problematic in terms of the locus of signification, that is 
to say, whether the unconscious writing of the world is presented 
photographically, or whether photography writes the world.  In order to 
be committed to photographic presentation, one must subscribe to 
photographic transparency.  Therefore, it is the latter position which this 
                                                
223 To a certain extent this is inevitable insofar as her argument explores surrealist practice 
which posits a duality between conscious/unconscious.  
224 Rosalind Krauss The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths p.107 
225 Ibid. p.115 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. p.113 
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thesis will develop.  Nothwithstanding the problems associated with 
Krauss’articulation of this, her conception of écriture as the addition of the 
double resonates with Derrida’s neographism différance.  The 
photographic double differs from itself.  Différance, which as Derrida 
argues is neither a word nor a concept, is a movement, a play, a gesture 
which strikes at the heart of philosophy’s metaphysical origins: the 
oppositional structure from which difference and meaning emerges.  
Derrida observes that ‘to differ’ has two distinct meanings: 
 
The verb “to differ” [differer] seems to differ from itself.  On the one 
hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, or discernability; 
on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay, the interval of 
spacing and temporalizing that puts off until “later” what is presently 
denied, the possible that is presently impossible.228 
 
Thus, to differ does not have a singular identity; it means either 
differentiation or deferment.  For Derrida, “to differ” is thus the site of 
sameness and non-identity: two different meanings issuing from the same 
word.  His neographism différance serves to mark this sameness and non-
identity: 
 
We provisionally give the name différance to this sameness which is 
not identical: by the silent writing of its a, it has the desired advantage 
of referring to differing, both as spacing/temporalizing and as the 
movement that structures every dissociation.229 
 
The silent mark of the a indicates an inaudible differentiation between the 
e of difference and différance.  To an extent, the neographism overturns 
                                                
228 Jacques Derrida ‘Différance’ in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's 
Theory of Signs David B. Allison (trans), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 p.129 
229 Ibid pp. 129-130 
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the privilege of speech over writing and underlines Derrida’s assertion that 
there is no purely phonetic writing, as there is no purely phonic phonè.  
The “tacit monument”230 which is the a of différance can only be seen 
and not heard: the tomb is silent.  However, even in so far as the a of 
différance is visible, it evades understanding.  As Derrida points out, the 
difference between two phonemes is inaudible and it may be argued 
that although the a of différance is visible, the “graphic difference” 
between the e and the a “itself sinks into darkness”.231   That is, the 
difference ‘itself’ remains invisible.  We see only the one, or the other, not 
the difference itself: 
 
It never constitutes the fullness of a sensible term, but draws out an 
invisible connection, the mark of an inapparent relation between two 
spectacles…since…the difference between the e and the a marked 
in “différance” eludes vision and hearing, this happily suggests that we 
must here let ourselves be referred to an order that no longer refers to 
sensibility.  But we are not referred to intelligibility either…We must be 
referred to an order that resists philosophy’s founding opposition 
between the sensible and the intelligible.232 
 
Différance calls into question the opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible, the signifier and the signified.  However, the economy or 
resource of the sign still has some utility.  Meaning issues from differences, 
difference issues from the language system which precedes the speaking 
subject.  What, therefore enables language and difference to be 
produced?  Derrida answers: différance.  For Derrida, différance is the 
primordial (but non-simple origin) “protowriting”233 or play, which 
                                                
230 Ibid. p.132 
231 Ibid p.133 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid. p.146 
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generates and sustains difference.  However, différance can neither be 
thought nor defined, for each time it appears, it erases itself. 
 
Every concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or 
system, within which it refers to another and to other concepts, by the 
systematic play of differences.  Such a play, then – différance – is no 
longer simply a concept, but the possibility of conceptuality, of the 
conceptual system and process in general…The difference that 
Saussure speaks about, therefore, is neither itself a concept nor one 
word among others.  We can say this a fortiori for différance.  Thus we 
are brought to make the relation between the one and the other 
explicit.234 
 
Différance resists philosophy’s founding opposition because, as Derrida 
writes, it maintains it.  Thus différance is incompatible with the notion that 
the binary sign is composed of the sensible signifier and the intelligible 
signified.  Derrida erases or crosses off the sign (“that ill-named thing”235), 
for the sign has no thingness, it is the proxy of a lost source.  The sign marks 
difference, it is that which it is not: its difference is unseen and unheard.  
The sign is crossed off, yet allowed to stand, for we have no recourse other 
than to language. 
 
The “formal essence” of the sign can only be determined in terms of 
presence.  One cannot get around that response, except by 
challenging the very form of the question and beginning to think that 
the sign  is  that ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the 
instituting question of philosophy: “what is…?”236 
 
                                                
234 Ibid. p.140 
235 Jacques Derrida Of Grammatology Corrected Edition Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(trans), Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 p.19 
236 Ibid. pp. 18-19 
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The sign, the very stuff of language slides from philosophy’s grasp: the 
material being of language escapes definition and thus undermines 
all philosophical claims to truth.  Although the opposition between 
the signified and the signifier is never absolute, according to Derrida, 
the sign continues as a valuable resource which enables the 
transformations of language through translation.  I intend to explore 
this in more detail during the ensuing chapter, where I propose that in 
writing the world, photography transforms it. 
 
Différance, neither a word nor a concept, is resolutely undefinable: it 
precedes language and gives rise to difference.  Différance is Derrida’s 
“avowedly paradoxical name for the primordial movement or ‘play’ of 
being which gives rise to differences.”237  Thus différance is the non-simple 
origin of difference.  It is the play which sustains difference, a play which 
cannot be mastered, différance has no subject or author.  Différance is 
the undetermined substratum of language or any other code which 
enables difference.  If we return to Derrida’s words on the trace, 
considered earlier in the chapter: 
 
The use of language or the employment of any code which implies a 
play of forms - with no determined or invariable substratum - also 
presupposes a retention and protention of differences, a spacing and 
temporalizing, a play of traces.  This play must be a sort of inscription 
prior to writing, a protowriting without a present origin, without an 
arché.238 
 
                                                
237 Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy Mautner, Thomas (ed) London: Penguin 2000 p.143 
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Although Derrida is sceptical of the metaphysical latencies in any system 
of opposing terms, as we have seen, he does not seek to completely 
dispense with the opposition between the signified and the signifier, 
although he does demonstrate that this opposition is not absolute.  And 
although différance sustains this opposition, it is important that we do not 
think this play in terms of a dialectical movement between each pair of 
opposing terms.  
 
Contrary to the metaphysical, dialectical, and “Hegelian” 
interpretation of the economic movement of différance, we must 
admit a game where whoever loses wins and where one wins and 
loses each time.  If the diverted presentation continues to be 
somehow definitively and irreducibly withheld, this is not because a 
particular present remains hidden or absent, but because différance 
holds us in a relation with what exceeds (though we necessarily fail to 
recognize this) the alternative of presence or absence.239 
 
Although Derrida writes here of the alterity of the unconscious, we can, in 
a sense, extend this way of thinking about absence and presence to the 
sign.  The deferment of the sign is thus not a temporary retardation, a 
postponement which nonetheless will eventually enable the deferred to 
present itself.  Rather, the sign, as facilitated by the movement of 
différance is permanently withheld.  As Derrida writes, this is not due to the 
hiddenness of presence, the necessity of unveiling being as presence, but 
his notion that différance sustains difference in such a way that exceeds 
opposition.  The sign therefore goes beyond the notion of absence and 
presence as alternatives, that is, other to one another.  Rather than these 
categories standing in opposition to one another, Derrida asks us to think 
of the one as the différance of the other.  And if we think of the 
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photographic sign as permanently deferred, the photographic signifier 
cannot present or presence its signified: the photograph is incapable of 
the disclosure of the real.  Photography, contrary to Susan Sontag’s 
assertion, is not a practice of unmasking the world, causing it to become 
unhidden.  Conversely, by way of the photographic re-inscription of the 
world, the photograph is a reconfiguration of the same; it is sameness in 
difference.   
 
We could thus take up all the coupled oppositions on which 
philosophy is constructed, and from which our language lives, not in 
order to see opposition vanish but to see the emergence of a 
necessity such that one of the terms appears as the différance of the 
other, the other as “differed” within the systematic ordering of the 
same (e.g., the intelligible as differing from the sensible, as sensible 
differed; the concept as differed-differing intuition, life as differed-
differing matter; mind as differed-differing life; culture as differed-
differing nature; and all the terms designating what is other than physis 
– technè, nomos, society, freedom, history, spirit, etc. – as physis 
differed or physis differing: physis in différance).  It is out of the 
unfolding of this “same” as différance that the sameness of difference 
and repetition is presented in the eternal return.240 
 
The importance of photography as sameness in difference will be 
explored further during the next chapter.  However, the investigation will 
be informed by Derrida’s non-concept différance, which has just been 
discussed.  I will therefore explore further the idea that the photograph is 
the différance of the world: a Derridean “physis in différance”. 
 
                                                
240 Ibid. pp.148-149 
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VI Concluding Remarks 
 
Throughout this chapter we have looked at Roland Barthes’ idea that the 
genius of photography is the touch of different space times coupled with 
the photograph’s capacity to resurrect the loved one.  We explored this 
conception of the photograph bringing the subject to presence in relation 
to Sausurre’s definition of the sign as the transparency between thought 
and speech.  According to Saussure, as speaking subjects we understand 
ourselves because we are present to ourselves at the moment of 
utterance i.e. our thoughts and words are contiguous and synchronous.  
This self-presence resonates strongly with the subjects’ self-identity in the 
photograph: the referent persists through the photograph.   However, as 
we have seen, Derrida argues that the sign is deferred by the duration of 
a breath, even in formulating and articulating our words we are already in 
the process of the indicative detour.  Therefore the sign never closes, it is 
permanently deferred, or delayed. 
 
In summary, the touch of the Barthesean photograph can be seen as a 
motif for the metaphysics of presence, Derrida’s critique of metaphysics 
(or the study of being) thought in terms of self-identity.  Thus just as in 
Sausurrean terms we are present in hearing ourselves speak, Barthes 
mother is brought to presence through the photograph – the contiguity of 
which he speaks is the touch of mother and son – across time and space.  
However, if we take the photograph to be the structuration of difference, 
photographic practice as writing, which I propose to term 
photogrammatology, a photograph is sameness in difference.  In 
sameness in difference we have the conception of the photographic 
double, écriture as the production of text in which the image of Barthes’ 
mother is read rather than seen. 
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This notion of reading reality, is consistent with Rosalind Krauss’ argument 
regarding the capacity of Surrealist photographs to convulse reality into a 
representation.  This occurs due to the invagination of the sign through 
rupture and doubling, and this idea has a resonance with Derrida’s writing 
which questions the unity of the sign.  The conception of reality as writing 
also has strong parallels with the thesis of the landscape as text.  However, 
we should exercise caution, because although Derrida’s expanded field 
of writing would support the thesis of world as écriture, text or 
grammatology, he does resist the idea that writing is representation.  
Writing as representation, or in Saussurean terms, writing as the external 
clothing of language, is problematic for Derrida as it is a tacit 
endorsement of the hegemonic privilege of speech over writing in the 
history of philosophy.  This assumption is deconstructed by Derrida and, as 
we will see later, for him there is nothing outside of text.  That is to say, the 
text does not refer to something outside of itself, it does not point 
transparently to a referent.  Instead, the text simply refers to another text in 
an endless play of textuality.  Finally, having reviewed the positions of 
Barthes, Sontag, Derrida and Krauss, the groundwork has been laid for a 
closer scrutiny of the inter-relationship between textuality, meaning and 
photography.  The significance of this play of textuality will be central to 
the following chapter in which we will seek to understand the relationship 
between ‘landtext’ and photogrammatology.  The relation in practice 
between these two terms and the significance that this has for the thesis 
will be discussed next. 
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I Inside/Out; Trace 
 
In building the elements of my argument we have discussed the following:  
1) The problematic of metaphysics conceived in terms of binary 
opposition, which early in the initial chapter was considered in relation to 
Roman Jackobson’s idea of the markedness of oppositional terms, that is, 
the conception that in any binary opposition, one term is always 
dominant, or marked, which reflects cultural values and assumptions.   
2) In the following chapter we looked at Bruno Latour’s argument 
regarding the need to move beyond old objects, which are clearly 
bounded and defined, in order to embrace new objects which are held 
in a relation with their producers, a matrix or network which includes the 
complex of the object’s production.  
3) We went on to look at Jacques Derrida’s non-concept différance and 
the notion that metaphysics or being is difference which is an unfolding of 
the same in différance.  We briefly touched upon the import of this way of 
thinking about photography at the close of the last chapter.  It is towards 
this question which constitutes the major component of my argument that 
I shall now turn: the conception of photography as physis in différance.   
 
As our deliberations on the binary oppositions of metaphysics have 
demonstrated thus far, to think photography as a practice with fixed 
subject/object relations is a strange problematic.  The conception that 
the lens is an objectifier (l’objectif), which forms a boundary or barrier 
between itself and world, inscribing the practice of photography in terms 
of the binary opposition interior/exterior is at once intuitively correct and 
yet returns the camera to the status of monocular picturing device, a 
position from which we have already tried to escape.  Derrida shows us 
that these oppositions (the binary differences of metaphysics) are 
produced rather than inherent in being: these differences are produced 
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by différance.  Thus we could say that the chamber of the camera, which 
structures the relation between itself and world as inside/outside, is in turn 
produced by différance. The conception of the photograph as an 
exteriority, an inscription of the camera’s interior is produced by 
différance.  Photography, thought of as “physis in différance” undermines 
the notion that the photographic interior is somehow separate from the 
outside world and this enables the relationship between the photograph 
and the world to be reconfigured as “the other as “differed” within the 
systematic ordering of the same”241.  Thus the photograph is part of the 
world, photography is a means of actualising the world, but the world and 
the photograph are transformed by one another.  The language of the 
world transforms the language of photography and the language of 
photography transforms the language of the world.   
 
The photograph as invaginated sign, explored in the previous chapter, 
has some utility at this stage of the discussion.  As Derrida writes in 
Positions, although the relation between the signifier and the signified is 
not a universal, fixed opposition, for example, there are not direct 
correlations between signifiers in different languages, the relationship 
between the components of the deferred sign serve a function.  Indeed, 
in certain instances we cannot do without them: 
 
That this opposition [between the signified and the signifier] is never 
radical or absolute does not prevent it from functioning, and even 
from being indispensable within certain limits – very wide limits.  For 
example, no translation would be possible without it…translation 
practices the difference between signified and signifier.  But if this 
difference is never pure, no more so is translation, and for the notion of 
                                                
241 Jacques Derrida ‘Différance’ Speech and Phenomena , and Other Essays on Husserl's 
Theory of Signs David B. Allison (trans), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 p.148 
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translation we would have to substitute a notion of transformation: a 
regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by 
another.242 
 
The photograph, as a signifier of a signifer, an image of a text, transforms 
the world, it writes the landscape.  The lens does not come between the 
film and the world, it is part of the world: photography is a gesture of 
transformation. 
 
During the first chapter we investigated certain preconceptions regarding 
the view in the landscape genre.  In order to move beyond the notion of 
the landscape as view, and landscape photography as a practice of 
‘picturing’ the view, we investigated the idea that the landscape could 
be considered as a text, that is, an artefact which is culturally inscribed.  
This idea of the culturally inscribed landscape as text, or landtext, which 
changes over time and under the gaze of many onlookers, resonates 
strongly with post-structuralist ideas about the movement of text.  The 
landtext, mobile and fleeting, eludes fixed meanings.  Transforming our 
understanding of the landscape from one of a picture or view, to 
landscape as text, has enabled me to engage photographically with 
landscape as a changing inscription.  The characterisation of the relation 
between the flickering shutter, the lens and the world as the momentary 
capture of a fleeting image (which then comes to persist iconically as a 
surrogate) is challenged.  This change in the relationship is exemplified by 
the practitioner’s continual return to a location, which facilitates the 
enduring difference of the same (change in the land) to be recorded.  
Thus the concept that the momentary time base of the photograph is 
fixed becomes open to question.  We might even argue that a 
                                                
242 Jacques Derrida Positions Alan Bass (trans), New York; London: Continuum, 2004 p.19 
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photograph persists over multiple exposures, that it is built rather than 
frozen, accreted, an oppositional paradigm, as Krauss describes it: the 
photograph is laid out side by side. 
 
The exploration of the notion of photography as writing/écriture, or in 
Derridean terms, the photograph as gram, in the last chapter facilitated 
the investigation of the so-called decisive or unified photographic 
moment.  This proceeded by way of questioning the presence of the 
photographic subject through recourse to the writings of Derrida and 
Krauss on the sign as the structured and permanent delay or deferral of 
presence.  The practice of photography, taken to be a form of writing, not 
only produces photographic texts, but also opens a space of practice.  
Practice-as-writing is this space where the possibility of meaning opens.  
Thus meaningful photographs are not full of meaning (i.e. replete with the 
plenitude of meaning). Rather, the photographic sign is an opening for 
meaning in and through its relation with other signs.  The photographic 
sign is that which it is not, and this is critical for photographic practice 
insofar as the body of work becomes meaningful by way of the gaps 
within and between signs.  Différance produces oppositional differences, 
one term is the différance of the other: the sign always carries within it the 
trace of the other.  Ecriture opens difference and the products of écriture, 
texts carry “a trace, and a trace of the effacement of a trace”243 within 
them. 
 
As Derrida writes, each opposition is the différance of the other: culture 
differed differing nature; subject differed differing object.  And as we 
have already seen, Derrida lauds Saussure’s notion of the relational 
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Theory of Signs, David B. Allison (trans), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 p.156 
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structure of language as difference: the sign is that which it is not. Thus it is 
the invisible and inaudible differences between signs that enable them to 
mean, rather than their meaningful presence.  So, for Derrida at least, the 
proposition of the differential and relational structure of language is one of 
Saussure’s key achievements.  The sign therefore carries otherness within its 
very structure and différance as writing is therefore the articulation of the 
relation between opposites, neither passive nor active, in the middle 
voice, in tension between the two but also in excess of both.  Différance is 
the articulation of the one as the differed other; the other deferred and 
delayed.  But what do we mean when we correlate photography as 
writing/écriture with différance?  The notion of the photograph as 
différance, as this is neither a word nor a concept is in fact 
“inconceivable”,244 it resists definition in itself but the photograph as the 
différance of the world produces difference: it articulates sameness in 
difference.  Photography as physis in différance opens the possibility that 
the photographic images are the eternal play of difference which bear 
the trace of the other.  This runs counter to Sontag’s articulation of the 
photographic inscription as “something directly stencilled off of the real, 
like a footprint or a death mask…a material vestige of its subject”245, or 
indeed, as Barthes would have it, as the imprint of Christ’s face on the 
sudarium, an acheiropoesis.246  Rather, the photograph does not 
presence the subject, indeed it resists representation, and, in so doing, 
distends and spaces it, delaying and deferring the subject’s presence and 
facilitating a chain of signification which can never be closed.  The 
potential of the other resides in the space between: the trace. 
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However, to think of the photograph as a physical inscription, a physical 
trace of the real, is to represence the subject-in-the-photograph: to argue 
that the photographic trace brings the subject to presence.  For Derrida, 
the trace never presences itself, as soon as it appears, it erases itself, and, 
as the a of différance attests, as soon as it is read, it is inaudible.  Gayatri 
Chakavorty Spivak writes of the trace that, in Derrida’s usage, it is 
 
A word that cannot be a master-word, that presents itself as the mark 
of an anterior presence, origin, master.247 
 
The French word ‘trace’ retains the association of track, footprint, spoor.  
Thus the trace is the imprint of an other, it derives its being from the 
presence of something going before it.  The trace is in itself no thing, it is 
the residual marker of presence that once was.  The trace has no origin: 
“it disappear[s] in its appearing”248.  The notion of the photographic 
tracery of the subject is evocative indeed, but as we saw a little earlier, to 
think through the Derridean trace in terms of photographic images is not 
to simply equate it with an imprint of its subject.  To talk of the 
photographic trace is to talk of an image which is not, to borrow from 
Spivak, a master-image, but an insubstantiated, substanceless reflection.   
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The very invocation of ‘trace’ for photography, in Derridean terms, is a 
denial of the presence in the photograph.  It denies photographic realism, 
in the sense that Barthes and Sontag understand it, the realism of 
photography being its capacity to bear the evidence of a past reality. 
 
It is evident – it is evidence itself – that system and nonsystem, the 
same and the absolutely other, etc., cannot be conceived 
together.249 
 
Thus to think of the photographic image as a trace opens a play of the 
substantial and the insubstantial within the photographic itself.  The 
subject-in-the-photograph is no thing, a shadow bound in the 
photographic material.  Thus the evidentiary power of the photograph is 
called into question.  The photograph relies on its caption to steer its 
reading, yet it can allow imaginative leaps, as in the paired photographic 
works of Paul Graham.  The hole in the ground, a void which remains after 
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Untitled, 1990 (hole from Berlin wall; swarm of flies) Paul Graham, 1990 
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the removal of the Berlin Wall is hung alongside an image of a swarm of 
flies, frozen staccato by the use of a flash gun.  The photographer brings 
together two disparate images and encourages us to make visual 
connections across the gutter between each image.  The void space of 
the hole in the ground calls to mind the photographic denial of presence, 
the notion that these static visions are but textual constructions.   
 
The photographic trace is imprinted in the granular ground of the 
materials of photography.  Thus the photograph as physis in différance is 
the subtle interplay between thing and no thing, substance and shadow.  
The photographic as différance is the production of absence and 
presence, it is the eternal delay of the subject, and if we think of the 
photograph as écriture, it is the play of difference in which the 
photograph has no origin.  To track the spoor of the photograph is futile, 
for it leads to no place, no one. 
 
II Cut and stitch: a new world of images 
 
The photograph does not point inexorably back through time towards its 
subject, as we saw in the previous chapter, the lens doubles; it cuts 
images or signifiers from the world.  Indeed, Walter Benjamin describes the 
photographer as a surgeon who reaches into the body, through the lens 
the photographer surgeon is in contact with the world.  He places the 
photographer in opposition to the painter, the magician, who is distanced 
from it the world: 
 
Magician and surgeon compare to painter and cameraman.  The 
painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, the 
cameraman penetrates deeply into its web.  There is a tremendous 
difference between the pictures they obtain.  That of the painter is a 
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total one, that of the cameraman consists of multiple fragments which 
are assembled under a new law.250 
 
The photographer surgeon reaches in and extracts images from the world.  
The simulacrum is sutured together along with other doubles to form new 
texts of the world, a new body of images stitched from unmatched parts.  
Benjamin speaks of the image world: a body of photographs brought 
together.  However, even insofar as the photographers’ apparatus is 
contiguous with the world, it is not in touch with our experience of the 
world.  The ocular metaphor of photography is just that: metaphorical.  
The camera is a tool, which, if we are to follow Benjamin, enables the 
photographer to reach in and pluck images from the world, to pick up a 
stitch from the fabric of the landscape and to weave it into a new set of 
relations, a new image world, a new text. 
 
If our deliberations convince us that we don’t frame landscape to form a 
view, or the landscape does not present itself to us as view, and that 
landscapes are collections of spaces stitched together, it no longer makes 
sense to argue that landscapes are ‘pictured’.  Landscapes weave in and 
out of each other, they are textural surfaces fabricated by interwoven 
references, the landscape therefore does not have any actual exclusions 
or edges: the text of the land is without boundary; it bleeds into our 
peripheral vision.  So we are always already inside the text of the 
landscape.  The landscape is not a matter of distantiated contemplation, 
but the condition of an active encounter.  We do not stand outside of the 
landscape but are within it, we are part of the writing of the world.  The 
lens is also part of the writing of the world: it rewrites the world written.  The 
                                                
250 Walter Benjamin ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ in Art in 
Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas Charles Harrison and Paul Wood 
(eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998 p.516 
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text of the world is not simply laid down as sediment on the land’s surface, 
evident upon it; it is inscribed in it.  Foucault writes: 
 
What appears to me to be deceiving and naïve in reflections on and 
analyses of signs is that one supposes them to be always already 
there, deposited on the figure of the world251 
 
The landscape as a system of signs is not simply there, lying in wait to be 
read.  Rather, as Foucault suggests, signs are not always, already there, 
but constantly in the process of inscription.  Landscape as text is therefore 
continually in process, it is always being written.  Our environment is 
modified by cultural inscriptions: the landscape is shaped politically, we 
only need to think of the visual (and environmental) impact of our cycles 
of activity, such as farming, land development and travel.  Now, if the 
experience of looking at the landscape is this continual reference from 
signifier to signifier, the text of the land is never static.  Our readings of it 
are never static, landscape references ideas, ideas reference other ideas, 
other images and so on. 
 
As a photographic practitioner, I find myself inside the text of the 
landscape and in reinscribing it photographically, this text becomes a 
trace of a trace.  The photograph, if thought as writing/écriture is not a 
depiction of my experience of the landscape, how can it be?  The 
photographic detour might be thought of as a failure to signify 
experience, which is an assertion with which I would agree.  The 
photograph cannot signify the experience of place, in this sense the 
photographic signifier is empty.  However, the notion of the emptiness of 
the photographic signifier, or its incapacity to signify experience, does not 
                                                
251 Michel Foucault Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology James Faubion (ed), Robert 
Hurley (trans), London: Penguin, 2000 p.266 
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disturb me, for it recalls Derrida’s criticism of Saussure’s conception of 
writing, which is the result of philosophy’s historical legacy.  He describes it 
as: 
 
the historico-metaphysical reduction of writing to the rank of 
instrument enslaved to a full and originarily spoken language.252 
 
To make our point, we might bastardize Derrida’s words and say that the 
photograph as an exteriority, fails to embody an internal and proximate 
experience of the landscape, which can be expressed as photography 
reduced to an instrument enslaved to a full and originarily lived 
experience.  Therefore, rather than worry that photographs are merely the 
barren imprints of an originally lived experience, (i.e. no substitute for it 
and unable to signify experience) we may as well accept photography’s 
failure in this regard.  However, the camera as an instrument of writing 
opens the in-between, the leaves of the laminated object have been 
teased apart, the sign invaginated.  The relation between the landtext 
and photowriting therefore becomes a question of intertextuality.  
 
The spacing of the sign, “the order of the signified” writes Derrida 
“is…discrepant by the time of a breath…from the order of the signifier.”253  
As we shall see in due course, this rupture is a characteristic of writing in 
general, including visual signs.  I would now like to explore a little more fully 
the idea alluded to earlier that the differential structure of the 
photographic encounter is a product of différance.  That is to say, the 
inside/outside binarism is produced photographically; photographs are 
the products of the differential structure of photographic writing. 
                                                
252 Jacques Derrida Of Gramatology Corrected Edition Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(trans), Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 p.29 
253 Ibid. p.18 
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The very etymology of the word ‘camera’ invokes an image of a 
sequestered space of privilege, as in a judge’s chambers.  Additionally, in 
terms of the physical and historical development of photography, it is 
impossible to escape from the material fact of the camera as a darkened 
room penetrated by light.  As in Plato’s allegory of the cave, the light 
images fixed by photography are the shadow play of reflections which 
dance on the back wall of the film plate.  Roland Barthes denies the 
lineage of photography through the use of the camera obscura by 
painters for the simple reason that the touch of photography is what 
matters to him: the photographic is an event, a performativity which is 
only enabled by the intervention of the chemistry by which the shadow 
play may be revealed.  As we saw in chapter two, this tendency in 
Barthes’ thinking leads him to deny the camera’s existence, to deny its 
instrumentality and to cherish the transparency of the photographic 
envelope. 
 
However, as far as I am concerned, the photographic moment is 
interventionist.  In working with a camera I cannot deny its existence and 
yet questioning the separateness of the camera from world begins to 
soften the intervention, to suggest that the two meet seamlessly or fold 
together, an intertwining as in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasma.  So, 
perhaps we might think of the camera as a frame after all, not in terms of 
framing the view but as a parergon.  Thus the inside/outside distinction 
can be seen as an effect of parergonality.  The camera is between the 
image and the world, actualising a new configuration of the world, whilst 
simultaneously effacing and burying itself.254  Therefore we may allow 
                                                
254 Derrida writes that “The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement 
belongs to the very structure of the trace…In addition, and from the start, effacement 
constitutes it as a trace – effacement establishes the trace in a change of place and 
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what we previously considered to be a troubling inside/outside dichotomy 
to persist as an effect of framing.  In taking this to be an effect of the 
photographic parergon rather than a rigid binary distinction, the notion of 
inside and outside as a fluid and changing relationship between the 
image and its subject enable us to persist with a reading of photography 
that is at once interventionist and yet connected to the world.  Indeed, 
the particularity of the photographic frame deserves further attention as 
this will have a bearing on our explorations of photographic writing. 
 
III Parergonality and the products of photowriting 
 
Is the frame (the blank area around a roll film negative) inside or outside 
the image?  It is produced by the camera and registered, in absence/in 
absentia, on the film.  Camera types vary and with this variety comes a 
variance of frame types.  Sometimes a camera leaves a particular trace 
in the frame – a nick or a rough edge – caused by damage or 
manufacture.  The frame in 35mm or 120 film spaces the images: it 
ruptures and breaks the images which is, as Krauss puts it, “a rupture that 
issues into sequence”255: the images are disseminated sequentially.  One 
might ask the question: where does the photographic image end, at the 
boundary of the frame, or the very edge of the film?  Are the inscriptions 
of the make of the film, the numbers, or the sprocket holes part of the 
photograph?  Does the frame delimit, delineate, describe, or reveal the 
work?  Is the means of production, the very industry of photography part 
of the work?  These are the very questions that Derrida addresses in 
‘Parergon’ from The Truth in Painting.  He writes of the frame that: 
                                                
makes it disappear in its appearing, makes it issue forth from itself in its very position.”  
‘Différance’ in Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs 
David B. Allison (trans), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 p.156 
255 Rosalind Krauss The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths 
Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1986 p. 115 
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Parerga have a thickness, a surface which separates them not only 
(as Kant would have it) from the integral inside, from the body proper 
of the ergon, but also from the outside, from the wall on which the 
painting is hung, from the space in which the statue or column is 
erected, then, step by step, from the whole field of historical, 
economic, political inscription in which the drive to signature is 
produced.256    
 
As I argued during chapter three, following Rosalind Krauss’s thesis on the 
photographic conditions of surrealism, the photographic frame is the 
signifier of photography as writing, or signification.  The frame structures 
the photograph as sign, and as such, it inserts a space between signifier 
and signified, whilst simultaneously generating images (or signifiers of 
                                                
256 Jacques Derrida The Truth in Painting Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod (trans) 
Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 p. 61 
Blackhills, Moray, Gina Wall 
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signifiers) which are copies, cut from the world and laid out in relation to 
one another.  The image has a syntax, which in the case of some of my 
landscape photographs, takes the form of a grid with overlaps, doublings 
and gaps.  These images remind us that our eyes are always moving, that 
we build our perceptions from sense data and memories.  Relative 
positions are significant: the images register small changes in stance, 
angle of view; the relational nature of the landscape and reader is 
emphasised.257  
 
In spite of my efforts to suppress the view, strangely it appears to rewrite 
itself; this reassembled view risks recentring the viewer.  However, it is 
important to bear in mind that Derrida’s deconstructive reading is not 
simply an inversion of logocentric prejudice.258  As Christopher Norris writes: 
 
Derrida insists that deconstruction is a process of ‘displacement’ 
endlessly at work…rather than…an act of critical intervention that 
would come, so to speak, from outside and simply apply the standard 
technique for reversing some ‘logocentric’ order of priorities.259 
 
The view, the occularcentrism of the photographic register, therefore 
cannot be challenged from outside.  One must be inside the view in order 
to deconstruct it, at which point we inevitably run the risk of constructing 
that which we seek to deconstruct.260  We might therefore argue that 
deconstructing photography’s hegemony of occularcentrism is not 
                                                
257 The eyes move in small jumps, called saccades, in ordinary vision. It is by means of 
these tiny movements that vision actually occurs. The notion of ‘static vision’ is illusion 
only; perception is always in motion, always in judgments of differences, however minute. 
258 Christopher Norris Derrida Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987 p.56 
259 Ibid. 
260 “a condition of deconstruction may be at work – part of the system to be 
deconstructed already at work not at the centre but in an eccentric centre – 
participating in the construction of what it threatens to deconstruct.” Jacques Derrida 
interviewed in Derrida, Dir. Kirby Dick, Amy Ziering Kofman, Drakes Avenue Pictures, 2006 
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something that is achieved once and for all, but proposes a schedule of 
practice which has no end.  Additionally, these ‘critical interventions’, as 
Norris puts it, must come from inside language, and in the case of the 
ocular metaphor of photography, from inside of photographic practice. 
 
Earlier in this chapter we considered the idea that the troubling 
inside/outside dichotomy of photography is an effect of parergonality, or 
framing.  I now intend to look more closely at Derrida’s critique of Kant 
found in ‘Parergon’ in The Truth in Painting.  In this piece of writing, Derrida 
argues that not only are parerga separate from the ergon, the work itself, 
but they can be distinguished from the outside of the work i.e. the wall 
which the framed piece (painting, photograph etc) is hung, or the space 
where a three-dimensional work is to be installed.  The parergon is neither 
intrinsic nor extrinsic to the work: neither nor; either/or; yet it enables the 
work to originate.  However Kant states that parerga are to be more than 
“finery”261 (ornamentation) and this leads Derrida to argue that the 
supplementarity of the parergon points to a lack in the ergon: 
 
What constitutes them as parerga is not simply their exteriority as a 
surplus, it is the internal structural link which rivets them to the lack in 
the interior of the ergon.  Without this lack, the ergon would have no 
need of a parergon.  The ergon’s lack is the lack of a parergon, of the 
garment or the column which nevertheless remains exterior to it.262  
 
                                                
261 “Thus it is with the frames (Einfassungen) of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the 
colonnades of palaces.  But if the ornamentation does not itself enter into the 
composition of the beautiful form – if it is merely to win approval for the picture by means 
of its charm – it is then called finery (parure) (Schmuck) and takes away from the 
genuine beauty” Immanuel Kant cited by Derrida p. 53 The Truth in Painting Bennington 
and Ian McLeod (trans) Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 
262 Jacques Derrida The Truth in Painting Bennington and Ian McLeod (trans) Chicago Ill.; 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 pp. 59-60 
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Thus the work/ergon cannot exist in totality without the parergon/frame.  
The frame does more than simply demarcate the work, it effectively brings 
the work into presence, from the outside.  It naturalises the notion of an 
intrinsically complete artwork.  The work is incomplete without the frame, 
yet the parergon is not intrinsic to the work, but for Kant contradictorily, 
aesthetic judgement can only bear on that which is intrinsic to the work.  
The parergon thus problematises the conception of aesthetic judgement 
because, as Derrida writes,  
 
one must know – this is a fundamental presupposition, presupposing 
what is fundamental - how to determine the intrinsic - what is framed - 
and know what one is excluding as frame and outside-the-frame.  We 
are thus already at the unlocatable centre of the problem.263   
 
That which is intrinsic to the work and therefore the proper object of 
aesthetic judgement is “unlocatable”264.  This, argues Derrida, leads Kant 
to describe the frame as  
 
a parergon, a hybrid of outside and inside, but a hybrid which is not a 
mixture or half-measure, an outside which is called to the inside of the 
inside in order to constitute it as an inside265   
 
The paradox is that which is intrinsic to the work relies upon an extrinsic 
framing, an exterior, to enable the interior of the work to be constituted: 
without the extrinsic, the intrinsic cannot come to be.  Although the 
problem of distinguishing the parergon from mere finery remains, in a 
sense Kant’s notion of the need for parergonality to articulate the ergon is 
                                                
263 Ibid. p.63 
264 Ibid. 
265 Immanuel Kant cited by Derrida in The Truth in Painting Bennington and Ian McLeod 
(trans) Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 p.63 
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allied to Derrida’s relational understanding of meaning, that is, meaning 
as a trace structure of difference.  Thus inside/outside produced by 
différance is part of the “general difference” that Derrida calls “writing”.266  
The parergon, although opposable to ergon, is not simply one side of an 
oppositional structure.  The parergon is the articulation of the supplement: 
it is the supplementarity of the parergon which challenges the very notion 
of the purity of the work: 
 
For Kant, the purity of the work can be augmented – supplemented – 
by things that belong to it only provisionally, tentatively, inessentially, 
since they remain strictly outside it.  Yet still they augment its ‘purity,’ a 
purity that must therefore have been always less than pure from the 
start.  From the beginning, then, the original purity of the work of art 
contains a lack.  It is this lack (an originary lack) that the supplement 
supplements. 
 
So the work of supplementarity turns out to be essential to the 
constitution of ‘the work itself’.  Essential, but also threatening, 
because it reveals that without the supplement there is no ‘itself’ of 
the work…the difference between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is rendered 
undecidable.267 
 
As Derrida himself writes in Deconstruction Engaged, the visual is “never 
totally “pure,” never free of traces”.268  Thus the aesthetic object is never 
pure, never sealed off from other modes of engagement, i.e. language.  
This calls into question the very purity of aesthetic judgements and asks if 
there is any such thing as pure visuality.   
                                                
266 Niall Lucy A Derrida Dictionary Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004 p. 158 
267 Ibid. 136-137 
268 Niall Lucy citing Jacques Derrida in A Derrida Dictionary Malden, Mass.; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004 p.160 
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Thus the notion that photography’s mode of operation is to generate a 
field of difference, that it is a kind of writing, renders the photographic as 
a space of both language and the visual, a weaving, binding, crossing 
over of both: the relationship between each, constantly folding as weft 
over warp, to weave a field of textuality.  And this field of textuality, 
practice as writing, forms a generalised practice operating as a system of 
differences, produces what Derrida would describe as “meaning-
effects”269.  The text of the world is not represented by photographic 
practice, rather, in accordance with Derrida’s notion that there is no 
outside of the text, photographic practice as writing gives us another text.  
Niall Lucy writes that: 
 
Because the structure of the inscriptive mark or ‘gram’ is typical of 
signs in general, then, Derrida argues that all meaning-effects are 
products of a general sign system of differences which is 
grammatological rather than ‘semiotic’ or ‘representational’ in 
nature270 
 
Thus we might say that any meaning(s) conferred by a photographic 
practice (characterised as writing) are meaning-effects generated and 
produced by a general system of differences, a grammatology.  If there is 
nothing outside of the text i.e. no referent or originary presence to which 
the text transparently refers, all we have are layers, or sequences of texts 
each referring to another in a continual chain of signification.  Barthes’ 
Winter Garden Photograph simply cannot presence his mother: the 
treasury of rays is a fictive emanation, a product of grammatology.  
 
                                                
269 Niall Lucy A Derrida Dictionary Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004 p.160 
270 Ibid. 
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Purity and presence are grammatological effects, effects of a general 
writing.  There is nothing outside this general writing and inside it 
nothing that is pure and full of presence.271 
 
For Barthes, the referent persists in the photograph, but for Derrida, the 
referent is simply another text.  Therefore under Derrida’s reading, in her 
life and death Barthes’ experience of his mother was textual: 
 
every referent, all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and 
that one cannot refer to this “real” except in an interpretative 
experience.  The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in 
a movement of differential referring.  That’s all.272 
 
Thus it is necessary to pay attention to the work of the parergon as the 
articulation of the ergon or interior.  Although the notion of the intrinsic 
qualities (aesthetic) of the work itself are called into question by the 
parergon, the work of the frame has a critical bearing on the manner in 
which art objects can be theorised.  The parergonal activity produces the 
very concept of the intrinsic art object, set against a ground, or extrinsic 
background.  The parergon thus generates difference, it is the articulator 
of difference and therefore demands that the objects of visual practice 
be read as being part of a differential field.  Or indeed, art objects are the 
products of a differential field. 
 
The frame then is at the limit or on the border separating the intrinsic 
from the extrinsic, and at the same time the intrinsic (the ergon) is 
precisely what is framed.  It follows from this that there can be no 
theory of the art object as such, but only a theory of the whole field 
                                                
271 Ibid. 
272 Niall Lucy citing Jacques Derrida in A Derrida Dictionary Malden, Mass.; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004 p.143 
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(what Derrida sometimes calls the general text) in which the art object 
is produced or constituted.  And that field opens out from somewhere 
in the in-between, between the ergon and the parergon.273 
 
Whilst in the above quote Niall Lucy characterises the in-between as 
“somewhere” between the ergon and the parergon, I consider the 
parergon to articulate the in-between.  It is the producer of the 
oppositional difference between intrinsic and extrinsic: functionally akin to 
différance itself.  For, as Derrida writes, “[t]he frame is in no case a 
background …but neither is its thickness as margin a figure.”274  
 
Photographic framing (the practice referred to in the previous chapter as 
one of elision, selection and inclusion) is a method by which the 
photographer articulates a differential field, which is the product/residue 
(or one might say trace) of practice.  Derrida asks that those engaged in 
theory, practice or theoretical practice, consider the frame and its role in 
the generation and articulation of difference.  That which is intrinsic and 
extrinsic to the artwork is unthinkable and inarticulable in the absence of 
the productive power of parergonality.   
 
No “theory”, no “practice,” no “theoretical practice” can intervene 
effectively in this field if it does not weigh up and bear on the frame, 
which is the decisive structure of what is at stake, at the invisible limit 
to (between) the interiority of meaning (put under shelter by the 
whole hermeneuticist, semioticist, phenomenologicalist, and formalist 
tradition) and (to) all the empiricisms of the extrinsic which, incapable 
of either seeing or reading, miss the question completely.275  
                                                
273 Niall Lucy A Derrida Dictionary Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004 p.54 
274 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, Bennington and Ian McLeod (trans) Chicago Ill.; 
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The practice of photography extends beyond making artworks to a range 
of cultural practices which rely heavily upon what is commonly regarded 
to be photography’s evidentiary power.  Whilst it is not my intention to 
debate the contested indexical account of photography here, let it 
suffice to say that there are theorists for whom the evidentiary power of 
photography is a matter of cultural convention.  The photographic 
convention of bearing witness to a forensic scene, for example the use of 
scenes of crime photography as evidence in court, can be considered in 
terms of what Derrida describes above as the empiricism of the extrinsic:  
a photographic practice which is valued for its capacity to generate or 
capture evidence.  This way of figuring photography does not allow any 
such thing as the photographically equivocal or uncertainty.  The Law, 
consistent with its demands, requires photography to play a monistic role 
in establishing the truth of the matter.  Therefore, photography as a 
“theoretical practice,” if we take theory (from theoros) to be speculative, 
is a far more pluralistic practice, one which is open to speculation, which 
pays attention to the effects of the instrumentality of the medium and the 
manipulations of the method.  Such as, the example at hand, which is the 
need to pay attention to the effect of the frame as the producer of that 
which is intrinsic and extrinsic to the artwork.   
 
At the very start of this thesis, we looked at landscape and the possible 
theoretical articulations of the word and the idea, which might be 
productive in the furtherance of this study.  Through the analysis of the 
ideas of a number of thinkers, we came to the conclusion that landscape 
is a synthetic space, the most apposite and resonant formulation of a 
definition regarding landscape, which was found in J.B. Jackson’s 
Understanding the Vernacular Landscape.  As a result of this and an 
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investigation into Roland Barthes’ writings, it became possible to write 
about the landscape in terms of text.  Although in itself it is not entirely 
novel, the conception of landscape as text is useful in terms of facilitating 
a break from the notion of landscape as a view or a picture.  Superficially 
at least, this frees photography from the role of optical instrument which 
pictures the landscape as view.  Some might wish to argue that this does 
not alter the fact that the camera is a picturing device, arguably it 
changes the dynamic from picturing or re-picturing the view, to picturing 
the text.  However, we have gone on to argue that photographic 
practice is grammatological, therefore the relationship between 
photography-as-writing and the landscape as text (landtext) might be 
described as intertextual: intertextuality is the in-between.  However, to 
say that there is a relation between them implies, to a certain extent, a 
separation between these texts which needs to be traversed.  It is this in-
between-ness which now requires further consideration and, in order to 
begin this process, I firstly intend to investigate the notion of intertextuality 
a little further. 
 
IV Intertextuality 
 
During the first chapter, we looked at a piece of writing by Roland Barthes 
entitled ‘From Work to Text’, in which Barthes begins to differentiate the 
work (a piece of writing which sustains monistic readings) from Text, which 
by its nature is pluralistic and mobile: 
 
The work has nothing disturbing for any monistic philosophy…for such 
a philosophy, plural is Evil.  Against the work, therefore, the text could 
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well take as its motto the words of the man possessed by demons 
(Mark 5:9): ‘My name is Legion: for we are many.’276 
 
The Text therefore resists monistic, singular readings and sets off a chain of 
signifiers.  The methodological field of the Text, as Barthes describes it, is a 
network or mesh or matrix of signifiers in which the signified is constantly 
disrupted and deferred.  Barthes argues that Text can only be text in 
difference: its reading is durational, that is, it takes place over time277 and 
it is re-written each time it is read (by one or more readers).  In its pluralistic 
vein, the text is scriptable rather than lisable, writerly as opposed to 
readerly, or readable.  It generates a plurality of meaning rather than 
being readable for a fixed singular and stable meaning. 
 
In ‘From Work to Text’ Barthes draws a clear distinction between the work 
and the text.  For Barthes, it is not a matter of the modernity of the writing 
or indeed its quality which determines it as either work or text.  He writes: 
 
It would be futile to try to separate out materially works from texts.  In 
particular, the tendency must be avoided to say that the work is 
classic, the text is avant-garde…there may be ‘text’ in a very ancient 
work, while many products of contemporary literature are in no way 
texts.278 
 
Thus, for Barthes, although the determining factor which defines the 
difference between work and text is clearly not historical, there is, 
                                                
276 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998 p. 944 
277 In this sense text is time based, it is diachronic as opposed to synchronic. 
278 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998 p.942 
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nonetheless a categorical distinction between a work and text: it is the 
writing’s resistance to monistic readings which characterises text as such.  
Having said this, there also appears to be an ontological difference 
between work and text in Barthes’ argument.  We might say that work has 
an ontology, whereas Text does not, indeed it cannot.  For Barthes, the 
work is quite clearly material: “the work is a fragment of substance, 
occupying part of the space of books”279, on the other hand he describes 
text as a methodological field.  We might say that work is a product 
bound in material whereas text practices an openness, articulates a field 
of differences, of other texts, which activates a new discursive space. 
 
Thus for Barthes, the work exemplifies the classical conception of a text, 
which derives its meaning from the Latin texere, to weave.  The classical 
text is thus woven together, enmeshed, bound, the inseparable nature of 
text and context is described in their shared etymology: context meaning 
woven together.  The modern conception of text as discussed by Barthes 
is unbound, loosely woven, the interstitial spaces open other possibilities 
for connectivity: a thread may easily pass through them providing a link to 
another fabric or text.  It could be said that the work is synchronic, whilst 
text is diachronic: text is tied, untied and retied through time.   
 
the Text is experienced only in an activity of production.  It follows that 
the Text cannot stop (for example of the library shelf); its constitutive 
movement is that of cutting across280 
 
Derrida differs from Barthes insofar as his writing overturns the very notion 
of the stable, classical text.  The question for Barthes is ontological, the 
work can be held in the hand, it can be commanded.  However, for 
                                                
279 Ibid. 
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Derrida, the matter of textuality turns on the way in which in which the 
work is read.  Under Derrida’s deconstructive reading, there would be no 
such distinction between work and text: all writing is product and process 
i.e. écriture.  Thus all writing is text because every word, or signifier, sets off 
different associations dependent upon the context, which the author can 
only attempt to regulate.281   
 
In his deconstructive reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, entitled ‘Plato’s 
Pharmacy,’ Derrida unravels the binary distinctions within the work, most 
notably the section on writing’s inferiority to speech.  He does this by 
demonstrating the reliance of meaning on contextualisation and 
interpretation.  That is to say, terms such as pharmakon, do not have one 
fixed meaning but are in themselves multi-valent or undecidable.  The 
meaning of pharmakon is determined by its contextual utilisation within 
the relational structure of language: pharmakon means either poison or 
cure.  Derrida argues that Plato opens the Phaedrus with the myth of 
Pharmacia and Oreithya in order to associate the later section on the 
inferiority of the written word to the spoken word with the poison of 
Pharmacia.  This has the purpose of ascribing to writing the character or 
role of poison or marking writing as the negative term in the binary 
opposition. 
 
This brief evocation of Pharmacia at the beginning of the Phaedrus – is 
it an accident?…Let us in any case retain this: that a little spot, a little 
stitch or mesh (macula) woven into the back of the canvas, marks out 
                                                
281 This is not to say that all texts are deconstructive.  Deconstruction, for Derrida, is a way 
of reading.  This is can be differentiated with Paul de Man’s understanding of 
Deconstruction which states that all texts are deconstructive. Irene E. Harvey writes on 
this subject in ‘The Différance Between Derrida and de Man’ The Textual Sublime: 
Deconstruction and its Differences The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and its 
Differences Hugh J. Silverman and Gary E. Aylesworth (eds) Albany, N.Y.: State University 
of New York, 1990 pp.73-86 
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for the entire dialogue the scene where that virgin was cast into the 
abyss, surprised by death while playing with Pharmacia.  Pharmacia 
(Pharmakeia) is also common noun signifying the administration of the 
pharmakon, the drug: the medicine and/or poison.282 
 
Writing as pharmakon seduces Socrates to leave the safety of the interior 
of the city (the Republic), the place of men of learning.  He enters nature, 
outside the city, the place of trees and fields which, according to Plato, 
would teach Socrates nothing.  Derrida calls this an exodus which takes 
Socrates “out of himself”.283 
 
the pharmakon makes one stray from one’s general, natural, habitual 
paths and laws.  Here it takes Socrates out of his proper place and off 
his customary track…The leaves of writing act as a pharmakon to push 
or attract out of the city the one who never wanted to get out, even 
at the end, to escape the hemlock.284 
 
The intoxication of Socrates in the presence of the written speech causes 
him to act out of character, to make Socrates think and behave 
differently than usual.  The sheaves of paper, speech written rather than 
spoken, corrupt him.  Derrida demonstrates that there is a contradictory 
logic found in the Phaedrus: not only does Plato equate writing with 
poison rather than cure (through his authorial determination), he goes on 
to equate speech with another kind of writing “the legitimate brother of 
written speech”285 as opposed to graphic writing which is the bastard 
brother, or bastard son of logos.  Written speech according to Plato is but 
                                                
282 Jacques Derrida ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ Dissemination Barbara Johnson (trans) New York; 
London: Continuum, 2004 p.75 
283 Ibid. p.76 
284 Ibid. 
285 Plato The Phaedrus; and, The seventh and eighth letters Walter Hamilton (trans) 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973 p. 98 
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the shadow of living speech, which is the kind of writing that is “written on 
the soul of the hearer together with understanding”286. 
 
The indecidability of pharmakon as either poison or cure is the device 
which Derrida uses to reveal the contradictory logic of the binary 
oppositions in Plato’s argument regarding the inferiority of writing in 
relation to speech.  Pharmakon reveals the play of differences within 
Plato’s text, demonstrating the textuality of the text.  The impossibility of a 
transparent translation of the text is heralded by this word: in translation, 
one text is transformed by another.  This is significant insofar as Derrida 
argues, as we have already seen, that there is no independently 
accessible reality outside of the text i.e. accessible to us without an 
interpretative experience: reality, truth, presence (etc.) are posited by 
textuality.  It is Derrida’s aim to convince us that Plato’s text is no more 
than a play of textuality and that once this play of textuality is set in 
motion, it continues indefinitely.  Once Derrida disrupts the authority of the 
text by undermining and unpicking its guiding threads, we will see that the 
Platonic dialogue is not an exemplar of a gradually disclosed truth 
through careful dialectic.  Rather it is a tissue of contradiction and 
opposition woven by Plato to communicate his ideas (in the voice of 
Socrates).  This play of textuality effectively undoes the fabric of Plato’s 
argument.  Derrida’s deconstruction of the binary oppositions in Plato’s 
text is analysed by James Powell in the form the text as a woven tapestry. 
 
Socrates’ retelling of the myth [is] woven of a series of binary 
opposites, and so is the dialogue: 
 
speech/writing 
                                                
286 Ibid. 
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philosopher/sophist 
citizen/scapegoat 
good seed/bad seed 
 
The “good” member of each pair [on the left] is like the part of the 
thread that shows in the tapestry.  While the marginalized is like the 
part of the thread that lies below the surface of the design, 
repressed.287 
 
Plato’s authorial regulation of context through choice of meaning of 
determinate terms (the proper reading) guides the reader to a particular 
understanding of writing.  This is like the patent or manifest face of a 
tapestry, the woven stitch which shows, rather than that which is hidden or 
repressed in the backing.  Derrida’s point could be understood as the 
‘proper reading’ being brought forward by the author but the back of the 
tapestry, the subtext, is there to be revealed by a deconstructive reading.  
This may even be extended to the proper reading being built or overlaid 
upon the subtext.  The proper reading is reliant upon the suppression of 
the subtext or alternative reading.  
 
As we discussed previously, Barthes defines Text as a methodological field 
and in so doing, expands Text to encompass the intertextual.  This is to say, 
the mobile and diachronic nature of Text, as Barthes understands it, is 
intertextuality itself: 
 
[Barthes’] theory of the text, therefore, involves a theory of 
intertextuality, since the text not only sets going a plurality of meanings 
but is also woven out of numerous discourses and spun from already 
existent meaning.  The text’s plurality is neither wholly an ‘inside’ or an 
                                                
287 James Powell Derrida For Beginners New York: Writers and Readers, c1997 p.73 
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‘outside’, since the text itself is not a unified, isolated object upon 
which an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ can be fixed.288 
 
Text is thus a non-systemic structure of plurality and reference.  The thread 
from which the fabric of the text is woven is garnered from a range of 
sources: it is rewoven, bringing with it references and meaning unpicked 
from a range of differing contexts.  However, it would be wrong to think of 
intertextuality as simply a way of making reference to the source of a 
given text.  This would be, according to Barthes, to fall prey to ‘the myth of 
filiation’, the idea that intertextuality is a means by which the reader tracks 
the reference of one text to another.  For Barthes, each text is read (in a 
writerly manner) and held in relation to every other text.  He characterises 
the relation between texts as intertextual.  The text is  
 
woven with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages (what 
language is not?), antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it 
through and through in a vast stereophony.  The intertextual in which 
every text is held, it itself being the text-between of another text, is not 
to be confused with some origin of the text: to try to find the ‘sources,’ 
the ‘influences’ of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; the 
citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, 
and yet already read: they are quotations without inverted 
commas.289 
 
Thus the intertextual is not the search for, or the mapping of the filiation or 
genesis of the work.  According to Barthes, the citations of the text do not 
appear in inverted commas, yet they are already read.  That is to say, 
language is a shared system which contains already existing metaphors, 
                                                
288 Graham Allen Intertextuality London: Routledge, 2000 p. 67 
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allusions turns of phrase which are non-original.  Barthes’ argument 
regarding the referential nature of Text is a recognition of this.  The Text 
therefore eschews the authorial, the intertext does not describe the origin 
of the work or the Text.  It is the invisible network of relations between texts: 
the tissue into which each textual relation is woven.   
 
Barthes’ expanded theory of the text which includes intertextuality in its 
very constitution, has a significant impact upon the conception of 
authorship.  In ‘The Death of the Author’ Barthes discusses the emergence 
of the Author as  
 
a modern figure, a product of our society insofar as, emerging from 
the Middle Ages with English empiricism, French rationalism and the 
personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the 
individual290 
 
Under this conception, the Author is thought to be the owner of language, 
a sovereign individual who means, in a monological/monistic sense.  
Barthes’ theory of the text impacts profoundly upon this position.  He writes 
of Stephane Mallarmé that 
 
For him, for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author; to write 
is, through a prerequisite impersonality (not at all to be confused with 
the castrating objectivity of the realist novelist), to reach that point 
where only language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’.291 
 
The erasure of the author thus results in language speaking rather than the 
authorial voice of the text, writing is a practice which facilitiates the 
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performativity of language.  The act, or performance of language results 
in an open text: scriptable rather than lisable. 
 
Thus the origin of the text is not the author, as classical writing would have 
it.  Rather, the unity or meaningful integrity of the text lies with the reader.  
In this sense the reader is the space of intertextuality, to borrow 
terminology used by Foucault to describe the book, “a node within a 
network”292, the reader synthesises the text.  But for every reader, there is a 
new text, a new set of relations.  Barthes writes: 
 
The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a 
writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies 
not in its origin but in its destination.  Yet this destination cannot any 
longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, 
psychology; he is simply that someone who holds together in a single 
field all the traces by which the written text is constituted.293 
 
It would be wholly appropriate to cast myself (as a photographic 
practitioner) as reader in relation to working with the landscape as text.  I 
have long had the sense that in selecting locations to photograph I am 
reading the land for the residual markers of human intervention.  The 
nature of those interventions does not necessarily interest me: I find the 
round mark left on a field where cows have been fed as compelling as 
the remnants of a Uist wheelhouse.  The words of George Tice come to 
mind: 
 
                                                
292 Michel Foucault cited by Daniel Chandler in Semiotics: the basics 2nd edition, New 
York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007 p. 201 
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As I progressed further with my project, it became obvious that it was 
really unimportant where I chose to photograph.  The particular place 
simply provided an excuse to produce work…you can only see what 
you are ready to see294 
 
Thinking through what Barthes writes in relation to the reader as the space 
of the text’s unity has an interesting bearing on my thinking as a 
practitioner as I play the role of both reader and writer.  As reader of the 
landtext I am that someone who “holds together in a single field all the 
traces by which the written text is constituted.”295  Therefore, as I cast 
myself as reader of the landtext, I cannot simultaneously occupy the 
position of author of the photographs which the camera produces.  
Writing (écriture) is the place of the loss of ego, which Barthes refers to as 
 
The reader of the Text may be compared to someone at a loose end 
(someone slackened off from any imaginary)296 
 
The text acts upon the reader: through the medium of photography, it is 
the language of the landtext which performs.  But photography as writing 
(photowriting) or grammatology does not simply come to be without light.  
The gram of photography is photochemical: light is inscribed in silver. 
 
V Light, the touch of the intertext 
 
Here we come, in a sense, to the ultimate connectivity or entanglement 
of photography.  The photograph as a nexus of landtext, photowriting 
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and light.  And perhaps we might say, it is light which enables landscape 
as text and photography as writing to come to be and ultimately it draws 
its line between both.  I return to the notion that photography is a gesture 
of transformation: the language of the world is transformed by 
photography and vice versa.  In fact, it is light which enables this to take 
place and therefore photography may play the role of the gesture but it is 
light which is the material of transformation.  Light is the condition under 
which that transformation takes place.  Light is the connective tissue, and 
as such, we might conjecture that it is the material of the intertextual.  
Thinking of light in these terms should help us to come to an understanding 
of the relationship between landtext and photowriting.   
 
If we remind ourselves that it is important to avoid the myth of filiation, we 
should be able to situate intertextuality as distinct from notions of 
postmodern pastiche, that is to say, it is neither a knowing visual or literary 
reference to another work, nor is it the reader’s ability to trace the 
influences in a text (either linguistic or visual).  Although many versions of 
intertextuality, most notably in cinema theory, seek out the intentioned 
reference of one work to another, this goes against Barthes’ and Kristeva’s 
usage of the term.  Intertextuality 
 
was originally introduced by Kristeva and met with immediate success; 
it has since been much used and abused on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  The concept, however, has been generally misunderstood.  
It has nothing to do with matters of influence by one writer upon 
another, or with the sources of a literary work; it does, on the other 
hand, involve components of a textual system such as the novel, for 
instance.  It is defined in La Révolution du langue poétique as the 
transposition of one or more systems of signs into one another, 
accompanied by a new articulation of the ennunciative and 
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denotative position.  Any SIGNIFYING PRACTICE (q.v.) is a field (in the 
sense of space traversed by lines of force) in which various signifying 
systems undergo such a transposition.297 
 
I would like to now consider landtext and photogrammatology as textual 
systems which relate to one another: they are tied together.  As we have 
already seen, Derrida argues that in translation, one language transforms 
another and this has informed my position regarding the transformative 
nature of the photographic gesture.  The landtext is transformed, or to use 
Roudiez’s term, transposed, by photogrammatology: the field, the 
signifiying landscape, is transposed into a different field, the signifying 
practice of photography.  I believe that it is light which holds the key to 
understanding the relationship between the textual systems above.  I 
begin to wonder whether light is the true in-between of the photographic; 
does light behave intertextually?  Is light a line of force drawn between 
these two texts? 
 
In Textures of Light, Cathryn Vasseleu investigates the relationship 
between vision and touch in the philosophy of Irigaray, Levinas and 
Merleau-Ponty.  In the introduction to ‘True Light’ she describes light as a 
texture.  In describing light in this way, Vasseleu is presenting the idea of 
light as both natural and historically informed.  Thinking or taking light to 
be a texture means that 
 
light is not a transparent medium linking sight and visibility.  It is not 
appropriate to think of light as a texture either perspectivally or as a 
thing, or as a medium which is separable from things.  In its texture, 
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light is a fabrication, a surface of depth that also spills over and passes 
through the interstices of the fabric.  The dichotomy between the 
visible and the invisible is itself a framing of photology that gives light 
its texture.  As a texture, the naturalness of light cannot be divorced 
from its historical and embodied circumstances.  It is neither visible nor 
invisible, neither metaphoric nor metaphysical.  It is both the language 
and material of visual practices, or the invisible interweaving of 
differences which form the fabric of the visible.298 
 
So, for Vasseleu, light is not simply a transparent connection between the 
sense of sight and visibility (the capacity to be seen), nor is it a medium 
which makes things visible.  Light is more complex than simply an object or 
medium which exists independently of things.  For Vasseleu, it is a 
construction which penetrates that which is constructed and holds it in 
relation to other things and ideas.  Light is neither visible nor invisible, that 
is, it does not play a role in the binary opposition either/or, on/off.  Light is 
indeterminate, like pharmakon, it articulates the difference of itself: it can 
be liminal as the states of dawn and dusk would suggest.  Vasseleu argues 
that light is both language and material, it is an intertwining of the visible 
and the ideal, which conflates vision and touch, insisting upon the visual 
as a space of proximity rather than a space of distance: 
 
The distance and space for reflection and insight that comes with 
vision through the mediation of light is lost as the sense of sight passes 
to the sense of touch.  At the point of light’s contact with the eye, the 
objectivity of the visual standpoint becomes a perception of the 
presence of difference299 
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Thus vision and touch are not placed in a hierarchy in the philosophy of 
Irigaray.  Rather, vision is not possible without touch, specifically the touch 
of light.  The texture or tactility of light is not simply material, that is, a 
physical touch, but a texture.   
 
Landscape(s) of difference: 1, Gina Wall 
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The “invisible interweaving of differences”300 which open before the touch 
of the eye are differences that can be seen and thought.  The differences 
which penetrate the eye are both material and ideal. 
 
tactility is an essential aspect of light’s texture, where texture refers not 
only to the feeling of a fabric to the touch, or the grasping of its 
qualities, but also to the hinges or points of contact which constitute 
the interweaving of the material and ideal strands of the field of 
vision.301 
 
If we think this through in terms of the photographic as physis in différance, 
that is to say, photography as a field of difference (a grammatology), the 
camera acts as a point of contact, a touch which both punctures and 
replicates the fabric of the world, the photographic intervention produces 
a text which is woven into a new field of textuality, a textual space.  Thus 
the visual texture produced by the camera in the form of a photograph 
connects or hinges the sensible and the intelligible.  The lens/camera is 
neither inside nor outside, both inside and outside of the world: it is a 
means by which this difference is structured and simultaneously erased. 
 
The photographic production of text, a new field of textuality, is explored 
in a work in progress entitled Tosg/Tusk.  This is a small concertina book 
work which investigates the nexus between landscape, photograph, text, 
articulated by light.  The photographic components of the piece were 
shot in North Uist over successive seasons.  It was here that I felt the 
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resonance of the landtext, in Barthes’ words “repeatable only as 
difference.”302 
 
 
 
 
Parts of the work are constructed like textile: the images were woven as I 
walked over the landscape.  The upright of the frames formed the warp 
and the images themselves, the weft.  The surface of the landscape was 
reconstructed, remade.  The light, low on the landscape throws the 
tactility of the landtext into sharp relief.  The peat banks, cut and recut, 
incise and mark the land.  Under the light, the Braille of the landscape 
touches the eye and the photographic film. 
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The manner in which Vasseleu calls into question light as the link between 
sight and visibility undermines Roland Barthes’ point, made in Camera 
Lucida, regarding the photographic emanation of the subject.  If we 
recall, he argues that we are touched by the subject’s “treasury of 
rays”303.  According to Vasseleu’s observation that light is an imbrication of 
the visual and the tactile, the delayed rays held in the Barthesean 
Photograph are not simply the transparent medium which facilitates sight.  
Rather, the trapped, cemented light in the photograph is an embodiment 
of the sensible and the intelligible.  The photograph, considered as hinge, 
becomes a physical embodiment of the interwoven texture of light.  The 
landtext, photogrammatology and textural light could be said to be held 
in an intertextual relationship in the photographic image.  We might even 
go as far as to say that the photograph, echoing Barthes’ words about 
the reader cited earlier, is the space in which all of the silent citations of 
the text are inscribed.  It is a field in which the traces of these inscriptive 
practices are brought together, the traces constituting the field itself.  The 
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Tosg/Tusk (work in progress), Gina Wall 
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space between, the methodological field, invites the reader, with each 
viewing, into an open-ended space of signification.  In this sense, these 
photographic images can be considered to be woven with the texture of 
light.   
 
VI Concluding remarks 
 
The idea that photography is a gesture of transformation was introduced 
at the outset of this chapter.  Subsequent argumentation has set out to 
show that this gesture is grammatological: that the world inscribed 
photographically is a field of difference(s): differed and deferred, laid 
down in salts of silver.  Photography neither presents nor represents but 
inscribes the world differentially.  Photographs are sameness in difference 
and thinking photography in general as a system which produces 
difference is to consider it to be grammatological.  Indeed, the pseudo-
presence of the photograph is an effect of grammatology.  Therefore, 
photography’s gesture of transformation is one of writing: photography 
writes the world. 
 
During this chapter we have also explored Derrida’s deconstruction of the 
binary opposition inside/outside which he undertakes in a reading of 
Kant’s ideas about the frame, or parergon.  The supplementary necessity 
of the extrinsic to the purity and unity of the intrinsic, causes Derrida to 
argue that there is an originary lack in the artwork.  Thus Derrida reveals a 
contradictory logic at play in Kant’s understanding of the parergon as a 
kind of hybrid which brings the outside into the inside, in order to 
constitute it as inside.  Therefore, Derrida asks us to consider the binary 
opposition inside/outside as indeterminate products of parergonality: they 
are the very function of the frame.  We also explored the frame in 
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connection with Krauss’ ideas regarding the syntax of the image, the 
spacing and deferral of the photographic sign is facilitated, in part, by the 
differencing of the lens and in part, by the frame itself, which Krauss has 
argued is a signifier of signification: the presence of the frame signifies 
writing. 
 
The notion of undecidability was also explored in Derrida’s writing on 
pharmakon, which as we saw, means both poison and cure.  This 
Derridean undecidability also problematises the notion that meaning can 
be contained, intrinsically, within the text.  The regulation of the proper 
reading is reliant upon validation through the appeal to authorial 
intention, that is to say, which meaning of the term was intended by the 
author.  Thus Derrida argues that the meaning of the text is disseminated 
in a variety of possible readings, each one of value, even when 
conflicting readings arise.  The text is open to the play of meaning, the 
text unravels itself under the deconstructive reader’s eye. 
 
Esther Leslie has discussed304 the notion of photographic analysis in 
relation to Benjamin’s ideas, drawing our attention to the meaning of 
analysis, which the Oxford Dictionary of English states is the “process of 
separating something into its constituent elements”305.  The photographic 
analysis of the world is therefore, as Leslie has observed, a process of 
breaking it up.  Whilst one might argue that photography does not do this 
in an elemental way, as in say, a chemical analysis: by and large, 
photography operates at a local level.  However, the image is still useful to 
my point.  Etymologically, analysis comes, via Medieval Latin, from Greek 
analusis meaning to loosen up or unloosen.  Photographic analysis in the 
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Press, 1995 p.55 
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context of this thesis - photography as photowriting, or as I have termed it, 
photogrammatology, is therefore a process by which images (i.e. texts) 
are loosened from the world.  Following Walter Benjamin we might argue 
that this loosening of images from the forms the image world.  For the sake 
of this thesis the image world can be purposefully adapted as a textual 
world.   
 
In order to prevent what might be interpreted as the appearance of a 
contradictory argument, I would like to clarify that, although this may run 
counter to Leslie’s argument, I do not wish to make the case for the 
textual world of photographs being broken entirely from the world.  As I 
have argued earlier in this thesis, for me (and indeed others306) the 
photograph is a double, it is not transparent.  The subject in the 
photograph is unloosened from its context in the world and the double, in 
virtue of the needs, desires, and intentions of the photographer or indeed 
curator, is stitched together with other doubles to make a body of work.  
However, these doubles are not free to float wherever they choose, there 
is a contiguous pivot around which they all turn and that is the touch of 
light.  It is this touch which hinges photographs to the world: the touch of 
light is the stitch which tacks the photograph to its subject.  The 
photograph is therefore loosened, slacked off, rather than broken, from 
the world. 
 
This loosening of the photograph from the world, a differencing if you will, 
means that we can begin to think of a photographic analysis of the world 
in terms of textual analysis.  The very textuality of photography is due in 
part, as we have discovered, to its structural character: the photographic 
sign is eternally delayed; the frame spaces the image from its referent and 
                                                
306 Notably André Bazin, and as we have seen in the previous chapter, Rosalind Krauss 
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introduces the possibility of the syntax of the photographic image as an 
oppositional paradigm.  However, the textuality of the photographic also 
owes itself to one of the key materials of photography, which is light.  This 
was explored in relation to the idea that light is the material of the 
intertext: a kind of connective tissue of photogrammatology.  The idea 
that light is an articulation of the intertext will be explored in the final 
chapter.  In addition, the question of the photographic textual world will 
be considered in relation to practice.  I will ask: what is a body of 
photographic work, is it a trace of practice, or another iteration of the 
intertextual, or is it relational?  I intend to explore the gallery in terms of 
parergon, drawing out some of the possibilities regarding the open-ness of 
form in Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics and Umberto Eco’s The 
Open Work.  The notion of textual spaces of practice will be investigated, 
paying particular attention to the loss of the reader/writer in the text.  This 
will lead me to once again question what it means to photograph the 
landscape, which will be a question that is now loaded with the inflection 
of my investigations into the writings of J.B. Jackson, Roland Barthes, Bruno 
Latour, Jacques Derrida and Rosalind Krauss, to name but a few. 
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I Text and Productivity 
 
Throughout this thesis a number of ideas relating to landscape, text, 
photography and writing have been brought together in order to open a 
space of dialogue which facilitates reflective (in Barthes’ words 
“pensive”307) photographic practice.  Latterly, we looked at photography 
through the lens of Derridean différance, which has given rise to an 
understanding of the photograph as product of différance, part of a 
general system of difference; that is, writing.  Considered in this way, 
photography is a practice of difference, and as such, I have called it 
photogrammatology.  We have encountered Barthes’ argument in favour 
of the photograph as presentation, which was shown to be problematic 
insofar as it completely ignores or elides the apparatus of photography.  
However, by rethinking photographic practice in terms of 
photogrammatology we also resist the concept of the photograph as 
representation: the photographic text is the text of a text, it is continually 
deferred, it cannot represent its origin308.  The photograph does not lead 
us back to the referent, only towards a differentially inscribed textuality. 
 
At the close of chapter four we considered the idea that the products of 
photographic analysis constitute an image world which, given our focus 
on grammatology, might be described as textual.  If a photographic 
practice could be considered to be the production of such a textual 
world, parallels can be drawn between Barthes’ notion of textual analysis 
and photographic analysis.  I intend to look at this in more detail later in 
this final written chapter.  Indeed I will also ask how can the textual space 
                                                
307 Roland Barthes Camera Lucida Richard Howard (trans), London: Vintage, 2000 p.38 
308 Although this thesis is written from the perspective of fine art practice, I do not seek to 
differentiate between photographic practices.  For the purposes of this thesis, all 
photographs are the product of photogrammatology. 
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of practice be described? In thinking the body of photography as text, 
punctuated by absence, space, the Other, can we relate this in any way 
to such contemporary art theories as relational aesthetics? 
 
The idea that photographic practitioners are implicated in the production 
of photographic texts, creates the possibility of talking about Walter 
Benjamin’s image world in terms of a photographic textual world.  During 
this chapter I shall explore the significance of the reader’s immersion in the 
text, both in terms of the practitioner in the landscape and the reader in 
the photographic textual world of practice.  The key reference point for 
this will be Roland Barthes’ ideas concerning the loss of the reader 
explored in ‘Theory of the Text’, Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics 
and Umberto Eco’s The Open Work.  This will also be looked at in terms of 
the textual sublime, which has relevance to both the reader in the text 
and indeed the notion, touched on at several points in the thesis, that 
translation turns the text into something other than itself.  Finally, this notion 
of the textual sublime will be tied to the ideas about landscape presented 
in this thesis, notably, the role played by light in the re-articulation of the 
landscape as text, the rewriting of the landscape as the difference of 
itself.  Taking Hugh J. Silverman’s conceptualisation of translation as an 
othering of the text,309 I will go on to argue that light is the translation of 
landscape. 
 
We have already demonstrated that the photographic text is produced 
by photogrammatology, and as Barthes would say, text is not “the 
                                                
309 This is consistent with Derrida’s argument, explored earlier in the thesis, that translation 
is the regulated transformation of one language by another.  However, as we shall see, 
this differential has interesting consequences for landtext. 
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product of a labour…but the very theatre of production”.310  Thus I intend 
to argue that the photographic textual world is the ‘site’ of productivity.  
Robert Young writes that: 
 
Text is produced in the space of the relations between the reader and 
the written, and that space is the site of a productivity: ‘écriture’ 
(‘writing’)311. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, text/intertext is ‘held’ in the reader, 
that is, text is produced in the space between the reader and the written.  
However, critically for Barthes, the reader who is immersed in the text is 
“undone”.312  Thus the reader does not command the text as an external 
observer, but being imbricated within text the reading subject is both 
made and unmade in its reading, which is a writerly engagement with 
text.   
 
criticism…hitherto unanimously placed the emphasis on the finished 
‘fabric’ (the text being a ‘veil’ behind which the truth, the real 
message, in a word the ‘meaning’, to be sought), the current theory 
of the text turns away from the text as veil and tries to perceive the 
fabric in its texture, in the interlacing of codes, formulae and signifiers, 
in the midst of which the subject places himself and is undone, like a 
spider that comes to dissolve itself in its own web313 
 
Thus photographic practice is not concerned with the production of veils 
or tightly finished fabrics behind which the practitioner’s ideas may be 
                                                
310 Roland Barthes ‘Theory of the Text’ in Untying the Text: a post-structuralist reader 
Robert Young (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 p.36 
311 Robert Young Untying the Text: a post-structuralist reader Robert Young (ed) London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 p.31 
312 Roland Barthes ‘Theory of the Text’ in Untying the Text: a post-structuralist reader 
Robert Young (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 p.39 
313 Ibid. 
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discerned.  Rather practice is concerned with the production of an 
intertextual space into which a reader may enter. 
 
The significance of this loss of the subject will be explored later in the 
chapter.  However we might say that the antithesis viewer/viewed is a 
product of différance.  This places the radical difference between the 
subject looking and the seen object sous rature, thus the looker looking 
becomes part of the landtext in difference.314  The notion of the 
landscape as a placeless place in which the reader is undone will also be 
investigated in due course, with particular reference to the textual 
sublime, which posits that the sublimity of text is its difference from itself. 
 
The reader and reading are themselves tropologically elaborated.  
The reader and the reading (figured as prosopopeia) are none other 
than the text itself – they do not constitute themselves as an 
alternative voice.  They are the sublimity of the text itself.315 
 
As we explored in chapter three, Krauss’ notion of the photographic 
doubling, the insertion of space which amounts to an invagination of 
presence, enables us to demonstrate that photographs have a syntax.  
That is to say, the photographic surface is distended and spaced: the 
syntagm of the photograph is denaturalised due to the practice of 
doubling.  If we take the paradigmatic figure of photographic practice to 
be Walter Benjamin’s surgeon, the photographer slices images from the 
text of the world and lays them out in opposition.  Thus defined, 
photography is an intertextual structure which should be considered in 
terms of the relation between groups of images.  We might therefore say 
                                                
314 Viewer in différance as viewer differed, differing view 
315 Hugh J. Silverman, ‘Introduction’ The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and its 
Differences Hugh J. Silverman and Gary E. Aylesworth (eds) Albany, N.Y.: State University 
of New York, 1990 p.xv 
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that collectively the product of photographic practice also has syntax, 
bodies of images are syntactically related.  However, we should be 
mindful of what Barthes says if we wish to argue that photography is a 
productive play, écriture: photographs as text would not be the products 
of a labour but the very theatre of production.  Photographic practice-as-
writing generates a syntax, the interstices of which are the in-between of 
practice: the meaning(s) of practice issue from the play of this space.  
Photographic practice thought in terms of photogrammatology is 
therefore a space of production.  In this regard photographs are less 
assured of their presentness.  They are products of the play of différance: 
the photograph is the trace of a practice, and as we have seen, the 
trace carries the Other within it. 
 
Thus the syntax of photogrammatology is the bringing together of images, 
the fabrication of a space of practice.  We may therefore think of the 
products of photographic practice as a changing textual field, a 
changing space: changing in the sense that it is arranged and 
rearranged in various loci (gallery, store, studio) but also subject to re-
articulation as it is encountered by different readers.  We might describe 
the syntax and interstice of photography as the photographic nexus held 
in an intertextual relation.  Indeed, the two senses of the word nexus mean 
that it is a useful word to describe the photographic in terms of both 
nodes and networks.  The nexus can be a central or focal point, or indeed 
it can be a connection or series of connections.  Thus the photographic 
nexus may be the singular photograph or the relation between the 
photographic pieces, that is a series of threaded connections which link 
two or more texts.   
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In the latter context, the nexus is abstract, invisible, it is inscribed in the 
relations between ideas, or properly speaking, it inscribes relations 
between ideas, proposing differential readings of practice(s).  The nexus, 
taken to be the weave of a practice, is intangible.  Alternatively, one 
might describe the nexus of any practice as the reader.  Rather than 
thinking the reader as a centralised focal point, as nexus would imply, we 
can go to the etymology of the word to find that it comes from ‘a binding 
together’.  Therefore the notion of the reader bound within the network 
becomes pertinent to Barthes’ understanding of the reader’s place in the 
text.  In terms of the photographic nexus, the reader is central to the text 
only insofar as he is within it.  He is bound into the text and, as Barthes 
argues, in this process is undone.   
 
At the close of chapter four we discussed the idea that photographic 
analysis loosens the subject from the world, fracturing the world and 
reconstituting it as the image world.  However, the notion that light tacks 
the photograph to its subject posits (a) contiguity between the world of 
things and the image world.  Thus the image world is not a hermetically 
sealed, self-contained world, a world apart; rather it relies upon contiguity 
with the world.  This is not to say that the relation between image and 
world is referential, it is, as we have already discussed, intertextual: the 
touch of light is the connective tissue between texts.  The tack, stitch, or 
macula around which photographic images pivot is a fine thread 
connecting one text to another: the photographic stitch is an intersection. 
 
So in a sense Roland Barthes is right when he argues that the noeme of 
photography is the touch of that-which-has-been, woven in the 
photograph and brought into here-now.  However, it is one thing to say 
that the timespace of the subject and the timespace of the photograph 
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are contiguous, but in fact, Barthes makes an entirely different argument 
when he posits that The Photograph brings his mother to presence.  He 
argues that the spacetimes brought into mutual contact are the there-
then and the here-now which are contiguous in virtue of the rays which 
emanate from the subject.  This is much more than a commitment to the 
indexicality of the photograph, this is a commitment to pure transparency: 
the photograph is a portal to another time.  As I hope to have shown 
through the critique of Barthes’ blindness to the instrumentality of 
photography, this is an untenable position.  The photographic macula in 
fact tacks together a skein of textual possibilities. 
 
In connection with this, we might usefully borrow Julia Kristeva’s 
articulation of Mikhail Bahktin’s understanding of the ‘word’ in poetic 
language as a productive image.  She writes that the word, in literary 
usage, is  
 
an intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (fixed meaning), 
as a dialogue among several writings316 
 
Whilst I do not wish to argue that the literary word is simply analogous to a 
photograph, the notion of the photographic image as an intersection of 
textual surfaces is useful insofar as it allows for the connotative reference 
of the photographic image, which as we saw earlier, Barthes describes as 
myth signification.  However, it also opens the possibility of the 
photograph in space (a gallery, a book, a photograph album) as a player 
or speaker in a dialogue.  The photograph, transposed from one context 
to another is inflected with varying meanings or resonances as its relation 
to other images and artefacts changes: images are read in relation to 
                                                
316 Julia Kristeva ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’ The Kristeva Reader, Toril Moi (ed), Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986 p.36 
 231 
one another; the photograph in a gallery space sets off a dialogue 
among several writings.  This conception of the photographic intersection 
of textual surfaces will shortly be looked at more closely in relation to the 
reader. 
 
At the close of ‘Theory of the Text’, Roland Barthes argues that text is 
mutable, it cannot be fixed: text is indefinable as a form and he writes 
that we only name it “provisionally”317.  Barthes invokes Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s call to look beyond the gross form of things in order to 
understand the eternal mobility of existence.  Barthes cites Nietzsche as 
follows: 
 
We are not subtle enough to perceive the probably absolute flow of 
becoming; the permanent exists only thanks to our coarse organs 
which summarise things and reduce them to common levels, when in 
fact nothing exists in that form.  The tree is at each instant a new thing; 
we assert form because we do not grasp the subtlety of an absolute 
movement.318 
 
Thus for Nietzsche, form is humanly constituted simply because we are 
unable, for lack of subtlety, to grasp the infinite movement of everything: 
movement and change is absolute.  As far as Barthes is concerned, this 
quote from Nietzsche also illustrates our provisional naming of text.  That is 
to say, it is only the coarseness of our thinking which demands that we 
name text, but just as the tree at each moment is new, so too is the text.  
Thus we might say that photographic textuality posits something in excess 
of the photographic object; beyond the ontology of the photograph 
                                                
317 Roland Barthes ‘The Theory of the Text’ in Untying the text: a post-structuralist reader 
Robert Young (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 p.45 
318 Friedrich Nietzsche cited by Roland Barthes ‘Theory of the Text’ text: a post-structuralist 
reader Robert Young (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 p.45 
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towards a conception of the photographic as the trace of practice.  
These differential traces of the subject are relational and, in their 
relationality, mutable.  The territory of photographic practice is full of 
interstitial spaces. 
 
 
II “Relational Form” 
 
 This manner of thinking about artworks as open, never definitively closed, 
social rather than aesthetic, is consistent with Nicolas Bourriaud’s ideas 
concerning relational aesthetics.  Bourriaud writes that relational art is “an 
art taking as its theoretical horizon the realm of human interactions and its 
social context rather than the assertion of an independent and private 
symbolic space”319.  Rather than the artist communicating personal 
‘truths’ or intentions through a private, symbolic, visual language, for 
Bourriaud the artist works with the social context offered by the gallery, 
specifically the opportunity for intersubjective encounter.  As far as 
Bourriaud is concerned, the artwork as object is contested by the art of 
the 1990s, which demands that art be critiqued in new and different ways.  
Artworks of the 90s are socially engaged (this however does not exclude 
gallery based practices) and this calls for different ways of theorising, 
criticising and thinking about the art of this era.  The ‘old’ aesthetic 
categories of modernism, the notion that aesthetic properties are 
properties of the art object itself, are questionable.  He demands that form 
itself be reconsidered: 
 
An artist’s artwork thus acquires the status of an ensemble of units to 
be re-activated by the beholder manipulator.  I want to insist on the 
                                                
319 Nicolas Bourriaud Relational Aesthetics Simon Pleazance and Fronza Woods (trans), 
Dijon: les presses du réel, 2002 p. 14 
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instability and the diversity of the concept of “form”…it is not the 
simple secondary effects of a composition, as the formalistic aesthetic 
would like to advance, but the principle acting as a trajectory 
evolving through signs, objects, forms, gestures…The contemporary 
artwork’s form is spreading out from its material form: it is a linking 
element, a principle of dynamic agglutination.320 
 
Bourriaud proposes that the form an artwork takes is unstable and 
divergent, changing and variable: form for Bourriaud is not fixed but 
evolutionary; it is not an effect of composition but a relation.  The artwork 
is a collection of units which he argues are “reactivated”321 by the viewer 
whom he describes as “beholder manipulator”322 who, as manipulator is 
also in some sense the maker.  That is to say, in viewing the work, the 
viewer handles it, brings meaning to it by engaging with it socially.  The 
form that a contemporary artwork takes is therefore not simply allied with 
its materiality but is implicated in the changing relations within which the 
material work is sited and interacted with by the participant.  Bourriaud 
articulates the contemporary artwork’s form as an agglutination: the 
artwork is glued together323.  The viewer, or participant, is the means by 
which the work is agglutinated.  “An artwork”, writes Bourriaud, “is a dot 
on a line”324.  We can also describe an artwork as a knot in a net where 
                                                
320 Ibid. p.20 
321 Ibid.  
322 Ibid. 
323 This also makes the connection between form and text: agglutination is a linguistic 
term.  Saussure writes: “Agglutination occurs when two or more terms originally distinct, 
but frequently joined together syntagmatically in sentences, merge into a single unit 
which is either unanalysable or difficult to analyse.  Such is the agglutination process: we 
say ‘process’ and not ‘procedure’, since the latter term implies will and intention.  But the 
involuntary nature of agglutination is one of its essential characteristics.” Course in 
General Linguistics Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye (eds), Roy Harris (trans), Peru, Ill.: 
Open Court Classics, 2008 p.175 In this sense we can understand the form of the artwork 
as process – its form is arrived at involuntarily as it is activated by successive participants. 
324 Nicolas Bourriaud Relational Aesthetics Simon Pleazance and Fronza Woods (trans), 
Dijon: les presses du réel, 2002 p.20 
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the tropes knot, rope and interstitial space are equally important.  In short, 
I would suggest that form for Bourriaud, bears a striking resemblance to 
the theories of text, which we have recently investigated. 
 
Indeed, for Barthes the grouping of images changes the way in which the 
work generates meaning.  The connotations are no longer generated by 
individual images but by the body of work, and each time the body can 
be put together differently. 
 
Naturally, several photographs can come together to form a 
sequence…the signifier of connotation is then no longer at the level of 
any one of the fragments of the sequence but at that – what the 
linguists would call the suprasegmental level – of the 
concatenation.325 
 
The condition of concatenation, of being linked together, implies that the 
reading takes place across the body of work, and as the corpus is subject 
to rearrangement, addition, subtraction and so on, the work is necessarily 
read differentially, even by the artist or photographer themselves.  
 
Just as the interstitial space of text is the space of play, according to 
Bourriaud, the form of the artwork is also the space of the encounter.  He 
describes the artwork as “social interstice”326.  It is temporal, not just to be 
walked through but experienced, that is lived: 
 
[The artwork] is henceforth presented as a period of time to be lived 
through, like an opening to an unlimited discussion…this system of 
                                                
325 Roland Barthes ‘The Photographic Message’ Image, Music, Text Stephen Heath (trans 
and selected) London: Fontana Press, 1977 p.25 
326 Nicolas Bourriaud Relational Aesthetics Simon Pleazance and Fronza Woods (trans), 
Dijon: les presses du réel, 2002 p16 
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intensive encounters has ended up producing linked artistic practices: 
an art form where the substrate is formed by inter-subjectivity, and 
which takes being-together as a central theme, the “encounter” 
between beholder and picture, and the collective elaboration of 
meaning.327 
 
Inter-subjectivity is therefore critical to understanding Bourriaud’s relational 
aesthetics.  The significance of self-Other relations in the generation of 
meaning calls into question the notion of the fixed form, and by extension 
the fixed meaning of the artwork: meaning is produced in the encounter. 
 
The types of work discussed by Bourriaud defy definition in terms of art 
objects; for example, this would include the work of Rirkrit Tiravanija, an 
artist whose work borders installation and performance.  Whilst artworks of 
this nature may seem to have little relevance to a photographic practice 
such as my own, it is this idea of the encounter which is pertinent to our 
current investigations: the reader in the text of practice.  However, it is 
important to point out that for Bourriaud, it is the work itself which is open, 
rather than our reading of it.  Claire Bishop argues that 
 
The curators promoting this…paradigm…have to a large extent been 
encouraged to adopt this curatorial modus operandi as a direct 
reaction to the type of art produced in the 1990s: work that is open 
ended, interactive, and resistant to closure, often appearing to be 
“work-in-progress” rather than a completed object.  Such work seems 
to derive from a creative misreading of poststructuralist theory: rather 
than the interpretations of a work of art being open to continual 
reassessment, the work of art itself is argued to be in perpetual flux.328 
 
                                                
327 Ibid. p15 
328 Claire Bishop ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’ October 110, Fall 2004 p.52 
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The kind of work championed by these curators resists all notion of the 
art’s objecthood, that is the artwork as a bounded, clearly defined, 
aesthetic object.  Therefore, this poses a problem in terms of defining the 
locus of the artwork, especially in terms of the aesthetic.  Indeed, the 
artwork, considered in terms of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics, is variably 
intersubjective, it is held in a collective.  In this sense, it is open insofar as 
the constitution of the collective is always changing.  However, Bishop’s 
point is that these works creatively mistake poststructuralist open-ness in 
terms of the meaning or interpretation of artworks, for open-ness in their 
ontology.  The artworks do not close because they never physically settle.  
Bishop goes on to draw the comparison between Umberto Eco’s The 
Open Work and Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics.  She argues that 
Bourriaud misreads Eco’s ideas about the open work: 
 
However, it is Eco’s contention that every work of art is potentially 
“open”, since it may produce an unlimited range of possible readings; 
it is simply the achievement of contemporary art, music, and literature 
to have foregrounded this fact.  Bourriaud misinterprets these 
arguments by applying them to a specific type of work (those that 
require literal interaction) and thereby redirects the argument back to 
artistic intentionality rather than issues of reception.329  
 
On this point I would concur with Bishop, Bourriaud’s argument is 
concerned with the defence and articulation of very particular artistic 
practices which consciously obfuscate the dyadic relation between the 
artwork and viewer.  Indeed Bishop points out in a footnote to this that 
these artworks could actually close off readings in view of their overt 
open-ness.  That is to say, it could be argued that the work demands that 
the viewer conform to expected behaviours within the gallery space 
                                                
329 Ibid. p.62 
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when faced with the work.  An example of this might be that in case of 
Tiravanija’s work, in which the artist cooks in the gallery and sets up spaces 
for eating, the viewer is expected to conform to the social norms of eating 
and socialising.  The specific sociability of Tiravanija’s practice closes 
rather than opens the work.   
 
The issue at hand parallels our encounter with Barthes and Derrida 
regarding the tension between work and text.  As was previously 
discussed, for Barthes the question is ontological: the work exists and can 
be read transparently, therefore Text is ontologically distinct: it is, as we 
have already seen, a “methodological field”330 rather than “a fragment of 
substance”331.  Bishop’s point turns upon this: for Bourriaud, the openness 
of the work is ontological, for Eco, the openness is in its reading.  Just as 
deconstruction is, for Derrida a way of reading, the open work for Eco is 
the textual possibility of multiple readings and the inexhaustive resources 
of the text. 
 
III The Gallery and the Space of Practice 
 
Earlier in this chapter we looked at Bahktin’s idea that the literary word is 
intertextual, it is a space, rather than a point of meaning, where 
textualities, or “textual surfaces”332 meet.  The word too is a nexus which 
brings together the “writings: that of the writer, the addressee (or the 
character) and the contemporary or earlier context.”333  Bahktin’s 
conception of the word as a space which sets a dialogue into play has 
                                                
330 Roland Barthes ‘From Work to Text’ in Art in Theory1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 
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331 Ibid. 
332 Julia Kristeva ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’ The Kristeva Reader, Toril Moi (ed), Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986 p.36 
333 Ibid. 
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fertile resonances with the gallery space.  Not simply in terms of its three 
dimensional space, but the notion that the players in the dialogue are 
themselves writings, or texts.  The gallery space, as the space of 
encounter, brings different writings into play: the viewer and the work are 
rewritten with each subsequent encounter.  This, for Bourriaud constitutes 
the gallery as a particular kind of social space. 
 
Art…tightens the space of relations, unlike TV and literature which refer 
each individual person to his or her space of private consumption, 
and also unlike theatre and cinema which bring small groups together 
before specific, unmistakable images.  Actually, there is no live 
comment to be made about what is seen…At an exhibition, on the 
other hand, even when inert forms are involved, there is the possibility 
of an immediate discussion, in both senses of the term.  I see and 
perceive, I comment, and I evolve in a unique space and time.  Art is 
the place that produces a specific sociability.334 
 
The gallery space is social and relational, even when used by artists 
working in ways which Bourriaud would not explicitly define as relational, 
i.e. even when the form is “inert”.  However, as we have just seen from 
Bishop’s argument, it is not the ontology of the work which makes it open, 
rather, it is the reading.  Considered in these terms, there would be no 
such thing as fixed form and Bourriaud’s contention that the theatre and 
film presents the audience with images that are incontestable and 
evident in their meaning is deeply problematic.  Notwithstanding the 
difficulty with Bourriaud’s ideas in terms of the “specific sociability” of the 
gallery, his notion that the gallery is a space of relations is pertinent to this 
thesis.  In addition, Bourriaud’s argument that old aesthetic objects are 
                                                
334 Nicolas Bourriaud Relational Aesthetics Simon Pleazance and Fronza Woods (trans), 
Dijon: les presses du réel, 2002 pp.15-16 
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open to question resonates with our enquiry regarding the notion that the 
aesthetic object is bounded, the question of the putative aesthetic unity 
of the work.  This also relates specifically to the characterisation of 
photographic images as new objects, with their means of production 
brought into the spotlight.  This argument was advanced during chapter 
two, where we looked at Bruno Latour’s imbroglio specifically in terms of 
Vilèm Flusser’s writing on photography.  The conception of the 
photograph as an old, bounded object submits to a new object, that is 
the photograph as the implicated imbroglio of the photographic industry. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Jacques Derrida deconstructs the 
binary opposition inside/outside in Immanuel Kant’s writing on the 
parergon.  If we recall from our earlier investigations that Kant argued that 
the parergon is “a hybrid of outside and inside…an outside which is called 
to the inside of the inside in order to constitute it as an inside.”335  The 
extrinsic, the frame, acts in such a way that it is both inside and outside.  
Therefore the inside cannot be an inside without the exterior parergon to 
articulate the difference.  This lack in the original interior of the work is 
supplemented by the exterior or parergon.  Therefore the artwork cannot 
be pure without this supplement which leads Derrida to argue, as we saw 
earlier, that 
 
What constitutes them as parerga is not simply their exteriority as a 
surplus, it is the internal structural link which rivets them to the lack in 
the interior of the ergon.336 
 
                                                
335 Immanuel Kant cited by Derrida in The Truth in Painting Geoffrey Bennington and Ian 
McLeod (trans) Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 p.63 
336 Jacques Derrida The Truth in Painting Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod (trans) 
Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 p.59 
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The supplementary role of the parergon therefore problematises the 
undecidability of the inside/outside distinction.  In fact, as we have 
already discovered, for Derrida there is no pure inside or outside, rather 
each is the product of parergonality.  This is pertinent to the debate 
between Bishop and Bourriaud insofar as it calls into question the closure 
of any work, even when, what Bourriaud describes as “inert forms”337 are 
brought into play.  The “specific sociability”338 of the gallery is significant to 
all artworks, be they relational (in Bourriaud’s understanding) or not and 
whilst I concur with Bishop in terms of her criticism of the kind of work that 
Bourriaud champions as relational, there are also problems with her 
expectation that works should be stable: 
 
There are many problems with the idea that the work of art is in 
perpetual flux, not least of which is the difficulty of discerning a work 
whose identity is wilfully unstable.339 
 
The point that Derrida makes in The Truth in Painting is that the very notion 
of a stable, intrinsic artwork is itself reliant upon that which is external to it.  
Thus the idea of the complete, bounded artwork is therefore in itself 
entirely unstable.  Bishop’s difficulties in discerning the work’s identity point 
to her need for the work to be present, unified and identifiable, subject to 
a textual interpretation: this demonstrates a need for closed artworks 
rather than artworks as text.  
 
In this sense, it would not be inconsistent to consider the possibility that the 
gallery space, as parergon, is in effect constitutive of the work.  Now, it is 
not my intention to argue that the things placed in a gallery are artworks 
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339 Claire Bishop ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’ October Fall 2004 p.52 
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simply because of their placement in the institutional setting (although 
there is a precedent for this attitude340).  However, I would argue that the 
work is never intrinsically complete, rather, it requires external factors to 
articulate it.  Notably, an artwork in the gallery is a space which articulates 
textual play: the viewer and the artwork rewrite one another in an 
ongoing process.  Practice-as-writing is disseminated in the textual play 
which takes place in the gallery.  In a sense, the work which Bourriaud 
advances as relational are new art objects, tangled networks of 
instrument, process and product which make the world speak in different 
ways.  Although there is not the space to discuss this in depth here, the 
problem with Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics does not lie in his theoretical 
paradigm but the work that he chooses to promote and more 
significantly, as Bishop points out, the work which he chooses to ignore.  In 
short, the problem with his position is that he advocates particular kinds of 
work which are relational. 
 
IV Loss: ‘signifiance’ 
 
The notion of writer as writing put forward by Bahktin is applicable to the 
debate about photography since it enables us to differentiate the 
photographer as writer from the photographer as author.  This is useful 
insofar as the photographer can be thought of as a generator of 
difference, rather than a creator of aesthetic objects.  A player, as Vilèm 
Flusser put it is (though altogether more cynically) “not Homo faber but 
Homo ludens”341.  Part of the photographic play is the play of the 
difference of world and image, the otherness of the subject and its image 
insisted upon by the articulation of the frame.  The play of the 
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photographic, as we saw in previous chapters, is the generative play of 
spacing.  Derrida writes in ‘The Double Session’ of a letter from Stephane 
Mallarmé to Maurice Guillemot in which Mallarmé describes himself as a 
“syntaxer”342.  The writer arranges words on the white space of the page in 
such a way as to draw attention to the spaces in language.  However, 
these spaces are not simply absences or the space between letters and 
words, but generative, thus the activity of spacing is crucial to the 
productivity of the text.343 
 
Spacing is a concept which also, but not exclusively carries the 
meaning of productive, positive, generative force.  Like dissemination, 
like différance it carries along with it a genetic motif: it is not only the 
interval, the space constituted between two things…but also spacing, 
the operation, or in any event, the movement of setting aside.  This 
movement is inseparable from temporalization…and from différance, 
from the conflicts of force at work in them.  It marks what is set aside 
from itself, what interrupts every self-identity, every punctual 
assemblage of the self, every self-homogeneity, self-interiority.344 
 
Textual production, or the productivity of practice-as-writing in the gallery 
is set in motion by the photographic syntaxer, on one level in the decisions 
about layout and the correlation of images, and on another, in the very 
practice that is photogrammatology. 
 
The proposition that the new artwork is akin to a network (of difference) 
resonates strongly with both Barthes’ and Derrida’s conception of text.  As 
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we have seen already, text does not close and photographic practice as 
photogrammatology opens textual spaces which the reader is invited to 
enter.  Meanings of text are constructed through playful engagement, 
however, as we shall discover later, this play is not facile but has important 
ramifications for the status of the reading subject.  In Barthes’ later 
articulation of text (‘Theory of the Text’) he differentiates between literary 
semiotics, concerned with the structure of language, and textual analysis, 
concerned with inter-subjective relations of language: 
 
Julia Kristeva proposed to call textual analysis ‘semanalysis’.  It was 
indeed necessary to distinguish the analysis of ‘text’ (in the sense that 
we have given to that word) from literary semiotics.  The most evident 
difference is in the reference to psychoanalysis, present in semanalysis, 
absent from literary semiotics (which merely classifies statements and 
describes their structural functioning, without concerning itself with the 
relation between the subject, the signifier and the Other).345 
 
Textual analysis, or ‘semanalysis’ in Kristeva’s nomenclature, is not simply 
the analysis of the material text, which would be the classical 
understanding of text, but the analysis of the relation between 
subject/Other/signifier.  Thus textual analysis concerns itself with the 
analysis of the relational space of text.  The analysis of text as the 
interrogation of the intersubjective space of writing is therefore remarkably 
consistent with Bourriaud’s notion of the contemporary artwork as social 
interstice.  However, as Bishop has argued, this extends beyond 
Bourriaud’s art of the 90s, to, theoretically at least, all artworks.  The writer 
and reader are imbricated within the space of the text, as we have seen 
from our discussions of landscape as text, the reader of the text does not 
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behold it from the outside.  Indeed, Barthes states that it is precisely this 
notion of the reader being outside of the text that textual analysis 
undermines. 
 
It is essentially this exteriority which textual analysis puts into question, 
not at all in the name of the rights of a more or less impressionistic 
‘subjectivity’, but on the grounds of the infinitude of languages…there 
is no metalanguage (a proposition established by psychoanalysis) and 
the subject of writing and/or of reading does not have to do with 
objects (words, statements) but with fields (texts, enunciations).346 
 
The reader/writer engaged in textual encounter is, in Barthesean terms, 
held in language.  He is held between the textual surfaces of writing and is 
‘undone’ by them.  By this Barthes means to say that the reading/writing 
subject loses himself in text, in jouissance, which for Barthes is a state of 
ecstatic, erotic bliss. 
 
The reader of the classical text holds the (aesthetic) object (the work) 
in his hand.   He is therefore in a masterful or sovereign relation to the 
work: central, privileged, positioned.  The work, for Barthes, is a space 
of signification.  However, he argues, for text, which is productivity 
rather than product, signification is no longer adequate to describe 
the manner in which meaning is made.  Signification is destabilised 
and replaced by ‘signifiance’, the ceaseless play of signifiers.  
“Significance”, writes Barthes, “is the text at work”347.  
 
A fortiori, when the text is read (or written) as a mobile play of 
signifiers, with no possible reference to one or several fixed signifieds, it 
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becomes necessary to distinguish between signification, which 
belongs to the level of the product…and the signifying work, which 
belongs to the level of production…it is this work that we call 
‘signifiance’.348 
 
The reader enters between the leaves of the textual surfaces of text, into a 
space of play in which the illusion of the reader as fixed centre is 
disseminated.  We might argue that the photographic address is textual, 
as we have already explored, the grid images which constitute a 
significant part of my own practice question the centredness of the 
subject before the view.  The shifts, duplications and elisions suggest a loss 
of command and a lack of certainty of one’s position in front of the work.  
The subject, worked by the photographic text, is unpositioned.  The 
photographic register acts as a reflecting pool, as we discussed earlier it 
doubles the subject and splits it at the same time – the originary subject is 
lost.  The onlooker, caught in this landscape of fracture is less assured of 
their footing. 
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The reader’s and the writer’s place within the text ensures that it acts upon 
him: his sense of unified subjecthood can no longer remain intact. 
 
‘Signifiance’…is thus work, not the work by which the subject (intact 
and external) might try to master the language…but that radical work 
(which leaves nothing intact) through which the subject explores how 
language works him and undoes him as soon as he stops observing it 
and enters it.349 
 
Thus we might think of practice-as-writing as a field in which the reader is 
ensnared.  It is a set of relations or forces which he inevitably becomes a 
part of.  Critically, Barthes refers to “the subject of writing and/or 
reading”350 to differentiate between the open work of textual analysis and 
                                                
349 Ibid. p. 38 
350 Ibid. p.43 
Fairway St. Andrews, Gina Wall 
 247 
the conception of the work “as a closed object placed at a distance 
from the observer who inspects it from the outside.”351  The subject of 
writing and/or reading is not the master but is subject to it.  Barthes argues 
that the reader is lost in the place of the text.  “He is himself caught in a 
topology (a science of the places of speaking).”352  To think photography 
as a textual space in which the reader finds himself caught, entails that 
we consider the photographic textual world as a place of making the 
world speak in divergent ways.  Topology is the arrangement or 
interrelation of (constituent) parts, by extension, the topology or place of 
the text enmeshes the reader.  Barthes’ invocation of topology is a useful 
metaphor as it enables us to think about photographic depictions of 
landscape in terms of images which make landscape speak in divergent 
ways: place as a textual relation is multi-vocal and mobile.  Images of 
landscape do not constitute images of place but iterations of place 
which in différance become placeless.  The textual body of a 
photographic practice depicting the landscape is a new emplacement 
of placelessness – a heterotopia, or place of difference.  The reader, 
caught in this topology of the placeless is disoriented and lost: subject(ed) 
to ‘signifiance’. 
 
‘Signifiance’ is a process in the course of which the ‘subject’ of the 
text, escaping the logic of the ego-cogito and engaging with other 
logics (that of the signifier and that of contradiction), struggles with 
meaning and is deconstructed (‘is lost’)353 
 
‘Signifiance’, a word which Robert Young argues has no equivalence in 
the English language, is the endless play of signification whereby the 
                                                
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid. p. 38 
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signifier does not correspond to, or close on a fixed signified, but 
continually refers to another signifier.  In the word signifiance, Barthes 
expresses what Jacques Derrida refers to in terms of the sign as “the unity 
of a heterogeneity”354, the notion that the signified is never quite mapped 
to a signifier due to the effect of spacing, or “the discrepant time of a 
breath”.355  In the space between the signified and the signifier, the 
signified slips to the position of signifier, thus the continual play of 
signification consists in a chain of signifiers which disrupts the settling of 
meaning.  For Barthes and Derrida it is ‘signifiance’ which precipitates the 
loss of the reading and writing subject: the conception of the subject as a 
fixed centre is destabilised. 
 
Signifiance, for Barthes, leads to jouissance, the ecstatic pleasure or bliss 
resulting from the engagement with scriptable, writerly text.  Jouissance is 
far more significant than plaisir (pleasure): 
 
Perhaps the most important distinction that [Barthes] makes is 
between plaisir and jouissance.  These terms are among the most 
difficult to translate.  Richard Miller, his translator, substitutes ‘pleasure’ 
and ‘bliss’, but ‘bliss’ may convey a more metaphysical, mystical form 
than the bodily sense of jouissance that is intended.356 
 
Jouissance for Barthes is therefore a bodily pleasure, an erotic, blissful 
state in which the reader is undone, lost and disoriented.  The notion that 
the reader is in a state of loss is pertinent to our discussion of the 
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landscape, in which the reader has been set adrift from a centred 
appraisal of the view, a fixed and certain anchor on the landscape.  As 
we shall see shortly, this loss can have a profound affect upon the reader 
in landscape.  Indeed, Duncan and Duncan write, apropos of Barthes, 
that “[t]he text of pleasure is the text that ‘grants euphoria’.  And the text 
of bliss disorients.”357 
 
The conception of the placelessness of the photographed landscape, the 
landscape in dissemination, runs counter, as we might expect, to what 
Roland Barthes writes about landscape photographs in Camera Lucida.   
 
An old house, a shadowy porch, tiles, a crumbling Arab decoration, a 
man sitting against the wall, a deserted street, a Mediterranean 
tree…this old photograph (1854) touches me: it is quite simply there 
that I should like to live…For me, photographs of landscape (urban or 
country) must be habitable, not visitable.358 
 
The landscape photograph, for Barthes, quite clearly posits place: a 
landscape is there in the photograph.  And in its habitable nature, 
photographed landscapes are not spectacles, touristic views of special 
places, but ordinary scenes, commonplaces in which Barthes would like to 
live.  The photographed landscape must have homeliness about it; 
indeed he goes on to write: 
 
Looking at these landscapes of predilection, it is as if I were certain of 
having been there or of going there.  Now Freud says of the maternal 
body that “there is no other place of which one can say with so much 
certainty that one has already been there.”  Such then would be the 
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essence of the landscape (chosen by desire): heimlich, awakening in 
me the Mother (and never the disturbing Mother).359 
 
As far as Barthes is concerned, appealing landscape photographs have a 
comfort and a certainty about them: they are recognisable and familiar.  
The body of the landscape is compared with the Freudian certainty of the 
offspring’s issue from the maternal body.  Where the landscape of 
Barthes’ “predilection” awakens in him something heimlich, the comfort of 
the son/Mother relationship, the thesis put forward here tends towards the 
unheimlich, the uncanny.  The doubling of landscape written throws the 
viewer into a state of discomfort regarding the parameters of old objects 
such as view, artwork, subject.  Images of the habitable, homely 
landscape may be the ultimate landscape photograph for Barthes, but 
for me it is the landtext of blissful disorientation which disseminates the 
view and beckons the viewer into the changing space practice which is 
of ultimate interest. 
 
IV Landscape and the Textual Sublime 
 
As we have discovered, it is scriptable or writerly text which precipitates 
the ecstatic loss of the reading subject.  The active participation, that is 
reading, decentres the reader’s sense of self, challenging his or her 
perceptions of self as a fixed and clearly defined identity: 
 
The text of jouissance is the text that imposes a state of loss, the text 
that discomfits, unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological 
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assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, and memories, 
brings to a crisis his relation with language.360 
 
This image of the disorientation of the reader engaged with scriptable text 
has certain resonances with me personally, due to experiences that I 
have had driving in North Uist.  The Uists are widely renowned for their 
amazing light, which has the capacity to radically transform the 
landscape.  Although one might argue that this is a quality of light in 
Scotland more generally, which may be indexed to rapidly changing 
weather conditions, in all probability it is the flatness of the landscape 
which makes the changes more significant.  Neil Gunn writes of Caithness, 
another geographically flat area, that “There are few places in Scotland 
where level light from a sinking sun can come across such as great 
area”361.  North Uist is also one of those places.  
 
I was driving in North Uist on two different occasions and due to the rapid, 
although somehow imperceptible, change in light, suddenly and 
inexplicably I felt totally disoriented, literally lost.  I was no longer driving on 
the landscape but in it; through it: due to this change in the light my own 
sense of place in the world was thrown open to question.  I quite literally 
did not know where I was.  This made me wonder: is this an experience 
which characterises what Barthes talks of in terms of jouissance: ecstatic 
loss.  I felt as though I went quite rapidly from being in control of the 
landscape to having no control whatsoever: the landscape was 
transformed from being lisible, readable, sequential and logical (one in 
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which I could orient myself) to being scriptable: I was suddenly 
disoriented, enveloped and aware of its power and scale. 
 
Thus if we are to think about landscape as text and text is Barthesean 
productivity, landscape is far more than a constructed materiality.  If we 
are to understand landscape as something more than ergon, i.e. text, we 
must reconcile ourselves to the fact that landtext is a product of 
encounter.  Firstly, the landtext needs to be disclosed, then it requires to 
be read.  These actions of disclosure and reading take place in virtue of 
light and the reader: light and readers need to engage with landscape in 
order for it to become text.  The reader/writer of the text might be a 
viewer, walker, driver or camera: not an objectifier but articulator.  (The 
camera might therefore be described as a non-bodily articulator.)  
 
In ‘The Light of the Sud-Ouest’ Barthes makes a direct correlation between 
the text of the landscape and light, he writes: 
 
I was already “reading” the Sud-Ouest, I covered the text that 
proceeds from the light of the landscape, from the languor of a day 
oppressed by the wind from Spain, to a whole type of discourse, social 
and provincial.  For to “read” a country is first of all to perceive it in 
terms of the body’s memory.  I believe it is to this vestibule of 
knowledge and analysis that the writer is assigned: more conscious 
than competent, conscious of the very interstices of competence.362 
 
For Barthes, the text “proceeds” or issues from the light, the light in this 
sense is a generative metaphor for text. The light of the Sud-Ouest, for 
Barthes, has a quality of its own: light saturates the landscape, throwing its 
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detail into relief.  Light’s interaction with the landscape is not simply a case 
of bringing things to visibility.  The landscape is not just disclosed under the 
light, landscape as text is landscape in difference.  Indeed Barthes writes:   
 
I find no other way of saying it: it is a luminous light…illuminating each 
thing in its difference.363 
 
If we recall Vasseleu’s words from the previous chapter: 
 
As a texture, the naturalness of light cannot be divorced from its 
historical and embodied circumstances…It is both the language and 
material of visual practices, of the invisible interweaving of differences 
which form the fabric of the visible.364 
 
Thus light itself is not an opposition: separated into the visible or invisible, 
for Vasseleu, it is neither/nor, it is indeterminate.  Light is not difference 
itself, rather light illuminates difference.  It illuminates the textual/textural 
difference of the land’s scape, the differences of the shape of the land.  
In its indeterminable role, light may be considered as a Derridean brisure, 
or hinge: an articulation of otherness of the same; light articulates 
sameness in difference. 
 
The touch of light opens a space of difference, this space of proximity, 
opens before the lens of the camera and the lens of the eye:   
 
At the point of light’s contact with the eye, the objectivity of the visual 
standpoint becomes a perception of the presence of difference365 
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The landtext is thus generated by light: light opens the landscape as text, 
in difference.  As Barthes argues, it is the bodily reading of the 
“inconsequentialities”366 which enables the reader to access deeper, 
more significant ideas about the social use of landscape and its political 
dimension.  However, this reading, argues Barthes, is a reading which is 
undertaken by the body and the memory in the space of the landscape.  
The “social and provincial discourse” is not only read with the eye but all 
of the senses: 
 
Between Nive and Adour…all the objects of a petty commerce 
mingled there to constitute an inimitable fragrance…it all functioned 
like the chemical formula of a vanished commerce…or, more exactly, 
functions today like the formula of that disappearance.  By its smell I 
can detect the actual change of a certain type of consumption367 
 
Barthes’ reading detects change, the changing text of, in this case, the 
commerce of the Bayonnaise marketplace: the changing identity of a 
land.  However, as Saussure teaches us, the difference cannot be 
detected, the marketplace is differed from itself: the formula of the 
disappearance of certain trading practices is written in Barthes’ memory.   
 
However, in thinking about the landtext opening under the light, we are in 
danger of re-inscribing the touch of light as a disclosure, a Heideggerian 
unveiling.  On the contrary, light discloses the landscape’s difference from 
itself: light articulates the textual sublime.  In order to elaborate the notion 
that light is the disclosure of the difference of landscape, we might pay 
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attention to what Barbara Johnson writes about text in relation to her 
deconstructive reading of Barthes’ ‘S/Z’, undertaken in ‘Structuralism’s 
Wake’: 
 
A text’s difference is not its uniqueness, its special identity.  It is the 
text’s way of differing from itself.  And this difference is received only in 
the act of re-reading…Difference…is not what distinguishes one 
identity from another.  It is not a difference between…It is a difference 
within.  Far from constituting the text’s unique identity, it is that which 
subverts the very idea of identity, infinitely deferring the possibility of 
adding up the sum of the text’s part or meanings and reaching a 
totalised, integrated whole.368 
 
The text of the landscape is, as we have already discussed, mobile and 
part of the mobility of this text is endowed by the play of light.  Under the 
light, the text of the landscape differs from itself, ever changing, ever 
moving, constantly at odds with itself: landscape is never a “totalised, 
integrated whole.”369 
 
Although our current explorations are theoretically remote from traditional 
notions of the sublime landscape which, in grandeur, wildness or enormity 
terrifies the viewer, this notion of landscape in difference resonates with 
the postmodern articulation of the sublime.  Although an exhaustive 
analysis of the sublime is not possible here (if indeed at all), the 
postmodern sublime is pertinent insofar as our enterprise has been 
concerned with the indeterminacy of language, especially in translation, 
Derridean différance which ruptures the stability of objective meaning as 
it defers and delay language.  The sublime in postmodern thought 
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represents “an aporia, a gap, or an abyss which marks the inability of 
language to signify objective meaning.”370  The eternal delay of the sign, 
the invagination of photographic presence, the landtext in difference, are 
all suggestive of the aporia of the postmodern sublime.  Indeed, the 
notion that the landtext under light is the difference of itself lends 
credence to an understanding of the shift and change in light on the text 
of the land as an articulation of, what Hugh J. Silverman describes as the 
textual sublime.  The textual sublime, in this instance is taken to be the 
condition of the text in difference.  In The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction 
and its Differences, differential readings of texts by philosophy and 
criticism are explored, particularly in relation to deconstruction.  Whilst the 
textual sublime is recontextualised for the purposes of my argument, the 
significance of the text in difference remains. 
 
The textual sublime characterizes that space or domain in which the 
concern for the relations between philosophy and criticism are 
placed in question and examined in detail.  As the text opens itself to 
what is other than itself, it marks the differential spaces of the text.371 
 
The textual sublime is a movement, either through the text in translation or 
the process of differential reading, which calls into question the bounded 
nature of text and the notion that its meaning can be exhausted in 
reading.  Silverman goes on to write: 
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Unlike the beautiful, the sublime is without boundaries.  The textual 
sublime puts all claim to rigid limits under a shadow of doubt (among 
other things, opens the text to generalities)372 
 
The textual sublime spills over the boundaries of our vision and opens a 
space in which the noeme of the landscape exceeds that which is before 
us.  As readers of the landscape we are also, like the critic, scholar or 
philologist 
 
in language, and he must assume his insertion, however ‘rigorous’ and 
‘objective’ he may wish to be, into the triple knot of the subject, the 
signifier, and the Other – an insertion which writing (the text) fully 
accomplishes, without having recourse to the hypocritical distance of 
a fallacious metalanguage.  The only practice that is founded by the 
theory of the text is the text itself.373 
 
As we explored earlier, Barthes describes the dissolution of the subject in 
the text as being like a spider, dissolved in its own web.  He writes that, for 
the lover of neologisms (of whom we can count Barthes as one) the 
practice or theory of the text may well be defined as a “ ‘hyphology’ 
(hyphos is the fabric, the veil, and the spider’s web).”374  Where Barthes 
concentrates on the dissolution of the subject (by ecstatic loss) within the 
text (as opposed to work), Derrida, in his insistence that there is nothing 
outside of text, posits that the binary oppositions of subject/object are the 
product of différance, or textuality.  Thus the subject is produced in the 
play of textuality.  The reader as both subject and object, self and Other, 
unstable and contingent from the outset, unfolds in the play of language.   
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The subject photographed is the difference of itself: it is the subject in 
différance.  Understandably, the last place we might look to find support 
for this argument would probably be Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida, for 
as we have seen on successive occasions throughout this thesis, Barthes’ 
ideas, on photography at least, are at odds with those expressed here.  
However, I believe that Barthes’ attempt to identify the genius of all 
photography by exclusive reference to The Winter Garden Photograph as 
the model for all photographs, leaves his account open to self-
contradiction.  In discussing the mortification of the pose, he writes:  
 
What I want, in short, is that my (mobile) image, buffeted among a 
thousand shifting photographs, altering with situation and age, should 
always coincide with my (profound) “self”; but it is the contrary that 
must be said: “myself” never coincides with my image; for it is the 
image which is heavy, motionless, stubborn (which is why society 
sustains it), and “myself” which is light, divided, dispersed; like a bottle 
imp, “myself” doesn’t hold still, giggling in my jar: if only Photography 
could give me a neutral…body…which signifies nothing!375 
 
Although Barthes complains that the photograph is frozen and 
recalcitrant (where elsewhere he calls it weightless and transparent) the 
photograph’s incapacity to be contiguous with his own image (which 
makes the genius of that special photograph all the more suspect) is 
altogether consistent with the conception of photographic images as the 
difference of the world.  Like the Barthesean “self”, photography as writing 
is light, divided, it does not hold still.  The landscape written is dispersed: 
the constant change in the land illuminated by light, in the reader (who is 
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reading in a writerly fashion), and in the textual spaces opened out by 
photogrammatology, landscape is perpetually differenced. 
 
The intertextual landscape, described by Roland Barthes as “a difference 
repeatable only as difference”376 resonates with the idea, drawn from 
Derrida, of the photgraphic encounter as differencing: a differential 
relation which, we saw earlier, facilitates the conceptualisation of the 
photograph as physis in différance.  The metaphor of landscape as text 
elucidated by Barthes in terms of a walk in a valley, as we saw in the first 
chapter, leads him to talk of the experience of being in the landscape in 
terms of the recognition of half “incidents…[that] come from codes which 
are known but their combination is unique”.377  The landscape as text 
takes place in a semalfactive, or momentary, reading.  It is an occurrence 
which photography stills but does not close, for photography, as we have 
seen, is a grammatology, a differencing of the world. The landscape 
photographed is dispersed, it is subjected to the translation, which is 
transformational, of photogrammalogy. 
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Inside the textual space of practice, the viewer as a textual surface is 
rewritten: the subject is differenced, spaced.  If we return to Derrida: 
spacing “marks what is set aside from itself, what interrupts every self-
identity, every punctual assemblage of the self, every self-homogeneity, 
self interiority”378.  The reader in the text is undone in Barthesean terms and 
spaced in Derridean terms.  The dissolution of the subject in the text is far 
from being a negativity, on the contrary, the reader’s subjection to the 
text enables him to be part of textual productivity, a subject “in process” 
as Kristeva might have it.  The reader’s immersion in the text, be it landtext 
or photogrammatology, facilitates the erasure and rewrite of those habits 
of seeing and understanding which we so often take as an indication of 
who and where we are. 
                                                
378 Jacques Derrida Positions Alan Bass (trans), New York; London: Continuum, 2004 p.86 
Landscape(s) of difference 2, Gina Wall 
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VI Concluding remarks 
 
This final written chapter has been concerned with the notion that 
practice-as-writing generates a photographic textual world, a world 
which is articulated in terms of grammatology.  The post-structuralist text 
was investigated further in order to explore Roland Barthes’ statement that 
text is productivity.  Taking text to be the site of productivity, a theatre of 
production, photogrammatology must therefore be thought of as a 
space of production.  The photograph is a trace of practice generated in 
the play of différance.  The place of the reader in this textual space is 
significant.  In our general deconstruction of the view which has taken 
place throughout this thesis, we have questioned the idea that the view is 
a kind of picture in tandem with the viewer’s centralised and privileged 
position.  We have concluded that the reader is bound into the textual 
space of practice rather than being central to it: bound in to an 
intertextual, relational space of meaning in which the ‘in-betweenness’ of 
photographic practice is set in play. 
 
This notion of the open form of the artwork was looked at, particularly with 
respect to Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics.  To think of 
photographic practice as a textual world, which the reader enters in to 
resonates strongly with Bourriaud’s thesis on Relational Aesthetics.  
However, as we saw from Claire Bishop’s critique of this, Bourriaud’s 
relational artworks are ontologically open.  Bishop sets this in 
contradistinction to Umberto Eco’s conception of the open work, whose 
open-ness is not ontological but derives from the reading of a work.  Eco’s 
open work is closer to the textuality posited in this thesis in virtue of our 
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emphasis on reading.  In reading, the work is opened, we might say that 
the noeme of the photographic textual world is open-ness. 
 
The textual space into which the reader enters has a bearing on the 
reading subject.  As we saw earlier, for Barthes, the reader engaged with 
text becomes the subject of reading rather than the reading subject: the 
reader is subjected to the text.  Thus the play of text is not facile, the 
reader is undone, disseminated, in the text.  The manner in which text 
works the subject is characterised by Barthes as ‘signifiance’, the 
ceaseless play of signifiers.  The subject of reading is unravelled by the text 
if he allows himself to stop observing it (the illusion of beholding it from the 
outside) and becomes immersed in it. 
 
The idea that text is mobile has enabled us to think about landtext as 
shifting, mutable, subject to change.  This has led to the very concept of 
place to be questioned.  Images of landscape(s) are not necessarily 
depictions of place but iterations of the difference of place: place in 
différance becomes placeless.  Placeless places, places of difference: 
heterotopias. 
 
The sense of the placeless in landscape photography is very un-
Barthesean insofar as Barthes expects photographed landscapes to 
represent commonplaces, recognisable and inhabitable landscapes.  The 
landscape is locatable, it is there in the photograph.  For Barthes, the 
landscape photographed is heimlich, however, for this thesis, with its 
emphasis on photographic doubling and the photographic dissemination 
of the view, a less stable reading of landscape is sought, one which tends 
towards the unheimlich, the unsettling or the uncanny.  This sense of the 
familiar becoming strange concurs with my actual experiences in the 
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landscape, the instances of my absolute disorientation which came 
about due to the change in light.  These experiences that I had whilst 
driving in North Uist transformed the landscape from lisable to scriptable, I 
found myself subjected to the text of landscape. 
 
Light therefore plays a critical role in the change of landscape.  However, 
as a we have seen from Cathryn Vasseleu’s book Textures of Light, light is 
not difference itself, rather it illuminates difference, and critically for this 
thesis, light illuminates the difference of the same: it articulates sameness 
in difference.  This difference within the text of landscape enables us to 
think about the landtext in terms of the textual sublime.  The textual 
sublime is the landscape in movement, the landscape is the perpetual 
difference of itself, it is radically in excess of that which lies before us.  
Landscape, considered in these terms, is not the shape of a bounded 
tract of land before us but a boundless space which is both sensible and 
intelligible: landscape in its fullest sense is both seen and thought. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this concluding section I intend to briefly summarise the territory 
covered, in broad terms, whilst simultaneously considering the importance 
of key conclusions with respect to photography in general and my own 
practice in particular.  As it stands, the drive to rehabilitate the word 
‘landscape’ in the early stages of the thesis turned out to be well 
founded.  The etymological enquiry into landscape yielded useful insights 
into the conceptual richness latent in the word itself.  A range of readings 
subsequently arose from the enquiry into those earlier etymologies which 
are absent from the modern dictionary.  Landscape, it seems, has a 
hidden imaginary.  The notion that landscapes are humanly manipulated 
rather than ‘natural’ is supported by the etymology and also by the writing 
of a range of theorists, notably John Brinkerhoff Jackson whose work on 
landscape studies has critically informed this thesis.  His understanding of 
landscape as a collection of lands, has been the most constructive, the 
idea that landscape is a synthetic space. 
 
The articulation of landscape as a collection of lands, a collection of 
synthetic spaces, is both a way of understanding landscape and a visual 
property of landscape.  The landscape as collection is land aggregated, 
it is, and always has been, the joins in the landscape which interest me.  
This way of thinking landscape has enabled me to conceive landscape in 
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terms of Michel Foucault’s heterotopia.  This notion of landscape as other 
place, or place of otherness, was germane as it opened the possibility of 
contemplating landscape as a place of difference, indeed I now think of 
the landscape in difference as placeless.   
 
In addition to the conception of the landscape heterotopia as place of 
difference, we were presented with the idea of the heterotopia as an 
actualised utopia.  That is, the heteropia comes to stand for something 
other than itself: the heterotopia contradicts the very utopian ideals that it 
purports to represent.  Looking at landscape, especially those putatively 
natural landscapes of National Parks, through the kaleidoscope of the 
Foucauldian heterotopia showed that the conception of wilderness is a 
partial reading of landscape which gives rise to a myth of nature.  This 
myth was investigated with reference to Roland Barthes’ seminal work 
‘Myth Today’ in relation to the photographic works of Ansel Adams and 
Stephen Shore.  Taking a kaleidoscopic view of heterotopian landscapes 
has enabled me to engage with our own National Park in a more 
balanced and measured way, which takes cognisance of the fact that it 
is at once a wilderness and a highly managed and manipulated 
landscape.  Raising our awareness of the fractures in landscape, the joins 
and seams in these synthetic spaces has had the (paradoxical) effect of 
clarifying my position: I find that I am standing on shifting ground – 
positionality becomes improbable if not impossible.  By way of an 
example, there is not one Cairngorm National Park, but a place which 
sustains multiple readings, it is many places. 
 
The notion that the landscape is a place in difference is commensurate 
with our reading of landscape as text.  The idea that landscape is a kind 
of text, formulated by cultural geographers was taken further than a 
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metaphoric reading of landscape.  Landscape as text, or ‘landtext’, has 
come to stand for both the inscribed landscape and our experience of it: 
landscape as text is productivity. Although I may not have recognised it at 
the time, the articulation of landscape as text is also consistent with 
thinking landscape in terms of a system of differences.  Roland Barthes’ 
articulation of text, for which he himself used landscape as a metaphor, is 
taken to be informative of our commerce with landscape.  Successive 
incursions into the landscape, we have shown, are encounters of place in 
difference. 
 
With reference to Roland Barthes’ writing on text, we can think about 
landscape as movement which does not stop, this as we saw in the 
course of the thesis has significant implications for the reader, especially 
with regard to non-durational reading.  Not only is the textual landscape 
constantly mobile, using Barthes’ words to describe text, we can call 
landscape a “methodological field”379, a field into which the reader 
enters.  Landscape as text is immersive, the reader does not contemplate 
it from afar but is within it.  Even with a distanced view before us, our feet 
are always on the ground, we are not apart from landscape but part of it, 
held in difference.  This formulation of the textual landscape is resolutely 
anti-essentialist: landscape is an ever changing inscription, and to think of 
the humanly inscribed landscape as a lost wilderness is to desire the origin, 
to fall prey to the mythology of nature in opposition with culture.  
 
Barthes’ own scepticism about the power of intentional photographs, built 
on photography’s natural syntagm, has been used as a strategy to 
undermine his late writing on photography.  Barthes’ earlier scepticisms 
about photographic images are elided in Camera Lucida, notably their 
                                                
379 Ibid. p.942 
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pseudo natural status which gives the intentional photograph its power of 
ideological persuasion.  However, it is of note that the consistency 
between these bodies of writing on photography is Barthes’ unavowed 
assertion that the photographic image is “a message without a code”.380  
But message it is nonetheless.  As we have seen, Barthes argues for the 
subject-in-the-photograph as presence, an emanation, the photograph 
certifies of the existence of the subject.  However, the work of Vilèm Flusser 
and Bruno Latour illuminates Barthes’ blind spot with respect to the 
apparatus and industry of photography, calling the whole notion of 
photographs as natural icons into dispute.  Photographic images do not 
presence the referent, rather, they inscribe the subject photographically.  
The natural syntagm can therefore be described as a compelling illusion.  
Rather than natural icons, the photograph is an inscription of synthetic 
realism. 
 
I have argued that the conception of the subject’s being-as-presence in 
the photograph has a strong parallel in Ferdinand de Saussure’s argument 
which posits the proximity of thought and speech.  As such, I argue that 
theorising photographic images as an extension of this Saussurean 
paradigm of proximity (i.e. in terms of the photographic touch) forces the 
photograph into the role of motif for what Jacques Derrida describes as 
the metaphysics of presence.  Throughout the process of writing this thesis 
I have questioned presence, both in terms of photography and the 
authorial presence of the writer in the text (or the photographer inside the 
text landscape).  Barthes’ contention that the photograph cannot be a 
sign, that the photographic image is uncoded (we might say that it is 
motivated in virtue of the syntagm’s adherence to the referent) was 
                                                
380 Roland Barthes ‘The Photographic Message’ Image, Music, Text Stephen Heath (trans 
and selected) London: Fontana Press, 1977 p.17 
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subjected to a critique through reference to the writing of Rosalind Krauss.  
Krauss’ problematic argument requires two formulations of photography, 
one which ruptures photography’s illusion of presence and the other, 
complicit in this illusion, which is in fact, a presentation.  In short, Krauss 
aligns herself as a Barthesean for certain kinds of images and as a 
Derridean for others.  Her thesis on surrealist photography as a 
“invagination” of presence, a spacing and doubling which constitutes 
photography as writing (écriture) was therefore shown to be characteristic 
of photographs in general.  That is, not only do surrealist photographs write 
the world, so too do all photographs.  In this regard, this thesis does not 
seek to differentiate different kinds of photography.  The practice of 
photography per se writes the world and our awareness of this may be 
foregrounded or not, dependent upon the use to which we put 
photographic images.  That is to say, our commerce with photographs 
can be characterised by a wilful ignorance of their illusions, which Krauss 
argues is deprived in the case of surrealist images.  However, if 
photographs in general belong to a system of difference through spacing, 
doubling and elision, photography is a practice of writing.  But not only in 
the grid images which were analysed in chapter three, but also in singular 
images: the lens and the shutter open difference.  Further still, the gap 
between the negative and the print sets in motion a multiplicity of 
photographic texts which presses the point that photographs are 
themselves disseminations of the subject. 
 
The notion of the photographic double which is a non-identical iteration 
of the same has clear parallels with Derrida’s neographism différance.  
The subject, written photographically, is dissociated from itself: the 
photographic double is continuously deferred, and the space opened 
between the leaves of the laminated object ensure that the subject 
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photographed is subject divided, spaced, re-temporalised.  Therefore, to 
think of photography in terms of physis in différance, means that the 
photographic sign is permanently deferred, the photographic signifier 
never closes on a signified or referent, and photographic images have no 
hope of presencing the real.  The photograph as physis in différance 
therefore operates between absence and presence, between nature 
and culture: it is sameness in difference. 
 
The sense that photography is a practice of inside/outside has also been 
considered, with particular reference to the reformulation of photography 
in Derridean terms.  Conceptualising photographs in such a way facilitates 
a reading of photography which at once accepts the inside/outside 
binarism as informative, the notion that photographic practice is 
interventionist – it produces difference, and yet it resists the singular 
monocular gaze of the camera.  Différance does not resolve this binarism, 
rather it produces oppositional paradigms of thought.  As différance is 
neither a word nor a concept, it is a neographism which elides 
conceptual definition, that is, it does not provide a definition of the 
production of oppositional structures, it provides the conditions in which 
they may be produced. Différance ruptures and delays meaning whilst 
simultaneously acting as a productivity.  Différance is both the play of text 
and the play of textuality. 
 
Photography as physis in différance is a practice which is part of the world 
but also transforms our world.  The multitude of positions on the world 
offered by photographs informs our reception of the world/landscape.  
Photography, I have written, is a gesture of transformation: photographs 
transform world, world transforms photograph.  However, the whole notion 
that photographic practice writes the world runs counter to Barthes’ 
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thoughts on the inability of the photograph to act as a sign, for Barthes 
even in his earlier writing on photography, photographs clearly do not 
transform the world.381   
 
In effect, the inside/outside opposition in photography is produced by 
photography as physis in différance: the moment at which the subject’s 
reflection touches the lens difference opens.  Thus through the 
oppositional structuration of photographic images by lens, shutter and 
frame, we are given images which speak of inside/outside: these are the 
products of the photographic parergon.  The paregonality of 
photographic practice has some utility as it allows us to call to attention 
the fact that in photographic practice elisions are as significant as 
inclusions.  To be at home in a parergonal photographic practice is to be 
mindful of the idea that a body of practice is an assemblage, a sutured 
text in which the interstices are as significant as what we might 
traditionally account for by the nomenclature work (ergon). Looking 
briefly at Walter Benjamin I have argued that practice-as-writing stitches 
together a new world of images, a body of work sutured together by the 
photographer surgeon, who cuts images from their surroundings.  The 
image world, the body of photowriting, or what I have called 
photogrammatology is assembled, it is built and woven, it too is text: 
photographs are held in syntactical relation to one another. 
 
Derrida’s practice of placing the sign under erasure has been of critical 
importance in terms of the deferral and delay of meaning.  That is, the 
deferred sign resists, as he writes, philosophy’s founding question: what is?  
The question of being as presence is disrupted, forcing us to think about 
                                                
381 Roland Barthes ‘The Photographic Message’ Image, Music, Text Stephen Heath (trans 
and selected) London: Fontana Press, 1977 p.17 
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‘what is?’ in terms of difference.  However, as Derrida points out,382 the 
sign placed under erasure is still allowed to stand for it still has some utility: 
it is the very structure of the sign which allows translation to take place.  
However, without a direct correlation between signifiers in different 
languages, translation must be thought in terms of transformation.  The 
Derridean sign sous rature is of significance for this thesis insofar as it 
facilitates the very play of meaning previously discussed.  In addition, it 
enables the photographic signifier to be considered as a transformative 
component in the practice of photogrammatology: a translation of the 
world.   
 
A key question throughout the thesis has been: how should the relation 
between landtext and photogrammatology be articulated?  My initial 
working question was: can my own photographic practice be described 
as intertextual?  I have provided an affirmative answer to this but in the 
process I have come to realise that intertextuality in Barthes’ terms, and 
textuality in Derrida’s is a constant throughout the thesis.  From the 
landscape to photographic practice-as-writing, from the relation 
between these practices to the relation of the reader to the artwork, 
(inter)textuality weaves its way throughout.  However, I had not reckoned 
upon one very significant discovery which showed itself through the 
writings of Cathryn Vasseleu: the role that light has to play in the 
intertextual relation.   
 
Light is the touch of the intertext and this in turn forced me to re-evaluate 
the Barthesean ‘treasury of rays’.  I have therefore conceded that Roland 
Barthes and Susan Sontag are right when they say that the subject’s 
                                                
382 Jacques Derrida, Positions, Alan Bass (trans), New York; London: Continuum, 2004 p.19 
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reflection is imprinted383 upon the photographic materials.  Where I 
diverge from them both significantly is in their contention that the subject-
in-the-photograph touches us, the spectator, across time and space.  For 
me this simply does not hold with a synthetic, interventionist account of 
photography.  In short, by taking account of the Latourean and Flusserian 
arguments regarding the complexity of new objects which are informed 
by their apparatuses and industries, we cannot reduce the photographic 
object to a transparent pane through which we feel the touch of the 
referent.  However emotionally compelling this account of photographs is, 
especially in the face of personal loss, we should not ignore the vast 
complex that is the photographic industry, even when considering these 
personal images.  Neither must we tolerate an account of photography 
which allows for different theoretical paradigms for intentional and non-
intentional images.  However, the photographic touch is of critical 
importance as it is this which opens difference: the touch opens the 
lacuna or delay in the image.  Without the photographic touch, Krauss’ 
notion of the invaginated presence would make no sense at all. 
 
Light, as we have discussed, is the touch of the intertext, but as I have 
discovered in the latter stages of the thesis, light opens the text of the 
landscape.  This is not simply in virtue of its role in revealing the texture of 
the world, anyone who has consciously observed the landscape under a 
low raking light will know that these conditions throw the texture of the 
world into low relief.  In fact, as Vasseleu shows us, light opens difference: 
the touch of light on the eye, and by extension on the lens, differences 
the world.  Under the light, the landscape is other than itself, it is sameness 
                                                
383 However, the idea of imprint is open to question and has been debated recently in 
Photography Theory James Elkins (ed) New York; London: Routledge, 2007 pp. 146-151.  
Rather than taking the imprint which, in the Sontagian sense, entails that the 
photographs retain a vestigae of the subject.  I take it to mean simply the point to point 
correlation of the reflection and the photosensitive surface of the film. 
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in difference, it offers an experience repeatable only as difference.  Light 
is therefore central to this thesis but this has come to my attention via my 
peripheral vision.  On many occasions throughout this research project I 
asked myself: what about light?  I chided myself: which photographer of 
worth is not keenly aware of light’s importance?  However, in spite of my 
theoretical inattention, light has insinuated itself quietly to the centre of 
the project.  Light occupies the centre field of the practice, not as a 
constant, a central pivot which grounds the work, but as difference itself.  
The centre is groundless and changing, the field before me is always 
moving: light is both the difference and the mobility of the landscape as 
text.  I have discovered that the role of photography is to chart that 
difference, to further transform and rewrite landscape. 
 
As we have seen, one can argue that the camera freezes time, its images 
endure, that is, they have duration.  This, in contradistinction with the 
Barthesean semelfactive reading, which is non-durational, it is momentary 
and (typically) punctual.  The semelfactive reading of landscape, as we 
have already seen, is repetition in difference.  Although it would seem that 
landscapes and photographs support divergent modes of reading, I 
argue that photography, taken as a practice of writing, proven during the 
thesis, produces images which are iterations of difference.  As such, we 
can describe each difference as a punctual image, a moment of 
difference within the same.  Cumulatively then, photographic images 
provide us with semelfactive rather than durational readings of their 
subjects, which in this case is landscape.  Photographs are differential 
blinks in the fabric of the same. 
 
The ruptures in the ‘unified’ photographic moment, instigated by a 
photographic practice taken to be a form of writing, supports the 
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assertion that a body of photographic practice is diachronic.  Although 
photographs appear to be frozen, that is synchronous occurrences in 
which the subject and its image are self-identical, the thesis of the subject 
in difference, offers a reading of photographic practice as historical 
insofar as it transects time.  As far as the so called photographic moment 
is concerned (the duration of the opening of the shutter which is ruptured 
by photogrammatology), the photographer is excluded.  Indeed, at the 
precise moment at which authorial control is desired, the apparatus 
conspires to overwrite the photographer’s vision.  But the photographer’s 
blindness in the face of the photographic moment can be productive, 
indeed generative, in the sense that it facilitates a loss of control over the 
subject.  This is further emphasised by my use of the camera to build 
pictures, unsighted, blindly assembling them on the negative which 
inscribes doublings and incongruities into the image.  The view is patiently 
deconstructed only to insinuate itself once again.  As Derrida states when 
interviewed for the DVD Derrida, a condition of deconstruction is that it 
may be at work on the periphery: 
 
part of the system to be deconstructed already at work not at the 
centre but in an eccentric centre – participating in the construction of 
what it threatens to deconstruct384 
 
However, the view reconstructed is of a different order, it is an 
assemblage of glances rather than a full frontal gaze. 
 
It is important to recall that writing, écriture, différance, text are 
productivity.   Text in its most radical sense does not exist, it is not a 
product but is a site or space of productivity: text is produced relationally.  
                                                
384 Jacques Derrida interviewed in Derrida Directed by Kirby Dick, Amy Ziering Kofman, 
2006 
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As such, Barthes’ ‘Theory of the Text’ investigates similar territory to Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics and, as we saw in the final written 
chapter, this can be applied to the gallery.  Returning momentarily to the 
notion of the parergon, we explored the idea that the gallery articulates 
the work, that is, it needs the extrinsic, the gallery wall, in order for the 
intrinsic to be read as such.  Without its context of presentation, the work 
fails to have a unified interiority.  However, paradoxically the work cannot 
be an aesthetic unity for, as we saw earlier, Derrida contends that the 
inside and the outside are not pure, rather each is the product of the 
parergon.  The ergon is completed, supplemented by the parergon, 
which is to say that without the extrinsic, the work is lacking.  The gallery 
supplements the lack in the work and acts as a parergon giving rise to the 
illusion of the pure interiority of the ergon/work.  Without the relational 
space of the gallery, the work cannot be articulated, it cannot be finished 
or complete.  However, this completion only constitutes a momentary rest, 
for the exhibition will be disassembled in due course, the text of practice 
rewritten: 
 
Thus it is always possible for a text to become new, since the blanks 
open up its structure to an indefinitely disseminated transformation.  
The whiteness of the virgin paper, the blankness of the transparent 
column, reveals more than the neutrality of some medium; it uncovers 
the space of play or the play of space in which transformations are set 
off and sequences strung out.385 
 
The hanging and re-hanging of work means that the body of 
photography, a product of writing: text, is opened by the white wall of the 
gallery.  Far from being a neutral space, the gallery is relational, and for 
                                                
385 Jacques Derrida Dissemination Barbara Johnson (trans) New York; London: 
Continuum, 2004 p.345 
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theorists such as Bourriaud, it is social.  Thus the white interstitial space 
between and around the work, to borrow Derrida’s words, “uncovers the 
space of play and the play of space in which transformations are set off 
and sequences are strung out.”386  That is to say, the whiteness of the 
gallery, like the white sheet of paper, is not invisible, neutral or benign.  
Rather, it discloses the play of space in which the work is set in motion.  
The photographer at play in the world and at play in the gallery is a 
“syntaxer”387.   
 
In my role as a photographer, it is essential that the effects of the frame 
are given due consideration.  The gallery wall, the elisions of the world all 
require to be taken as part of the text, part of its “indefinitely disseminated 
transformation.”388  If we recall what Derrida writes in The Truth in Painting:  
 
No ”theory”, no “practice”, no “theoretical practice” can intervene 
effectively in this field if it does not weigh up and bear on the 
frame…at the invisible limit to…the interiority of meaning…and…all 
the empiricisms of the extrinsic which, incapable of either seeing or 
reading, miss the question completely.389 
 
In this sense practice itself is placed under erasure insofar as we take an 
artist/photographer to have a practice.  A more productive means of 
expressing this would be to say that the photographer is in practice, akin 
to Kristeva’s articulation of the subject in process.  Whilst this research 
project is both theoretical and practical, following Derrida it tries not to 
                                                
386 Ibid. 
387 Stephane Mallarmé cited by Jacques Derrida Dissemination Barbara Johnson (trans) 
New York; London: Continuum, 2004 p.194 
388 Jacques Derrida Dissemination Barbara Johnson (trans) New York; London: 
Continuum, 2004 p.345 
389 Jacques Derrida The Truth in Painting Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod (trans) 
Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 p.61 
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observe and analyse practice from afar but to undertake this endeavour 
both from within practice and crucially within theory.  The theoretical has 
not been utilised as a validation or decoding of practice, rather the 
theoretical works encountered during the writing of the thesis have 
functioned as discursive spaces which have been inhabited.  Not, in a 
“homely” way but, especially in the case of Derrida, spaces which 
destabilise one’s limited thought. 
 
The pursuit of a practice led research project has not been without its 
challenges.  But for all the seemingly unsystematic play, a cogency has 
emerged.  In terms of a contribution to knowledge my approach may 
appear to have its drawbacks: inevitably the pursuit of a Derridean 
account of photography encourages a slippery engagement with 
meaning, which may be misinterpreted as a looseness of intention.  
However, rather than seeking to formulate an epistemic framework within 
which to situate the thesis, I have taken the thesis to be a discursive 
practice in a discursive space.  Notwithstanding the general scepticism of 
this anti-essential, constructivist approach, localised contributions to (the 
construction of) knowledge can be demonstrated.  Notably, the writings 
of Jacques Derrida provide a way of thinking photography in terms of the 
expanded field of writing.  Therefore, Derrida’s work acts as a force for 
productivity within the thesis, which some argue has been lacking in the 
visual arts thus far.  As Robin Marriner points out in Companion to Art 
Theory, Derrida’s influence on the visual arts has not been significant: 
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References to Derrida are much rarer…and for the most part to be 
found in journals that, though concerned with art, are somewhat 
peripheral to the making of contemporary culture.390 
 
Admittedly difficult to read, Derrida’s work has proven to have productive 
consequences for my thinking and practice.  He has enabled me to 
engage with the deconstruction of the view photographically, whilst 
reminding me that deconstruction is always at work.  However, as we 
have just seen, the re-constructed view is a re-viewing, view re-assembled, 
an articulation of differential blinks.  Barthes’ words which follow are 
Derridean in tenor: 
 
The infinity of the signifier refers not to some idea of the ineffable (the 
unnameable signified) but to that of a playing; the generation of the 
perpetual signifier…in the field of the text…is realized…according to a 
serial movement of disconnections, overlappings and variations.391 
 
In the thorny territory of the “what” of this practice-led thesis, différance, 
écriture, grammatology, the expanded field of writing, have enabled me 
to concentrate as much on process as on content.  This has alerted me to 
far subtler readings of photography than I ever hoped to achieve, and 
those readings were emergent, products themselves of the discursive 
space of the thesis.  The sign, cleaved by Derrida, sets off a play of 
meaning which frustrates closure.  This is far from problematic for the visual 
practitioner as it enables one’s (space of) practice to be a place of 
encounter in which partial meanings are constructed.  There is no proper 
                                                
390 Robin Marriner ‘Derrida and the Parergon’ in A Companion to Art Theory eds Paul 
Smith and Carolyn Wilde Malden, Mass.;Oxford: Blackwell, 2002 p.349 
391 Roland Barthes ‘From Work to Text’ in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998 p.943 
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reading, only numerous readings, equally valid and mobile in the gallery 
space.  I play in the differential gap within the sign.  And the textual space 
of the gallery is the space of the encounter with the Other (khora). 
 
The resolutely Derridean theorisation of photogrammatology has enabled 
me to test some long held intuitions about photographic practice.  In the 
expanded field of writing I have been able to rigorously explore 
something otherwise inexpressible: the in-between.  Derrida and Saussure 
alert us to difference, inaudible, invisible, yet a critical structuration of 
experience and meaning.  The thesis also occupies a space between 
disciplines: photography and philosophy; theory and practice; in 
investigating these spaces between, the work is interdisciplinary in the 
strongest terms.  I find myself to be a “hybrid” in the Latourean sense, 
which one might argue is the most effective role to play in the occupation 
of academic interstitial spaces.  The artwork in the gallery asks the viewer 
to see in-between.  The images are not difference itself but articulate 
difference which is intangible.  Difference is a lacuna between the works 
which the viewer is asked to imagine. 
 
Photogrammatology is also a productivity and a space from within which 
it is critiqued.  As Barthes demonstrates, text is not analysed from the 
outside, but from within.  Photography is therefore to be researched from 
inside of its own practice.  In terms of this thesis, photography is not a 
subject dispassionately investigated but a textual process in which the 
play of research has unfolded.  By working from the inside of 
photography’s text, imbricated within it, (whilst bearing in mind the 
problematic of the inside/outside relation) I have avoided two kinds of 
academic oversight.  Firstly, the potential myopia of single discipline study 
has been avoided by a dialogical encounter between disciplines, and 
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secondly, I have avoided what we saw Derrida describe earlier as “the 
empiricisms of the extrinsic”392 which render one unable to see the very 
question at hand. 
 
In the ceaseless play of signifiers (‘signifiance’) the reader loses command 
of the text, the reader is subjected to text.  This sense of loss and 
disorientation in a scriptable rather than lisable text resonates strongly with 
my own experiences of landscape.  The light on the land is transformative, 
it illuminates the text of the landscape in difference.  And the landscape, 
always, already the difference of itself, articulates the textual sublime.  
Additionally, the photographic writing of landscape translates this text: it is 
the double, unheimlich.  These photographic texts literally disseminate 
landscape, they are the dissemination of landscape in difference.  In the 
land light others land’s shape, landscape is sameness in difference, yet 
déja lu, it is always, already read.  The translations of the photograph 
articulate landscape as textual sublime, under the touch of light and the 
photographic inscription it is the eternal difference of itself.  The 
photographer is within the field of the text and the body of work is 
assembled “according to a serial movement of disconnections, 
overlappings and variations.”393  This thesis has opened new possibilities in 
practice which means that this work is as much as starting point as it is a 
conclusion.  In a sense, I have not found a clear definition of my practice, 
but I have discovered much more: a productive place in which to play. 
                                                
392 Jacques Derrida The Truth in Painting Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod (trans) 
Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 p.61 
393 Ibid. 
 313 
 314 
Bibliography 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Aesthetic Theory, Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedman (eds); 
Robert Hullot-Kentor (trans), London: Continuum, 2004 
Alcoff, Linda Martin (ed), Epistemology: the Big Questions, Malden, Mass.; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998  
Allen, Graham, Intertextuality, London: Routledge, 2000 
Anderson, Nicole, ‘(De)constructing Technologies of Subjectivity’ Scan Journal, 
Vol.3, Number 3, December 2006  
Andrews, Malcolm, Landscape and Western Art, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999 
Audi, Robert (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd Edition), 
Cambridge; New York; Oakleigh, Australia; Cape Town, South Africa: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999 
Barnes, Trevor J. and James Duncan (eds), Writing Worlds: Discourse, text and 
metaphor in the representation of landscape, New York; London: Routledge, 1992 
Barthes, Roland, The Pleasure of the Text, Richard Miller (trans), Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990 
Barthes, Roland, S/Z, Richard Miller (trans), preface Richard Howard, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990 
Barthes, Roland, Elements of Semiology, Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (trans), 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1968 
Barthes, Roland, Writing Degree Zero, Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (trans) 
London: Cape, 1967 
Barthes, Roland, Image, Music, Text, Stephen Heath (trans and selected) London: 
Fontana Press, 1977 
Barthes, Roland, Camera Lucida, Richard Howard (trans), London: Vintage, 2000 
Barthes, Roland, The Semiotic Challenge, Richard Howard (trans) Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988  
Barthes, Roland, Mythologies, Annette Lavers (trans and selected) London: 
Vintage, 2000 
Barthes, Roland, ‘From Work to Text’ Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas, Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998 
Barthes, Roland, ‘Theory of the Text’ Untying the text: a post-structuralist reader, 
Robert Young (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 
Barthes, Roland, Incidents, Richard Howard (trans) Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
Calif.; Oxford: University of California Press, 1992 
Bazin, André What is Cinema? Volume 1, Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.; 
London: University of California Press, 2005 
Belsey, Catherine, Poststructuralism: a very short introduction, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002 
Benjamin, Walter, Reflections: essays, aphorisms, autobiographical writing, 
Edmund Jephcott (trans) New York: Schocken Books, 1986 
 315 
Benjamin, Walter, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ Art in 
Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Charles Harrison and Paul 
Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998 
Benjamin, Walter, ‘The Author as Producer’ Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology 
of Changing Ideas, Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998 
Bennington, Geoffrey, Interrupting Derrida, London: Routledge, 2000 
Berger, John X., Olivier Richon, Other Than Itself: Writing Photography, 
Manchester: Cornerhouse Publications, 1989 
Bishop, Claire, ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’ October Fall 2004 pp.51-79 
Bourriaud, Nicolas, Relational Aesthetics, Simon Pleazance and Fronza Woods 
(trans), Dijon: les presses du réel, 2002  
Brittain, David, New Scottish Photography: a critical review of the work of 
seventeen photographers, Edinburgh: Scottish National Portrait Gallery, 1990 
Bringhurst, Robert, ‘Elements of Topographic Style’ Online Etymology Dictionary, 
http://www.etymonline/index.php?search=text&searchmode=none accessed 25.02.2008 
Büchler, Pavel, Ghost Stories: stray thoughts on photography and film, London: 
Proboscis, 1990 
Burke, Seán, The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in 
Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999 
Butler, Christopher, Postmodernism: a very short introduction, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002   
Calvet, Louis-Jean, Roland Barthes: a biography, Sarah Wykes (trans) Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1994 
Cazeux, Clive (ed), The Continental Aesthetics Reader, New York; Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2005 
Chandler, Daniel, Semiotics: the basics (2nd edition), New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2007 
Collingwood, R.G., The Idea of Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945 
Cosgrove, Denis E. and Stephen Daniels, The Iconography of Landscape: Essays 
on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 
Cosgrove, Denis E., ‘The Art Seminar’ Landscape Theory, James Elkins and Rachel 
Ziady DeLue (eds,) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 
Crang, Mike, Cultural Geography, London: Routledge, 1998 
Crang, Mike, ‘Picturing Practices: research through the touristic gaze’ Progress in 
Human Geography 21, 3 (1997) pp. 359-373 
Crary, Jonathan, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 
Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992 
Cresswell, Tim, In place/out of place: geography, ideology and transgression, 
Minneapolis, M.N.; University of Minnesota Press, 1996 
Crowther, Paul, Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993 
Culler, Jonathan D., On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism, 
 316 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, c1983  
Culler, Jonathan D., Saussure, Revised Edition London: Fontana Press, 1986 
Culler, Jonathan D., The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction, 
London: Routedge, c2001  
Culler, Jonathan D., Framing the sign: criticism and its institutions, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1988 
Davey, J.R. Nicholas, ‘Writing and the in-between’ Word & Image, Vol. 16. No.4, 
October-December 2000 pp.378-386 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton (trans) 
London: Continuum, 2004 
Deleuze, Gilles, Foucault, Sean Hand (ed and trans) London: The Athlone Press 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchill (trans) New York; London: Verso, 1994 
Demos, T.J. (ed), Vitamin Ph: New Perspectives on Photography, London: 
Phaidon, 2006 
Derrida, Jacques, Rights of Inspection, New York: Monacelli Press, 1998 
Derrida, Jacques, The Truth in Painting, Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod 
(trans) Chicago Ill.; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987 
Derrida, Jacques, Dissemination, Barbara Johnson (trans) New York; London: 
Continuum, 2004 
Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory 
of Signs, David B. Allison (trans), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 
Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008 
Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology, Corrected Edition Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (trans), Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 
Derrida, Jacques, Positions, Alan Bass (trans), New York; London: Continuum, 2004 
Derrida, Jacques, Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass (trans), New York; London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982 
Derrida, Jacques, Limited Inc., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988  
Diprose, Rosalyn and Robyn Ferrell (eds), Cartographies: Poststructuralism and the 
Mapping of Bodies and Spaces, St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1991 
Duncan, James and Nancy Duncan, ‘Ideology and Bliss: the Secret Landscape of 
Roland Barthes’ Writing Worlds: Discourse, text and metaphor in the 
representation of landscape, Barnes, Trevor J. and James Duncan (eds), New 
York; London: Routledge, 1992 
Duncan, Nancy (ed), Body Space: destabilizing geographies of gender and 
sexuality, New York; London: Routledge, 1996  
Eco, Umberto, The Open Work, Anna Cancogni (trans), Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1989 
Elkins, James ‘Writing Moods’ Landscape Theory, James Elkins and Rachel Ziady 
DeLue (eds) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 
Elkins, James and Rachel Ziady DeLue (eds), Landscape Theory, New York; 
Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 
 317 
Elkins, James (ed), Photography Theory, New York; London: Routledge, 2007 
Elkins, James (ed), The New PhD in Studio Art Dublin: Sculptors' Society of Ireland, 
Issue 4 of the journal Printed Project catalogued individually as a book 
Ellis, Brian, The Philosophy of Nature: a guide to the new essentialism, Chesham: 
Acumen, 2002 
Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Dordecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1997 
Flusser, Vilèm, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, Anthony Mathews (trans) 
London: Reaktion Books, 2006 
Fonds Regional d'Art Contemporain, Steven Pippin, Limoges: F.R.A.C. Limousin, 
1995 
Foster, Hal (ed), DIA Art Foundation discussions in contemporary culture; Number 
1 Seattle, Wash.: Bay Press, 1987 
Foster, Hal (ed), DIA Art Foundation discussions in contemporary culture: vision 
and visuality; Number 2 Seattle, Wash.: Bay Press, 1988 
Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish, Alan Sheridan (trans) Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1991 
Foucault, Michel, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, 
Alan Sheridan (trans), London: Routledge, 1989 
Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008 
Foucault, Michel, Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, James Faubion (ed), 
Robert Hurley (trans), London: Penguin, 2000 
Foucault, Michel, Archaeology of Knowledge, A.M. Sheridan Smith (trans), 
Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 2009 
Fowles, John and Ian Jeffrey, Fay Godwin: Land, London: Heinemann, 1985 
Frayling, Christopher, Research in Art and Design, London: Royal College of Art, 
1993 
Fried, Michael, Art and Objecthood: essays and reviews, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998 
Fruitmarket Gallery, Liquid crystal futures : contemporary Japanese photography, 
Edinburgh: Fruitmarket Gallery, 1994 
Glotfelty, Cheryll, The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology, Athans 
Ga.; London: University of Georgia Press, c1996 
Goodwin, James, Akira Kurosawa and Intertextual Cinema, Baltimore, Md.; 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994 
Gray, Carole and Julian Malins, Visualizing Research: A Guide to the Research 
Process in Art and Design, Burlington VT; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004 
Green, David (ed), Where is the Photograph? Manchester: Surrey Institute; Kent 
Institute of Art and Design; University of Brighton, 2003 
Green, Nicholas, The Spectacle of Nature: Landscape and Bourgeois Culture in 
Nineteenth-Century France, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990 
Grenier, Katherine Haldane, Creating Caledonia: Tourism and Identity in 
 318 
Scotland, 1770-1914 Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005 
Griffin, Jeanine (ed), Frame, Sheffield: Site Gallery, 2000 
Groth, Paul Erling, ‘Frameworks for Cultural Landscape Study’ Understanding 
Ordinary Landscapes, Paul Groth and Todd W. Bressi (eds) New Haven Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, c1997 
Gunn, Neil M., Landscape to Light, Dunbeath: Whittles Publishing, 2009 
Harrison, Charles and Paul Wood (eds), Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas, Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998 
Harvey, Irene E., ‘The Différance Between Derrida and de Man’ The Textual 
Sublime: Deconstruction and its Differences, Hugh J. Silverman and Gary E. 
Aylesworth (eds) Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 1990 
Hay, David ‘The Art Seminar’ Landscape Theory, James Elkins and Rachel Ziady 
DeLue (eds,) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 
Heidegger, Martin, The Question Concerning Technology, New York: Harper Row, 
1977 
Heidegger, Martin, The Question of Being, William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde 
(trans), London: Vision Press, c1958 
Heywood, Ian and Barry Sandywell (eds), Interpreting visual culture: explorations 
in the hermeneutics of the visual, London: Routledge, 1999 
Holloway, Richard, ‘The Now of Then’ Will MacLean: Different Meridians, London: 
Art First, 2008 
Hugonnier, Marine, Marine Hugonnier, Film and Video Umbrella/Dundee 
Contemporary Arts, 2004 
Iannone, A. Pablo (ed), Dictionary of World Philosophy, London; New York: 
Routledge, 2001 
Innis, Robert E., Semiotics: an introductory reader, London: Hutchison & Co., 1986 
Jackson, John Brinkerhoff, Discovering the Vernacular Landscape, New Haven, 
Conn.; London: Yale University Press, c1984 
Jackson, John Brinkerhoff, A Sense of Place, a Sense of Time, New Haven, Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, c1994 
Jacobs, Steven and Frank Maes (eds), Beyond the Picturesque Gent, Belgium: 
S.M.A.K., 2009 
Jaeger, Anne-Celine, Image Makers, Image Taker: The Essential Guide to 
Photography by Those in the Know, London: Thames Hudson, 2007 
James, Sarah, ‘The Truth About Photography’ Art Monthly Dec 05 – Jan 06 pp.7-10 
Jay, Martin, Downcast eyes: the denigration of vision in twentieth century French 
thought Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, c1993 
Johnson, Barbara, ‘Structuralism’s Wake’ Untying the text: a post-structuralist 
reader, Robert Young (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 
Johnson, Galen A. (ed), The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and 
Painting, Michael Smith (trans) Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993 
Kearney, Richard and David Rasmussen (eds), Continental Aesthetics: 
Romanticism to Postmodernism: An Anthology, Malden, M.A.; Oxford; Carlton, 
Victoria: Blackwell, 2001 
 319 
Kemp, Martin, Susan Derges liquid form, 1985-99 London: Michael Hue-Williams 
Fine Art, 1999 
Kögler, Hans Herbert, The Power of Dialogue: critical hermeneutics after 
Gadamer and Foucault, Paul Hendrickson (trans), Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT 
Press, 1996 
Krauss, Rosalind E., Bachelors, Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1999 
Krauss, Rosalind E., The Originality of the Avant-garde and Other Modernist Myths, 
Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1986 
Krauss, Rosalind E., ‘X Marks the Spot’ Rachel Whiteread: shedding life, Fiona 
Bradley (ed), London, England : Tate Gallery Publishing, 1996 
Kristeva, Julia, Desire in Language: a semiotic approach to literature and art, 
Leon S. Roudiez (ed), Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (trans), 
Oxford: Blackwell, c1980 
Kristeva, Julia, Revolution in Poetic Language, Margaret Waller (trans), New York: 
Guildford Columbia University Press, c1984 
Kristeva, Julia, Crisis of the European Subject, trans Susan Fairfield New York: Other 
Press, c2000 
Kristeva, Julia, The Kristeva Reader, Toril Moi (ed), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986 
Lacan, Jacques, Ecrits: a selection, Alan Sheridan (trans), London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1977 
Lacan, Jacques, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, Jacques-
Allain Miller (ed), Alan Sheridan (trans), London: Karnac Books, 2004 
Lacan, Jacques, ‘The Mirror Phase as Formative of the function of the I’ Art in 
Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Charles Harrison and Paul 
Wood (eds), Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998 
Lange, Suzanne (ed), Festschrift: Erasmuspreis 2002/ Bernd und Hilla Becher, 
Munich: Schimmer Mosel, 2002 
Latour, Bruno, We Have Never Been Modern, Catherine Porter (trans), Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993 
Latour, Bruno, Politics of Nature: how to bring the sciences into democracy, 
Catherine Porter (trans), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004 
Latour, Bruno, third lecture in the Nature Space Society series, Tate Modern 2004 
webcast: 
www.tatemodern.org.uk/onlineevents/webcasts/nature_space_society/bruno_latour/default.jsp 
accessed 19.04.2005 
LeDoeuff, Michele, The Philosophical Imaginary, Colin Gordon (trans), London: 
The Athlone Press, 1989 
Lee, Pamela M., Uta Barth, London: Phaidon, 2003 
Lefebvre, Henri, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith (trans), Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991 
Levin, David Michael (ed), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, Berkley, Calif.; 
London: University of California Press, c 1993 
Levin, David Michael (ed), Sites of Vision: the discursive construction of sight in the 
history of philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1999 
 320 
Lippard, Lucy R., The Lure of the Local: Senses of Place, in a Multi-centred Society 
New York: New Press, 1997 
Lippard, Lucy R., Overlay: Contemporary Art and the Art of Prehistory, New York: 
New Press, 1983  
Lloyd, Genevieve, The Man of Reason: ‘male’ and ‘female’ in Western philosophy 
2nd edition, London: Routledge, 1993 
Lord, Beth, ‘Foucault’s Museum: difference, representation, and genealogy’ 
Museum and Society, March 2006 4 (1) pp.11-14 
Lucy, Niall, A Derrida Dictionary Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi (trans), Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, c1984 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois, Peregrinations law, form, event, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988 
MacCabe, Colin, ‘Barthes and Bazin: The Ontology of the Image’ in Writing the 
Image After Roland Barthes, Jean-Michel Rabaté (ed) Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1997 
MacCannell, Dean, The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 1999 
MacLeod, Katy and Lin Holdridge (eds), Thinking Through Art: Reflections on Art as 
Research, Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 2006 
Mansfield, Nick, Subjectivity: Theories of Self from Freud to Haraway, New York, 
New York University Press, 2000 
Mautner, Thomas (ed), The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, London: Penguin 
2000 
McDonald, Sarah, ‘The Great American West’ Black and White Photography, 
Number 41, December 2004 
Meinig, Donald W. (ed), The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical 
Essays, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979 
Mirzoeff, Nicholas (ed), The Visual Culture Reader 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 
2002 
Mitchell, W.J.T., ‘Imperial Landscape’ Landscape and Power Chicago, Ill.; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2002 
Mulvey, Laura, Visual and Other Pleasures, New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1989 
Nietzsche, Freidrich, ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ Philosophy and Truth, 
D. Breagle (trans and ed.) New Jersey: Humanities Press; Sussex: New Horeter, 
1979 
Norris, Christopher, Derrida, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987 
Norris, Christopher and Andrew Benjamin, What is Deconstruction? New York: St. 
Martin’s Press; London: Academy Editions, 1988 
Olwig, Kenneth R., ‘The “Actual Landscape,” or Actual Landscapes?’ Landscape 
Theory, James Elkins and Rachel Ziady DeLue (eds,) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 
2008 
Onions, Charles Talbut (ed), Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, Oxford: 
 321 
Clarendon Press, 1978 
Pakman, Marcelo, ‘Thematic Foreword: Reflective Practices: The Legacy of 
Donald Schön’ Cybernetics and Human Knowing, Vol. 7 number 2-3, 2000 pp.5-8 
The Photography Book, London: Phaidon, 1997 
Plato, Phaedrus; and, The seventh and eighth letters, Walter Hamilton (trans) 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973 
Powell, James, Derrida for Beginners, New York: Writers and Readers, c1997 
Protevi, John (ed), The Edinburgh Dictionary of Continental Philosophy, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, c2005 
Rabaté, Jean-Michel (ed), Writing the Image After Roland Barthes, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press 1997 
Ricœur, Paul, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, Kathleen Blamey and 
John B. Thompson (trans), London: Athlone Press, 1991 
Ristelheuber, Sophie, Operations, London: Thames and Hudson, 2009 
Robertson, Iain and Richardson, Penny (eds) Studying Cultural Landscapes, 
London: Arnold, 2003 
Rogoff, Irit, Terra Infirma: geography’s visual culture, New York; London: 
Routledge, 2000 
Rose, Gillian, Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Selected Writings, London: Collector’s Library of 
Essential Thinkers, 2005 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and nothingness: an essay on phenomenal ontology, 
Mary Warnock (trans), London: Routledge, 2003  
Saussure, Ferdinand de, Course in General Linguistics, Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye (eds), Roy Harris (trans), Peru, Ill.: Open Court Classics, 2008 
Schama, Simon, Landscape and Memory, London: Harper Collins; Fontana, 1995 
Scharf, Aaron, Art and Photography, London: Penguin, 1986 
Scott, Clive, The Spoken Image, London: Reaktion, 1999 
Shibata, Toshio, Landscape, Berlin: Nazareli Press, 2000 
Silverman, Hugh J., ‘Introduction’ The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and its 
Differences, Hugh J. Silverman and Gary E. Aylesworth (eds) Albany, N.Y.: State 
University of New York, 1990 
Silverman, Hugh J. and Gary E. Aylesworth (eds), The Textual Sublime: 
Deconstruction and its Differences, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 
1990 
Shore, Stephen, Stephen Shore, New York; London: Phaidon, 2007 
Sloterdijk, Peter, Critique of cynical reason, Minneapolis, M.N.: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005 
Smith, Paul and Wilde, Carolyn (eds), A Companion to Art Theory, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002 
Sontag, Susan, On Photography, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002 
Sullivan, Graeme, Art Practice as Research: Inquiry in the Visual Arts, Thousand 
Oaks, Calif.; London; New Delhi: Sage, 2005 
 322 
Szarkowski, John, John Szarkowski: Photographs, New York: Bullfinch Press, 2005 
Taylor, Victor E. and Charles E. Winquist, Encyclopedia of Postmodernism, New 
York; London: Routledge, 2001 
Thompson, Della (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Ninth 
Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 
Vasseleu, Cathryn, Textures of Light: Vision and touch in Irigaray, Levinas and 
Merleau-Ponty, Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 2005 
Weissberg, Liliane, ‘The Photographic Exchange’ in Writing the Image After 
Roland Barthes, Jean-Michel Rabaté (ed) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press 1997 
Whiston Spirn, Anne, ‘The Art Seminar’ Landscape Theory, James Elkins and 
Rachel Ziady DeLue (eds,) New York; Abingdon, Oxon: 2008 
Williams, Raymond, The Country and the City, London: Chatto & Windus, 1973 
Wylie, John, Landscape, New York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007 
Young, Robert (ed), Untying the text: a post-structuralist reader, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 
 
Filmography 
 
Derrida, Dir. Kirby Dick, Amy Ziering Kofman, Drakes Avenue Pictures, 2006 
 
 323 
 324 
List of Illustrations 
Two Ordinary Landscapes Gina Wall 
We Won’t Play Nature to Your Culture, 1983 Barbara Kruger 
Woman at a Window, 1882 Caspar David Friedrich 
Merced River, Yosemite National Park, 
California, August 13, 1979 
Stephen Shore 
Clearing Winter Storm, Yosemite National Park, 
1944 
Ansel Adams 
Jackson, Wyoming, September 2, 1979 Stephen Shore 
The Continued Saga of an Amateur 
Photographer 
Stephen Pippin 
Uig from the Hebrides (Starboard) Gina Wall 
Picture from the roadside, Glen Shiel Gina Wall 
Untitled, 1990 (hole from Berlin wall; swarm of 
flies) 
Paul Graham 
Blackhills, Moray Gina Wall 
Landscape(s) of difference: 1 Gina Wall 
Tosg/tusk (work in progress) detail Gina Wall 
Tosg/tusk (work in progress) Gina Wall 
Fairway, St. Andrews Gina Wall 
Landscape(s) of difference: 2 Gina Wall 
Chapter 6: Towards Landscapes of Difference 
 
This section remains deliberately unmediated 
by written text. 
Gina Wall 
 
